partially revamped from #16712
- fall thru -> fall through
- time stamp -> timestamp
- file name -> filename
- host name -> hostname
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.
There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.
Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16918)
Partial fix for #12964
This adds ossl_ names for the following symbols:
ec_*, ecx_*, ecdh_*, ecdsa_*, sm2_*
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14231)
This includes error reporting for libcrypto sub-libraries in surprising
places.
This was done using util/err-to-raise
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13318)
- Convert to affine coords on ladder entry. This lets us use more efficient
ladder step formulae.
- Convert to affine coords on ladder exit. This prevents the current code
awkwardness where conversion happens twice during serialization: first to
fetch the buffer size, then again to fetch the coords.
- Instead of projectively blinding the input point, blind both accumulators
independently.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11435)
Use of the low level ECDSA and EC_KEY_METHOD functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10960)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
which are already enabled for ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular
field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the
implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures.
The new pointer is defined as:
`int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)`
and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field,
storing the result in `r`.
Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA
countermeasures:
- `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through
blinding.
- `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's
Little Theorem (FLT) inversion.
- `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which
already features SCA hardening through blinding.
From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage
previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates.
This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e.,
`EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three
implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but
through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack
states.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8254)
The EFD database does not state that the "ladd-2002-it-3" algorithm
assumes X1 != 0.
Consequently the current implementation, based on it, fails to compute
correctly if the affine x coordinate of the scalar multiplication input
point is 0.
We replace this implementation using the alternative algorithm based on
Eq. (9) and (10) from the same paper, which being derived from the
additive relation of (6) does not incur in this problem, but costs one
extra field multiplication.
The EFD entry for this algorithm is at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4
and the code to implement it was generated with tooling.
Regression tests add one positive test for each named curve that has
such a point. The `SharedSecret` was generated independently from the
OpenSSL codebase with sage.
This bug was originally reported by Dmitry Belyavsky on the
openssl-users maling list:
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008540.html
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7000)
This commit leverages the Montgomery ladder scaffold introduced in #6690
(alongside a specialized Lopez-Dahab ladder for binary curves) to
provide a specialized differential addition-and-double implementation to
speedup prime curves, while keeping all the features of
`ec_scalar_mul_ladder` against SCA attacks.
The arithmetic in ladder_pre, ladder_step and ladder_post is auto
generated with tooling, from the following formulae:
- `ladder_pre`: Formula 3 for doubling from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel
elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks",
as described at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2
- `ladder_step`: differential addition-and-doubling Eq. (8) and (10)
from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication
resistant against side channel attacks", as described at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3
- `ladder_post`: y-coordinate recovery using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye
"Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to
work in projective coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6772)
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations
PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for
prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation
with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret
scalar is feed to the point multiplication).
The newly introduced default implementation directly used
EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop.
The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a
specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking
advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling
and different coordinate systems.
- `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by
default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R.
Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition
to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling;
- `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it
computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could,
e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential
addition-and-doubling;
- `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default
it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this
hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing
the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of
the result point.
This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`,
as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be
truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this
function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily
constant-time themselves.
What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of
operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given
EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar.
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.
For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.
For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
We check that the curve name associated with the point is the same as that
for the curve.
Fixes#6302
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6323)
To make it consistent in the code base
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3749)
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This gets BN_.*free:
BN_BLINDING_free BN_CTX_free BN_FLG_FREE BN_GENCB_free
BN_MONT_CTX_free BN_RECP_CTX_free BN_clear_free BN_free BUF_MEM_free
Also fix a call to DSA_SIG_free to ccgost engine and remove some #ifdef'd
dead code in engines/e_ubsec.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
It should have freed them when != NULL, not when == NULL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
Move compression, point2oct and oct2point functions into separate files.
Add a flags field to EC_METHOD.
Add a flag EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT to use the default compession and oct
functions (all existing methods do this). This removes dependencies from
EC_METHOD while keeping original functionality.
seed to: this doesn't introduce any binary compatibility issues as the
function is only used internally.
The seed output is needed for FIPS 140-2 algorithm testing: the functionality
used to be in DSA_generate_parameters_ex() but was removed in OpenSSL 1.0.0
