CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21636)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21579)
per request.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21595)
CLA: trivial
Code that includes applink.c can now define APPLINK_NO_INCLUDES to suppress the include preprocessor lines in that file. This might be needed if, for example, applink.c is being included into a source file that will be compiled to reference a C library built using different calling conventions. (Example: Open Watcom.)
This pull request is intended to replace an identical pull request that I screwed up.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21595)
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21608)
We add an additional loop around test_quic_write_read() to repeat the
test but using a session obtained from the initial iteration to confirm
that we can successfully resume the session.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21591)
If we shutdown the QUIC connection then we should mark the underlying
TLS SSL object as shutdown as well. Otherwise any sessions are considered
unusable for resumption.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21591)
There may be post-handshake messages to process so make sure we keep
ticking things even if the handshake has finished. We do this simply by
calling SSL_read(). There should never be app data to read but we will
process any handshake records we encounter.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21591)
If the request comes in in multiple chunks properly keep tract of where
we are.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21578)
s_client calls SSL_has_pending() even before the connection has been
established. We expect it to return 0 in this case and not put any errors
on the stack.
We change things so that SSL_has_pending() always returns 0 if there is
no stream available.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21578)
A call to SSL_write() with a zero length buffer should still advance the
handshake. Applications (including s_client) may rely on this.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21578)
Check that if one endpoint is sending data faster than its peer can handle
then we eventually see back pressure.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21368)
We must not ask for a password when attempting to read parameters.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21603)
The PEM_read_bio_Parameters[_ex] function does not have the capability
of specifying a password callback. We should not use the fallback password
callback in this case because it will attempt to send a prompt for the
password which might not be the correct thing to do. We should just not
use a password in that case.
Fixes#21588
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21603)
We're always supposed to add the fallback "unsupported" error if we don't
have anything better. However in some cases this wasn't happening because
we were incorrectly setting "flag_construct_called" - even though the
construct function had failed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21603)
msblob only decodes public/private keys (not just params).
pvk only decodes private keys.
If the requested selection doesn't intersect with the above then don't
consider those decoders.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21603)
In the definition of the latest revised LoongArch64 vector instruction manual,
it is clearly pointed out that the undefined upper three bits of each byte in
the control register of the vshuf.b instruction should not be used, otherwise
uncertain results may be obtained. Therefore, it is necessary to correct the
use of the vshuf.b instruction in the existing vpaes-loongarch64.pl code to
avoid erroneous calculation results in future LoongArch64 processors.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21530)
Now the default is linux-generic32, it's not good for loongarch64.
We can also test if the assembler supports vector instructions here and
disable asm if not.
Closes#21340.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21510)
Always report "<algo> ops in <time>", instead of "<algo>'s in <time>" or
similar. Avoid the use of apostrophes and/or plural with algorithm names.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21383)
While RSA encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify are basically the same mod-expo
operations, the speed of the operation may still differ, due to different
padding, as well as the use of implicit rejection for RSA decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21383)
Also fixes a similar regression in X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table().
Commit 38ebfc3 introduced a regression in 3.0.6 that changed the return
value of the two functions above from 1 on success to the number of entries
in the stack. If there are more than one entry then this is a change in
behaviour which should not have been introduced into a stable release.
This reverts the behaviour back to what it was prior to the change. The code
is slightly different to the original code in that we also handle a possible
-1 return value from the stack push function. This should never happen in
reality because we never pass a NULL stack as a parameter - but for the sake
of robustness we handle it anyway.
Note that the changed behaviour exists in all versions of 3.1 (it never had
the original version). But 3.1 should be fully backwards compatible with 3.0
so we should change it there too.
Fixes#21570
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21576)
Fixes#21569
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21569)
Running LSX instructions requires both the hardware support and the
kernel support. The `cpucfg` instruction only tests the hardware
support, causing a SIGILL if the hardware supports LSX but the kernel
does not.
Use `getauxval(AT_HWCAP)` as the ["Software Development and Build
Convention for LoongArch Architectures"][1] manual suggests.
The LOONGARCH_HWCAP_LSX and LOONGARCH_HWCAP_LASX bits are copied from
the manual too. In Glibc 2.38 they'll be provided by <sys/auxv.h> as
well, but they are unavailable in earlier Glibc versions so we cannot
rely on it.
The getauxval syscall and Glibc wrapper are available since day one
(Linux-5.19 and Glibc-2.36) for LoongArch.
Fixes#21508.
[1]:https://github.com/loongson/la-softdev-convention/blob/master/la-softdev-convention.adoc#kernel-constraints
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21509)
Fixes#21554
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21562)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21545)
Apply normal sentence case to db update message
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21535)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
This must fail with DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE and
with DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME unset.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
q value.
Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
computations.
Fixes CVE-2023-3817
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
The pre-existing error cases where DH_check returned zero
are not related to the dh params in any way, but are only
triggered by out-of-memory errors, therefore having *ret
set to zero feels right, but since the new error case is
triggered by too large p values that is something different.
On the other hand some callers of this function might not
be prepared to handle the return value correctly but only
rely on *ret. Therefore we set some error bits in *ret as
additional safety measure.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21524)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21515)
CLA: trivial
The purpose of adding the conditional operator on line 710 is to check
if the value of the variable 'fplace' exceeds the size of the array
'fconvert', and to reduce the value of 'fplace' by 1, so that later on
we can set the value to zero of the array element with the index 'fplace'
and not make any calls beyond the array edges.
However, the condition on line 710 will always be false, because
the size of 'fconvert' is strictly specified at the beginning of
the 'fmtfp()' function (line 571), so it is reasonable to remove
this conditional operator, as well as the unreachable decrementation
code of the variable 'fplace'.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21325)
