the openssl speed command could not benchmark FFDH speed, but it could
benchmark ECDH, making comparisons between the two hard
this commit adds this feature
fixes#9475
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hubert@kario.pl>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10887)
There is a problem casting ULONG_MAX to double which clang-10 is warning about.
ULONG_MAX typically cannot be exactly represented as a double. ULONG_MAX + 1
can be and this fix uses the latter, however since ULONG_MAX cannot be
represented exactly as a double number we subtract 65535 from this number,
and the result has at most 48 leading one bits, and can therefore be
represented as a double integer without rounding error. By adding
65536.0 to this number we achive the correct result, which should avoid the
warning.
The addresses a symptom of the underlying problem: we print doubles via an
unsigned long integer. Doubles have a far greater range and should be printed
better.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11955)
A CAVEATS section is present in this manual. That section name is
borrowed from OpenBSD, where mdoc(7) explains it like this:
CAVEATS
Common misuses and misunderstandings should be explained in this
section.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11963)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11976)
As of the previous commit, when a zero-length (string) parameter
is present in the parameters passed to a provider for a given operation,
we will produce an object corresponding to that zero-length parameter,
indicating to the underlying cryptographic operation that the parameter
was passed. However, rsa_cms_decrypt() was relying on the previous
behavior, and unconditionally tried to call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label() even when the implicit default label
was used (and thus the relevant local variable was still NULL).
In the new setup that distinguishes present-but-empty and absent
more clearly, it is an error to attempt to set a NULL parameter,
even if it is zero-length.
Exercise more caution when setting parameters, and do not call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label() when there is not actually a
label provided.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
Prior to this commit, if a string (or octet string) parameter
was present but indicated it was zero-length, we would return success
but with a NULL output value. This can be problematic in cases where
there is a protocol-level distinction between parameter-absent and
parameter-present-but-zero-length, which is uncommon but can happen.
Since OPENSSL_malloc() returns NULL for zero-length allocation requests,
make a dummy allocation for this case, to give a signal that the string
parameter does exist but has zero length.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
Add an extra EVP test that provides empty input key material. It
currently fails, since we lose the information about "key present but
zero length" as we deserialize parameters in the provider.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
Following on from the previous commit, add a test to check that we fail
to create an EVP_PKEY_CTX if an algorithm is not available in any provider,
*unless* it is an algorithm that has no provider support.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11826)
If we failed to fetch an EVP_KEYMGMT then we were falling back to legacy.
This is because some algorithms (such as MACs and KDFs used via an old
style EVP_PKEY) have not been transferred to providers.
Unfortunately this means that you cannot stop some algorithms from being
used by not loading the provider.
For example if you wanted to prevent RSA from being used, you might expect
to just not load any providers that make it available. Unfortunately that
doesn't work because we simply fall back to legacy if we fail to fetch
the EVP_KEYMGMT.
Instead we should fail *unless* the key type is one of those legacy key
types that we have not transferred.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11826)
Some older compilers use "unknown function" if they dont support __func, so the
test using ERR_PUT_error needed to compensate for this when comparing against the
expected value.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11967)
for signing certificate V2 and signing certificate extensions.
CAdES: lowercase name for now internal methods.
crypto/cms: generated file changes.
Add some CHANGES entries.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8098)
Mostly "No items in =over/=back list"
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11902)
Renamed some values in core_names i.e Some DH specific names were changed to use DH instead of FFC.
Added some strings values related to RSA keys.
Moved set_params related docs out of EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod into its own file.
Updated Keyexchange and signature code and docs.
Moved some common DSA/DH docs into a shared EVP_PKEY-FFC.pod.
Moved Ed25519.pod into EVP_SIGNATURE-ED25519.pod and reworked it.
Added some usage examples. As a result of the usage examples the following change was also made:
ec allows OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH as a settable gen parameter.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11610)
Fixes#11743
The ouput format had 2 issues that caused it not to match the expected documented format:
(1) At some point the thread id printing was changed to use the OPENSSL_hex2str method which puts ':' between hex bytes.
An internal function that skips the seperator has been added.
(2) The error code no longer exists. So this was completely removed from the string. It is now replaced by ::
As an example:
00:77:6E:52:14:7F:00:00:error:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_check_tlen:wrong tag:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:1135:
Is now:
00776E52147F0000:error::asn1 encoding routines:asn1_check_tlen:wrong tag:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:1135:
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11789)
The ticket callback is deprecated in 3.0 and can't be used in a no-deprecated
build.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11944)
Dependencies on generated files must be declared explicitly. When
refactoring the DER code in providers/common/der, a few of those
dependency declaration were omitted, which may lead to build errors in
a parallel build.
Some cleanup and extensive used of build.info variables is done while
at it, to avoid unnecessary repetition.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11906)
The existing special case code is broken and it is not needed
anymore as times() and _SC_CLK_TCK should be supported
on the supported VMS versions.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11905)
The __TMS might be necessary on VMS however there is no such
define on glibc even though the times() function is fully
supported.
Fixes#11903
This reverts commit db71d31547.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11905)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11916)
s_client: connection via an HTTP proxy broke somewhere prior to openssl-3.0.0-alpha2.
openssl s_client -connect <target> -proxy <proxy_host:proxy_port>
Results in s_client making a TCP connection to proxy_host:proxy_port and then issuing an HTTP CONNECT to the proxy, instead of the target.
Fixes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/11879
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11880)
This should fix 2 issues detected by Coverity and introduced with
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11807
- CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
- CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
In practice the tests seem to show that they both aren't real issues,
yet I believe this small change should appease the scanner and at the
same time improve clarity for the reader.
Here is the original report:
```
** CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118 if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119 ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121 else
1122 /* use default */
CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
Passing "&point" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123 ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127 BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128 #endif
** CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118 if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119 ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121 else
1122 /* use default */
CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
Passing "&p_scalar" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123 ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127 BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128 #endif
```
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11919)
EVP_PKEYs with provider side internal keys got the key type
EVP_PKEY_NONE. This turned out to be too disruptive, so we try
instead to find a matching EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and use whatever
EVP_PKEY type it uses.
To make internal coding easier, we introduce a few internal macros to
distinguish what can be expected from a EVP_PKEY:
- evp_pkey_is_blank(), to detect an unassigned EVP_PKEY.
- evp_pkey_is_typed(), to detect that an EVP_PKEY has been assigned a
type, which may be an old style type number or a EVP_KEYMGMT method.
- evp_pkey_is_assigned(), to detect that an EVP_PKEY has been assigned
an key value.
- evp_pkey_is_legacy(), to detect that the internal EVP_PKEY key is a
legacy one, i.e. will be handled via an EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and an
EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
- evp_pkey_is_provided(), to detect that the internal EVP_PKEY key is
a provider side one, i.e. will be handdled via an EVP_KEYMGMT and
other provider methods.
This also introduces EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT, to indicate that this EVP_PKEY
contains a provider side key for which there are no known
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs or EVP_PKEY_METHODs, i.e. these can only be
handled via EVP_KEYMGMT and other provider methods.
Fixes#11823
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11913)
This fixes a strict aliasing issue in ui_dup_method_data.
The parameter type of CRYPTO_EX_dup's from_d parameter
is in fact void **, since it points to a pointer.
This function is rarely used, therefore fix the param type
although that may be considered an API breaking change.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2986)
This function only considered the built-in and application
EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs, and is now amended with a loop that goes
through all loaded engines, using whatever table of methods they each
have.
Fixes#11861
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11872)
In the FIPS module, the code as written generate an unconditional
error.
Fixes#11865
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11869)
This splits up all the providers/common/der/*.c.in so the generated
portion is on its own and all related DER writing routines are in
their own files. This also ensures that the DIGEST consstants aren't
reproduced in several files (resulting in symbol clashes).
Finally, the production of OID macros is moved to the generated header
files, allowing other similar macros, or DER constant arrays, to be
built on top of them.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11868)
