We already have SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(). This just adds the SSL_CTX
equivalent.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some
applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit
function call is required for a client to indicate support for
post-handshake auth.
Fixes#6933.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
gcc 4.6 (arguably erroneously) warns about our use of 'free' as
the name of a function parameter, when --strict-warnings is enabled:
crypto/x509/x509_meth.c: In function 'X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_free':
crypto/x509/x509_meth.c:61:12: error: declaration of 'free' shadows a global declaration [-Werror=shadow]
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
make[1]: *** [crypto/x509/x509_meth.o] Error 1
(gcc 4.8 is fine with this code, as are newer compilers.)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6991)
CRYPTO_atomic_read was added with intention to read statistics counters,
but readings are effectively indistinguishable from regular load (even
in non-lock-free case). This is because you can get out-dated value in
both cases. CRYPTO_atomic_write was added for symmetry and was never used.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6883)
Relax memory_order on counter decrement itself, because mutable
members of the reference-counted structure should be visible on all
processors independently on counter. [Even re-format and minimize
dependency on other headers.]
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6900)
Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output
buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from
the 1.0.2 documentation):
For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be
allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this
case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
data just written.
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL
output buffer was provided.
Fixes#6914
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)
Also add build-time errors to keep them in sync.
Thanks to GitHub user YuDudysheva for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6874)
Goal here is to facilitate writing "thread-opportunistic" code that
withstands Thread Sanitizer's scrutiny. "Thread-opportunistic" is when
exact result is not required, e.g. some statistics, or execution flow
doesn't have to be unambiguous.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6786)
There are symbols we've marked for deprecation in OpenSSL 1.2.0. We
must ensure that they don't actually become deprecated before that.
Fixes#6814
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6824)
Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't
get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3).
Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts.
Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left
over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used.
Fixes#6804
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
Some EC functions exist in *_GFp and *_GF2m forms, in spite of the
implementations between the two curve types being identical. This
commit provides equivalent generic functions with the *_GFp and *_GF2m
forms just calling the generic functions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But
the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger
primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075Fixes: #6012
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit.
We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for
DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075
These tiny functions only read from the input SSL, and we are
about to use them from functions that only have a const SSL* available,
so propagate const a bit further.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and
requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3.
Fixes#6600
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6747)
By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder
implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint).
ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit
forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification
path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case.
With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and
is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it.
While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized
that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given
EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the
corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and
again in every single implementation (and actually some
implementations lacked some of the tests).
I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are
independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to
be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes
these changes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized
ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed
Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the
operands.
The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is
auto generated with tooling:
- see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the
`ladder_pre` implementation;
- see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3
for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in
`ladder_step`;
- see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m)
without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy
for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in
affine coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations
PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for
prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation
with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret
scalar is feed to the point multiplication).
The newly introduced default implementation directly used
EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop.
The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a
specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking
advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling
and different coordinate systems.
- `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by
default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R.
Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition
to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling;
- `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it
computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could,
e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential
addition-and-doubling;
- `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default
it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this
hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing
the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of
the result point.
This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`,
as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be
truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this
function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily
constant-time themselves.
What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of
operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given
EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar.
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
Run `make update ERROR_REBUILD=-rebuild` to remove some stale error
codes for SM2 (which is now using its own submodule for error codes,
i.e., `SM2_*`).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
Fix the NULL check lack in a different way that is more compatible with
non-NULL branch. Refer #6632
Also mark and pop the error stack instead of clearing all errors when something
goes awry in CONF_get_number.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6643)
We need to check that __GNUC__ is defined before trying to use it.
This demands a slightly different way to define DECLARE_DEPRECATED.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6680)
Previoulsy we just had max_early_data which controlled both the value of
max early_data that we advertise in tickets *and* the amount of early_data
that we are willing to receive from clients. This doesn't work too well in
the case where we want to reduce a previously advertised max_early_data
value. In that case clients with old, stale tickets may attempt to send us
more early data than we are willing to receive. Instead of rejecting the
early data we abort the connection if that happens.
To avoid this we introduce a new "recv_max_early_data" value. The old
max_early_data becomes the value that is advertised in tickets while
recv_max_early_data is the maximum we will tolerate from clients.
Fixes#6647
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6655)
Currently if you encounter application data while waiting for a
close_notify from the peer, and you have called SSL_shutdown() then
you will get a -1 return (fatal error) and SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL from
SSL_get_error(). This isn't accurate (it should be SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
isn't persistent (you can call SSL_shutdown() again and it might then work).
We change this into a proper fatal error that is persistent.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
This allows operation inside a chroot environment without having the
random device present.
A new call, RAND_keep_random_devices_open(), has been introduced that can
be used to control file descriptor use by the random seed sources. Some
seed sources maintain open file descriptors by default, which allows
such sources to operate in a chroot(2) jail without the associated device
nodes being available.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6432)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
Separate out as a new function the code to write out data which is specific
to a stateless ticket.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
This function is documented to be deprecated since OpenSSL 1.1.0. We
need to make it so in openssl/ssl.h as well.
Fixes#6565
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6588)
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.
For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.
For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
Use EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type to access
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6443)
(that is, until 1.2.0 comes along)
Since we allow future deprecation (and that shouldn't be affected
by 'no-deprecated'), we need to distinguish what to have deprecated
on the value of OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, not the existence of
OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED.
Note that the macro OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED still exists, in case
someone still uses it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6470)
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_get_priv_key() and EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_get_pub_key()
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6394)
Only applies to algorithms that support it. Both raw private and public
keys can be obtained for X25519, Ed25519, X448, Ed448. Raw private keys
only can be obtained for HMAC, Poly1305 and SipHash
Fixes#6259
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6394)
All tickets on a connection need to have a unique nonce. When this was
originally implemented we only ever sent one ticket on the conneciton so
this didn't matter. We were just using the value 0. Now we can get multiple
tickets to we need to start doing the ticket nonce properly.
Fixes#6387
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6415)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 made the X509_LOOKUP_METHOD structure opaque, so
applications that were previously able to define a custom lookup method
are not able to be ported.
This commit adds getters and setters for each of the current fields of
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, along with getters and setters on several associated
opaque types (such as X509_LOOKUP and X509_OBJECT).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6152)
This reverts commit a6f5b11634.
The EVP_PKEY_sign() function is intended for pre-hashed input which is
not supported by our EdDSA implementation.
See the discussion in PR 5880
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6284)
We send a session ticket automatically in TLSv1.3 at the end of the
handshake. This commit provides the ability to set how many tickets should
be sent. By default this is one.
Fixes#4978
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5227)
Don't call the decrypt ticket callback if we've already encountered a
fatal error. Do call it if we have an empty ticket present.
Change the return code to have 5 distinct returns codes and separate it
from the input status value.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
The function SSL_get_shared_ciphers() is supposed to return ciphers shared
by the client and the server. However it only ever returned the client
ciphers.
Fixes#5317
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6113)
No need to buildtest on opensslconf.h
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6149)
which is used for ASN1_STRING_print_ex*() and X509_NAME_print_ex*().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6105)
Fixes#6022
In commit de4d764e32, the following SSL_CTRL #define's where renamed
SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES -> SSL_CTRL_GET_GROUPS
SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES -> SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS
SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST -> SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST
SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE -> SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_GROUP
The corresponding function-like macros (e.g, SSL_get1_curves(ctx, s)) were
renamed, too, and compatibility #define's were added. This was overlooked for
the above constants. Since the constants are part of the public interface,
they must not be removed for a minor release.
As a consequence the Qt5 configure check (and the build) fails.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6023)
fix some indents, and restrict to 80 cols some lines.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4466)
Fixes#5961
This reverts commit 3c5a61dd0f.
The macros OPENSSL_MAKE_VERSION() and OPENSSL_VERSION_AT_LEAST() contain
errors and don't work as designed. Apart from that, their introduction
should be held back until a decision has been mad about the future
versioning scheme.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5968)
Adding support for these operations for the EdDSA implementations
makes pkeyutl usable for signing/verifying for these algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5880)
There are two undocumented DSA parameter generation options available in
the genpkey command line app:
dsa_paramgen_md and dsa_paramgen_q_bits.
These can also be accessed via the EVP API but only by using
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() or EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() directly. There are no
helper macros for these options.
dsa_paramgen_q_bits sets the length of q in bits (default 160 bits).
dsa_paramgen_md sets the digest that is used during the parameter
generation (default SHA1). In particular the output length of the digest
used must be equal to or greater than the number of bits in q because of
this code:
if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
md[i] ^= buf2[i];
/* step 3 */
md[0] |= 0x80;
md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
goto err;
qsize here is the number of bits in q and evpmd is the digest set via
dsa_paramgen_md. md and buf2 are buffers of length SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH.
buf2 has been filled with qsize bits of random seed data, and md is
uninitialised.
If the output size of evpmd is less than qsize then the line "md[i] ^=
buf2[i]" will be xoring an uninitialised value and the random seed data
together to form the least significant bits of q (and not using the
output of the digest at all for those bits) - which is probably not what
was intended. The same seed is then used as an input to generating p. If
the uninitialised data is actually all zeros (as seems quite likely)
then the least significant bits of q will exactly match the least
significant bits of the seed.
This problem only occurs if you use these undocumented and difficult to
find options and you set the size of q to be greater than the message
digest output size. This is for parameter generation only not key
generation. This scenario is considered highly unlikely and
therefore the security risk of this is considered negligible.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5800)
The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.
Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.
This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.
Fixes#5809
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)
Fail harshly (in debug builds) when rand_pool_acquire_entropy isn't
delivering the required amount of entropy. In release builds, this
produces an error with details.
We also take the opportunity to modernise the types used.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5857)
The RAND_DRBG API was added in PR #5462 and modified by PR #5547.
This commit adds the corresponding documention.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5461)
Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth.
CVE-2018-0739
Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's really from an other thread because the SSL object moved to an
other thread.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
Without actually using EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4793)
There is a requirements of having access to a live entropy source
which we can't do with the default callbacks. If you need prediction
resistance you need to set up your own callbacks that follow the
requirements of NIST SP 800-90C.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5402
This commit adds a new api RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() which sets the
default type and flags for new DRBG instances. See also #5576.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5632)
Fixes#4403
This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.
Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
Renamed to EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key()/EVP_new_raw_public_key() as per
feedback.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
Not all algorithms will support this, since their keys are not a simple
block of data. But many can.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
With the current mechanism, old cipher strings that used to work in 1.1.0,
may inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites causing connections to
fail. This is confusing for users.
In reality TLSv1.3 are quite different to older ciphers. They are much
simpler and there are only a small number of them so, arguably, they don't
need the same level of control that the older ciphers have.
This change splits the configuration of TLSv1.3 ciphers from older ones.
By default the TLSv1.3 ciphers are on, so you cannot inadvertently disable
them through your existing config.
Fixes#5359
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5392)
These functions are similar to SSL_CTX_set_cookie_{generate,verify}_cb,
but used for the application-controlled portion of TLS1.3 stateless
handshake cookies rather than entire DTLSv1 cookies.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5463)
Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
The introduction of thread local public and private DRBG instances (#5547)
makes it very cumbersome to change the reseeding (time) intervals for
those instances. This commit provides a function to set the default
values for all subsequently created DRBG instances.
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
unsigned int master_reseed_interval,
unsigned int slave_reseed_interval,
time_t master_reseed_time_interval,
time_t slave_reseed_time_interval
);
The function is intended only to be used during application initialization,
before any threads are created and before any random bytes are generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5576)
Add functions that will do the work of assigning certificate, privatekey
and chain certs to an SSL or SSL_CTX. If no privatekey is given, use the
publickey. This will permit the keys to pass validation for both ECDSA
and RSA. If a private key has already been set for the certificate, it
is discarded. A real private key can be set later.
This is an all-or-nothing setting of these parameters. Unlike the
SSL/SSL_CTX_use_certificate() and SSL/SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() functions,
the existing cert or privatekey is not modified (i.e. parameters copied).
This permits the existing cert/privatekey to be replaced.
It replaces the sequence of:
* SSL_use_certificate()
* SSL_use_privatekey()
* SSL_set1_chain()
And may actually be faster, as multiple checks are consolidated.
The private key can be NULL, if so an ENGINE module needs to contain the
actual private key that is to be used.
Note that ECDH (using the certificate's ECDSA key) ciphers do not work
without the private key being present, based on how the private key is
used in ECDH. ECDH does not offer PFS; ECDHE ciphers should be used instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1130)
... and add some missing known values.
Sort ssl/tls extension array list
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5304)
Retain open file handle and previous stat data for the CA index
file, enabling detection and index reload (upcoming commit).
Check requirements before entering accept loop.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5506
Either files or directories of *.cnf or *.conf files
can be included.
Recursive inclusion of directories is not supported.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5351)
This adds all of the relevant EVP plumbing required to make
X448 and Ed448 work.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5481)
This commit adds SSL_export_keying_material_early() which exports
keying material using early exporter master secret.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5252)
Add -bind option to s_client application to allow specification of
local address for connection.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5272)
This function makes it easier to retrieve a reference to the
authority key identifier (akid->keyid) inside a certificate.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5271)
In PR #5295 it was decided that the locking api should remain private
and used only inside libcrypto. However, the locking functions were added
back to `libcrypto.num` by `mkdef.pl`, because the function prototypes
were still listed in `internal/rand.h`. (This header contains functions
which are internal, but shared between libcrypto and libssl.)
This commit moves the prototypes to `rand_lcl.h` and changes the names
to lowercase, following the convention therein. It also corrects an
outdated documenting comment.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5375)
It's a convenient complement to OSSL_STORE_ctrl()
Suggested by Norm Green
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5363)
Output copyright year depends on any input file(s) and the script.
This is not perfect, but better than what we had.
Also run 'make update'
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5350)
The NIST standard presents two alternative ways for seeding the
CTR DRBG, depending on whether a derivation function is used or not.
In Section 10.2.1 of NIST SP800-90Ar1 the following is assessed:
The use of the derivation function is optional if either an
approved RBG or an entropy source provides full entropy output
when entropy input is requested by the DRBG mechanism.
Otherwise, the derivation function shall be used.
Since the OpenSSL DRBG supports being reseeded from low entropy random
sources (using RAND_POOL), the use of a derivation function is mandatory.
For that reason we change the default and replace the opt-in flag
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF with an opt-out flag RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
This change simplifies the RAND_DRBG_new() calls.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
The functions drbg_setup() and drbg_cleanup() used to duplicate a lot of
code from RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_free(). This duplication has been
removed, which simplifies drbg_setup() and makes drbg_cleanup() obsolete.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
This commit adds three new accessors to the internal DRBG lock
int RAND_DRBG_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
The three shared DRBGs are intended to be used concurrently, so they
have locking enabled by default. It is the callers responsibility to
guard access to the shared DRBGs by calls to RAND_DRBG_lock() and
RAND_DRBG_unlock().
All other DRBG instances don't have locking enabled by default, because
they are intendended to be used by a single thread. If it is desired,
locking can be enabled by using RAND_DRBG_enable_locking().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
- pem2.h is empty, so pem.h doesn't need to include it.
- pem2.h once declared ERR_load_PEM_strings(), so it should now
include pemerr.h
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5150)
In commit 52df25cf2e, the
ERR_load_FOO_strings() functions were moved from their original
location in foo.h into new headers called fooerr.h. But they were
never removed from their original locations. This duplication
causes redundant-declaration warnings on programs that use OpenSSL's
headers with such warnings enabled.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5150)
Mac OS/X has a type for %j that doesn't agree with how we define it,
which gives incorrect warnings. The easiest way out of that situation
is simply to turn off that check on Mac OS/X.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5302)
If such a timer/counter register is not available, the return value is always
zero. This matches the assembly implementations' behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)
Patch by @levitte.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)
added macro to create version number
use the macro to build OPENSSL_VERSION_AT_LEAST(maj,min,fix) so that
customers of libssl (such as ruby-openssl) do not need to be so aware of
openssl version numbers.
includes updates to ssl(7) and OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER(3) man page
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5212)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:
Revert "Address feedback"
This reverts commit 75551e07bd.
and
Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"
This reverts commit ed6b2c7938.
But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.
The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions! The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.
However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL. That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:
(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)
For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).
(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock). Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.) If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.
(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()
As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed. The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.
(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion. However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions. Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation. So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().
In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
The getters for min and max proto version wrongly passed NULL instead of
0 as third argument to SSL_ctrl() and SSL_CTX_ctrl(). The third argument
is not used, but the error results in a compiler warning:
warning: passing argument 3 of ‘SSL_CTX_ctrl’ makes integer from pointer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
int v = SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(self->ctx);
See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4364
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5128)
When using the SSL_CTX_get_min_min_version macro while compiling with
-Wall, my compiler rightfully complains about this construction:
warning: passing argument 3 of ‘SSL_CTX_ctrl’ makes integer from
pointer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
These macro's should use 0, instead of NULL, for the third argument,
like most other SSL_CTX_ctrl 'get' wrappers do.
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5099)
Add a -rsigopt option to the ocsp command that allows signature parameters to be provided for the signing of OCSP responses. The parameters that may be provided to -rsigopt are the same as may be provided to -sigopt in the ca, req, and x509 commands.
This PR also defines a OCSP_basic_sign_ctx() function, which functions in the same way as OCSP_basic_sign(), except that it accepts a EVP_MD_CTX rather than a key and digest. The OCSP_basic_sign_ctx() function is used to implement the -rsigopt option in the ocsp command.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4190)
This enables sending and receiving of the TLSv1.3 cookie on the server side
as appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
This just adds the various extension functions. More changes will be
required to actually use them.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
Support added for these two digests, available only via the EVP interface.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5093)
EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() would search through standard asn1 methods
first, then those added by the application, which EVP_PKEY_asn1_find()
worked the other way around. Also, EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() didn't
handle aliases.
This change brings EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() closer to EVP_PKEY_asn1_find().
Fixes#5086
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5137)
More to the point, Cygwin is a POSIX API. In our library, the use of
a POSIX API is marked by defining the macro OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX.
Therefore, that macro shouldn't be undefined when building for Cygwin.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5060)
The data argument of SSL_dane_tlsa_add is used read-only, so it
should be const.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5056)
This is based on RT#3810, which added dedicated modular inversion.
ECDSA verify results improves as well, but not as much.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5001)
The DRGB concept described in NIST SP 800-90A provides for having different
algorithms to generate random output. In fact, the FIPS object module used to
implement three of them, CTR DRBG, HASH DRBG and HMAC DRBG.
When the FIPS code was ported to master in #4019, two of the three algorithms
were dropped, and together with those the entire code that made RAND_DRBG
generic was removed, since only one concrete implementation was left.
This commit restores the original generic implementation of the DRBG, making it
possible again to add additional implementations using different algorithms
(like RAND_DRBG_CHACHA20) in the future.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4998)
Similar to commit 17b602802114d53017ff7894319498934a580b17(
"Remove extra `the` in SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod"), this commit removes
typos where additional 'the' have been added.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4999)
This comment was correct for the original commit introducing this
function (5a3d21c058), but was fixed
in commit d2fa182988 (and
67b8bcee95)
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
GH: #4975
Every DRBG now supports automatic reseeding not only after a given
number of generate requests, but also after a specified time interval.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
A third shared DRBG is added, the so called master DRBG. Its sole purpose
is to reseed the two other shared DRBGs, the public and the private DRBG.
The randomness for the master DRBG is either pulled from the os entropy
sources, or added by the application using the RAND_add() call.
The master DRBG reseeds itself automatically after a given number of generate
requests, but can also be reseeded using RAND_seed() or RAND_add().
A reseeding of the master DRBG is automatically propagated to the public
and private DRBG. This construction fixes the problem, that up to now
the randomness provided by RAND_add() was added only to the public and
not to the private DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
The new ServerHello format is essentially now the same as the old TLSv1.2
one, but it must additionally include supported_versions. The version
field is fixed at TLSv1.2, and the version negotiation happens solely via
supported_versions.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
Follow up from the conversion to use SSLfatal() in the state machine to
clean things up a bit more.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Sometimes at the top level of the state machine code we know we are
supposed to be in a fatal error condition. This commit adds some sanity
checks to ensure that SSLfatal() has been called.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
IFF the client has ChaCha first, and server cipher priority is used,
and the new SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA_FOR_MOBILE option is used,
then reprioritize ChaCha above everything else. This way, A matching
ChaCha cipher will be selected if there is a match. If no ChaCha ciphers
match, then the other ciphers are used.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4436)
This avoids taking quadratic time to pretty-print certificates with
excessively large integer fields. Very large integers aren't any more
readable in decimal than hexadecimal anyway, and the i2s_* functions
will parse either form.
Found by libFuzzer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4790)
Switch to make it return an uint32_t instead of the various different
types it returns now.
Fixes: #3125
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #4757
* Introduce RSA_generate_multi_prime_key to generate multi-prime
RSA private key. As well as the following functions:
RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count
RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors
RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params
RSA_set0_multi_prime_params
RSA_get_version
* Support EVP operations for multi-prime RSA
* Support ASN.1 operations for multi-prime RSA
* Support multi-prime check in RSA_check_key_ex
* Support multi-prime RSA in apps/genrsa and apps/speed
* Support multi-prime RSA manipulation functions
* Test cases and documentation are added
* CHANGES is updated
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4241)
EVP_PKEY_public_check() and EVP_PKEY_param_check()
Doc and test cases are added
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4647)
Add a new function OCSP_resp_get0_signer() that looks in the
certs bundled with the response as well as in additional certificates
provided as a function argument, returning the certificate that signed
the given response (if present).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4573)
Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
There were 4 macros in ocsp.h that have not worked since 1.1.0 because
they attempt to access the internals of an opaque structure.
For OCSP_REQUEST_sign() applications should use OCSP_request_sign() instead.
For OCSP_BASICRESP_sign() applications should use OCSP_basic_sign() instead.
For OCSP_REQUEST_verify() applications should use OCSP_request_verify()
instead.
For OCSP_BASICRESP_verify() applications should use OCSP_basic_verify()
instead.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4635)
SM3 is a secure hash function which is part of the Chinese
"Commercial Cryptography" suite of algorithms which use is
required for certain commercial applications in China.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4616)
This is a combination of sk_new and sk_reserve, to make it more
convenient to allocate a new stack with reserved memory and comaprison
function (if any).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4559)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API
and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when
the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular,
RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed
on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API'
and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues,
introducing the following changes:
- Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which
facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback.
- Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the
get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by
RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
- Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG
in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current
state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller
provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding.
- Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll()
(namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based
on rand_drbg_restart().
- Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy
source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
Names were not removed.
Some comments were updated.
Replace Andy's address with openssl.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4516)
Use atomic operations for the counters
Rename malloc_lock to memdbg_lock
Also fix some style errors in mem_dbg.c
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4359)
Add functions to return DH parameters using NID and to return the
NID if parameters match a named set. Currently this supports only
RFC7919 parameters but could be expanded in future.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4485)
Add an ENGINE to EVP_PKEY structure which can be used for cryptographic
operations: this will typically be used by an HSM key to redirect calls
to a custom EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4503)
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
Remove all stack headers from some includes that don't use them.
Avoid a genearic untyped stack use.
Update stack POD file to include the OPENSSL_sk_ API functions in the notes
section. They were mentioned in the name section but not defined anywhere.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4430)
This allows the caller to guarantee that there is sufficient space for a
number of insertions without reallocation.
The expansion ratio when reallocating the array is reduced to 1.5 rather than 2.
Change bounds testing to use a single size rather than both INT_MAX and
SIZE_MAX. This simplifies some of the tests.
Switch the stack pointers to data from char * to void *
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4386)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 made SSL_CTX and SSL structs opaque and introduced a new
API to set the minimum and maximum protocol version for SSL_CTX with
TLS_method(). Add getters to introspect the configured versions:
int SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_get_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_get_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
NOTE: The getters do not resolv the version in case when the minimum or
maxium version are configured as '0' (meaning auto-select lowest and
highst version number).
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4364)
