There were no PKIX-TA(0) SPKI(1) Full(0) (i.e. "0 1 0") test cases in
"danetest.in".
There is now at least a success case, which will exercise freeing the public
key after it is sanity checked, since with PKIX-TA(0) there's nothing we can do
with just the raw public key, a full chain to a local trust anchor is in any
case required.
The failure (to match) code path is already well oiled, but failure to decode
while adding malfored TLSA records could still use some additional tests...
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22821)
We don't need the decoded X.509 Full(0) certificate for the EE usages 1 and 3,
because the leaf certificate is always part of the presented chain, so the
certificate is only validated as well-formed, and then discarded, but the
TLSA record is of course still used after the validation step.
Added DANE test cases for: 3 0 0, 3 1 0, 1 0 0, and 1 1 0
Reported by Claus Assmann.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22821)
In light of potential UKS (unknown key share) attacks on some
applications, primarily browsers, despite RFC761, name checks are
by default applied with DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. Applications for
which UKS is not a problem can optionally disable DANE-EE(3) name
checks via the new SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags() and friends.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Add copyright to missing assembler files.
Add copyrights to missing test/* files.
Add copyrights
Various source and misc files.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails. However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction. Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.
This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails. Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail. They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible. Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.
Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records. Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.
This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.
Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).
Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.
Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().
Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error. [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
