Fixes#5778, #5840
The various IS_*() macros did not work correctly for 8-bit ASCII
characters with the high bit set, because the CVT(a) preprocessor
macro and'ed the given ASCII value with 0x7F, effectively folding
the high value range 128-255 over the low value range 0-127.
As a consequence, some of the IS_*() erroneously returned TRUE.
This commit fixes the issue by adding range checks instead of
cutting off high order bits using a mask. In order avoid multiple
evaluation of macro arguments, most of the implementation was moved
from macros into a static function is_keytype().
Thanks to Румен Петров for reporting and analyzing the UTF-8 parsing
issue #5840.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5903)
Original logic was "if no records found *or* last one is truncated, then
leave complete records in queue." Trouble is that if we don't pass on
complete records and get complete packet in opposite direction, then
queued records will go back to sender. In other words complete records
should always be passed on. [Possible alternative would be to match
direction in reconstruct_record.]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5887)
Even though removed calls were oiriginally added on Windows, problem
they tried to mitigate is not Windows-specific.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5887)
Without TCP_NODELAY alerts risk to be dropped between shutdown and close.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5887)
HP-UX provides sockets symbols with incompatible prototypes under same
name. This caused problems in 64-bit builds. Additional macros force
unambiguous symbols with unambiguous prototypes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5742)
hpux64-parisc2-gcc is chosen based on gcc's bitness, and it was overriden
unconditionally.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5742)
HP-UX gmtime fails with ERANGE past 19011213204552Z, so skip some tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5742)
add_attribute_object and add_DN_object have similar code, so move
it into a common function build_data.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4566)
Adding support for these operations for the EdDSA implementations
makes pkeyutl usable for signing/verifying for these algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5880)
The wrong "set" field was incremented in the wrong place and would
create a new RDN, not a multi-valued RDN.
RDN inserts would happen after not before.
Prepending an entry to an RDN incorrectly created a new RDN
Anything which built up an X509_NAME could get a messed-up structure,
which would then be "wrong" for anyone using that name.
Thanks to Ingo Schwarze for extensive debugging and the initial
fix (documented in GitHub issue #5870).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5882)
There are two undocumented DSA parameter generation options available in
the genpkey command line app:
dsa_paramgen_md and dsa_paramgen_q_bits.
These can also be accessed via the EVP API but only by using
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() or EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() directly. There are no
helper macros for these options.
dsa_paramgen_q_bits sets the length of q in bits (default 160 bits).
dsa_paramgen_md sets the digest that is used during the parameter
generation (default SHA1). In particular the output length of the digest
used must be equal to or greater than the number of bits in q because of
this code:
if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
md[i] ^= buf2[i];
/* step 3 */
md[0] |= 0x80;
md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
goto err;
qsize here is the number of bits in q and evpmd is the digest set via
dsa_paramgen_md. md and buf2 are buffers of length SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH.
buf2 has been filled with qsize bits of random seed data, and md is
uninitialised.
If the output size of evpmd is less than qsize then the line "md[i] ^=
buf2[i]" will be xoring an uninitialised value and the random seed data
together to form the least significant bits of q (and not using the
output of the digest at all for those bits) - which is probably not what
was intended. The same seed is then used as an input to generating p. If
the uninitialised data is actually all zeros (as seems quite likely)
then the least significant bits of q will exactly match the least
significant bits of the seed.
This problem only occurs if you use these undocumented and difficult to
find options and you set the size of q to be greater than the message
digest output size. This is for parameter generation only not key
generation. This scenario is considered highly unlikely and
therefore the security risk of this is considered negligible.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5800)
The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.
Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.
This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.
Fixes#5809
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)
By asking for port 0, you get a free port dynamically assigned by OS.
TLSProxy::Proxy now asks for 0 and asks s_server to do the same. The
s_server's port is reported in "ACCEPT" line, which TLSProxy::Proxy
parses and uses.
Because the server port is now a random affair in TLSProxy::Proxy,
it's no longer possible to change it with the method 'server_port',
and it has become an accessor only. For the sake of orthogonality, so
has the method 'server_addr'.
Remove all fork calls on Windows, as fork is not to be trusted there.
This naturally minimized amount of fork calls on POSIX systems, to 1.
Sink s_server's output to 'perl -ne print' which ensures that output
is written strictly in lines. This keeps TAP parser happy.
Improve synchronization in -naccept +n cases by establishing next
connection to s_server *after* s_client finishes instead of before it
starts.
Improve error handling and clean up some methods.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5843)
The line saying ACCEPT is extended with a space followed by the the
address and port combination on which s_server accepts connections.
The address is written in such a way that s_client should be able to
accepts as argument for the '-connect' option.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5843)
When these two functions returned zero, it could mean:
1. that an error occured. In their case, the error is an overflow of
the pool, i.e. the correct response from the caller would be to
stop trying to fill the pool.
2. that there isn't enought entropy acquired yet, i.e. the correct
response from the caller would be to try and add more entropy to
the pool.
Because of this ambiguity, the returned zero turns out to be useless.
This change makes the returned value more consistent. 1 means the
addition of new entropy was successful, 0 means it wasn't. To know if
the pool has been filled enough, the caller will have to call some
other function, such as rand_pool_entropy_available().
Fixes#5846
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5876)
We started using $(CPP) instead of $(CC) -E, with the assumption that
CPP would be predefined. This is, however, not always true, and
rather depends on the 'make' implementation. Furthermore, on
platforms where CPP=cpp or something else other than '$(CC) -E',
there's a risk that it won't understand machine specific flags that we
pass to it. So it turns out that trying to use $(CPP) was a mistake,
and we therefore revert that use back to using $(CC) -E directly.
Fixes#5867
Note: this affects config targets that use Alpha, ARM, IA64, MIPS,
s390x or SPARC assembler modules.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5872)
felem_neg does not produce an output within the tight bounds suitable
for felem_contract. This affects build configurations which set
enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128.
point_double and point_add, in the non-z*_is_zero cases, tolerate and
fix up the wider bounds, so this only affects point_add calls where the
other point is infinity. Thus it only affects the final addition in
arbitrary-point multiplication, giving the wrong y-coordinate. This is a
no-op for ECDH and ECDSA, which only use the x-coordinate of
arbitrary-point operations.
Note: ecp_nistp521.c has the same issue in that the documented
preconditions are violated by the test case. I have not addressed this
in this PR. ecp_nistp521.c does not immediately produce the wrong
answer; felem_contract there appears to be a bit more tolerant than its
documented preconditions. However, I haven't checked the point_add
property above holds. ecp_nistp521.c should either get this same fix, to
be conservative, or have the bounds analysis and comments reworked for
the wider bounds.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5779)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5625)
Fail harshly (in debug builds) when rand_pool_acquire_entropy isn't
delivering the required amount of entropy. In release builds, this
produces an error with details.
We also take the opportunity to modernise the types used.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5857)
Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5790)
Thanks to Sem Voigtländer for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5826)
