This appears to be emitted with gcc and clang with -fcf-protection
selected, so we should do the same.
We're trying to be smart, and only emit this when the 'endbranch'
pseudo-mnemonic has been used at least once.
This is inspired by and owes to work done by @hjl-tools (github)
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10875)
The code to ensure that an EVP_PKEY is exported to providers is
repeated all over the place, enough that copying it again has the
usual future hazards with code copying.
Instead, we refactor that code into one function,
evp_pkey_make_provided(), and make sure to use that everywhere.
It relies on the creation of EVP_PKEY_CTX to figure out facts about
the input key, should it need to.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10850)
An amount of upcoming work does this to make space for new functions
in different groups.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10804)
We change the description to be about the key rather than the
signature. How the key size is related to the signature is explained
in the description of EVP_SignFinal() anyway.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10778)
These functions relied entirely on the presence of 'pkey->pmeth',
which is NULL on provider only keys. This adds an interface to get
domparam and key data from a provider, given corresponding provider
data (the actual domparam or key).
The retrieved data is cached in the EVP_PKEY structure (lending the
idea from provided EVP_CIPHER).
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10778)
These functions would only handle provided methods, but there are
cases where the caller just passes along a received method without
knowing the underlying method tech, so might pass along a legacy
method. We therefore need to have them handle this case as well so
they don't cause any unnecessary surprises.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10845)
When generating html or manpages from POD files, we used $< or $? to
get the file name to process. It turns out, though, that some make
implementations only define $< with implicit rules, so its expansion
remains empty in explicit rules. $? is a fine replacement, but only
as long as we have one dependency, so it may cause problems in the
future.
The final solution seems to be to use explicit POD file names
instead. That leaves no doubts.
Fixes#10817
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10849)
Add a changes entry to cover the deprecation of the low level digest functions:
MD2, MD4, MD5, MDC2, RIPEMD160, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 and
Whirlpool
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10802)
The existing documentation for the new-session callback was unclear
about the requirements on the callback with respect to reference-handling
of the session object being created. Be more explicit about the
(non-)requirements on the callback code for "success" (1) and "ignore"
(0) return values.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10848)
Prepopulation of the stored namemap from the legacy method object
database happened on first EVP fetch. However, there are moments when
that prepopulation needs to happen even though no fetching has been
performed yet. We therefore move pre-population to happen when the
namemap is constructed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10846)
These fields are purely application data, and applications don't reach
into the bowels of the FIPS module, so these fields are never used
there.
Fixes#10835
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10837)
Use of the low level RC5 functions has been informally discouraged for a long
time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10834)
Use of the low level RC4 functions has been informally discouraged for a long
time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10834)
Use of the low level RC2 functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10834)
Use of the low level SEED functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10833)
Added an API to optionally set a self test callback.
The callback has the following 2 purposes
(1) Output information about the KAT tests.
(2) Allow the ability to corrupt one of the KAT's
The fipsinstall program uses the API.
Some KATS are not included in this PR since the required functionality did not yet exist in the provider.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10374)
The returned -2 was to mark when these operations are unsupported.
However, that breaks away from the previous API and expectations, and
there's not enough justification for that not being zero.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10815)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10794)
providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm_hw.c had an AES
specific GCM update function, while
providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aria_gcm_hw.c had the more
general implementation.
This moves them around to have the more general implementation in the
common source, and place the AES specialiation where it belongs.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10783)
For provider only keys where the initialization didn't catch, we may
end up crashing because the legacy code path didn't check that it had
support carefully enough. This only happens if the caller didn't
check if initialization worked or not.
For the one-shot case, it's very simply handling the case where the
key has no legacy implementation an fall back to the standard
init+update+final mechanism.
While at it, EVP_DigestSignFinal() and EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() got a
slight code cleanup.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10806)
The test can be moved into the EVP tests and the separate executable removed.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10821)
We test with both an implicitly fetched digest and an explicitly fetched
digest.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10796)
If we're using an explicitly fetched digest in an EVP_DigestUpdate
operation, then we should still go the legacy route if
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT has been set because we are being used in the
context of a legacy signature algorithm and EVP_DigestInit has not been
called.
This fixes a seg fault in EVP_DigestSignUpdate()
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10796)
Applications should instead use the higher level EVP APIs, e.g.
EVP_Encrypt*() and EVP_Decrypt*().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10742)
Applications should instead use the higher level EVP APIs, e.g.
EVP_Encrypt*() and EVP_Decrypt*().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10741)
