This does things as per the recommendation in the TLSv1.3 spec. It also
means that the server will always choose its preferred ciphersuite.
Previously the server would only select ciphersuites compatible with the
session.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3623)
Also remove nested OPENSSL_NO_EC conditional; it was properly indented,
but a no-op.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3693)
Add "*" as indicator meaning the function/reason is removed, so put an
empty string in the function/reason string table; this preserves backward
compatibility by keeping the #define's.
In state files, trailing backslash means text is on the next line.
Add copyright to state files
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3640)
It is an API to be used from the early callback that indicates what
extensions were present in the ClientHello, and in what order.
This can be used to eliminate unneeded calls to SSL_early_get0_ext()
(which itself scales linearly in the number of extensions supported
by the library).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2976)
We prevent compression both when the server is parsing the ClientHello
and when the client is constructing the ClientHello. A 1.3 ServerHello
has no way to hand us back a compression method, and we already check
that the server does not try to give us back a compression method that
we did not request, so these checks seem sufficient.
Weaken the INSTALL note slightly, as we do now expect to interoperate
with other implementations.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3131)
Signed-off-by: Paul Yang <paulyang.inf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3622)
This uses memset() to clear all of the SRP_CTX when free'ing or
initializing it as well as in error paths instead of having a series
of NULL and zero assignments as it is safer.
It also changes SSL_SRP_CTX_init() to reset all the SRP_CTX to zero
in case or error, previously it could retain pointers to freed
memory, potentially leading to a double free.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3467)
Ownership and lifetime rules of SRP_CTX.info are confusing and different
from those of SRP_CTX.login, making it difficult to use correctly.
This makes the ownership and lifetime be the same as those of SRP_CTX.login,
thet is a copy is made when setting it and is freed when SRP_CTX is freed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3467)
This used to work but was inadvertently removed as part of the TLSv1.3
work. This adds it back.
Fixes#3633
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3639)
Run perltidy on util/mkerr
Change some mkerr flags, write some doc comments
Make generated tables "const" when genearting lib-internal ones.
Add "state" file for mkerr
Renerate error tables and headers
Rationalize declaration of ERR_load_XXX_strings
Fix out-of-tree build
Add -static; sort flags/vars for options.
Also tweak code output
Moved engines/afalg to engines (from master)
Use -static flag
Standard engine #include's of errors
Don't linewrap err string tables unless necessary
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3392)
At the moment we flush the write BIO if we send a fatal alert, but not a
warning one. This can mean the warning is never sent if we never do another
write and subsequently flush the BIO. Instead we should just always flush
after writing an alert.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3432)
Code was added in commit b3c31a65 that overwrote the last ex_data value
using CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() causing a memory leak, and potentially
confusing the ex_data dup() callback.
In ssl_session_dup(), fix error handling (properly reference and up-ref
shared data) and new-up the ex_data before calling CRYPTO_dup_ex_data();
all other structures that dup ex_data have the destination ex_data new'd
before the dup.
Fix up some of the ex_data documentation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3323)
The check for SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION is
inconsistent. Most places check SSL->options, one place is checking
SSL_CTX->options; fix that.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
GH: #3523
SSLv3 (specifically with client auth) cannot use one shot APIs: the digested
data and the master secret are handled in separate update operations. So
in the special case of SSLv3 use the streaming API.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3527)
The return code from tls1_mac is supposed to be a boolean 0 for fail, 1 for
success. In one place we returned -1 on error. This would cause code calling
the mac function to erroneously see this as a success (because a non-zero
value is being treated as success in all call sites).
Fortunately, AFAICT, the place that returns -1 can only happen on an
internal error so is not under attacker control. Additionally this code only
appears in master. In 1.1.0 the return codes are treated differently.
Therefore there are no security implications.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3495)
We are quite inconsistent about which alerts get sent. Specifically, these
alerts should be used (normally) in the following circumstances:
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR = The peer sent a syntactically incorrect message
SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = The peer sent a message which was syntactically
correct, but a parameter given is invalid for the context
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = The peer's messages were syntactically and
semantically correct, but the parameters provided were unacceptable to us
(e.g. because we do not support the requested parameters)
SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR = We messed up (e.g. malloc failure)
The standards themselves aren't always consistent but I think the above
represents the best interpretation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3480)
add_key_share() is a helper function used during key_share extension
construction. It is expected to be a simple boolean success/fail return.
It shouldn't be using the new EXT_RETURN type but it was partially converted
anyway. This changes it back.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3488)
The current TLSv1.3 spec says:
'If a server is authenticating via a certificate and the client has not
sent a "signature_algorithms" extension, then the server MUST abort the
handshake with a "missing_extension" alert (see Section 8.2).'
If we are resuming then we are not "authenticating via a certificate" but
we were still aborting with the missing_extension alert if sig algs was
missing.
This commit ensures that we only send the alert if we are not resuming.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3478)
We already did this on an ad-hoc per extension basis (for some extensions).
This centralises it and makes sure we do it for all extensions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3418)
An alert message is 2 bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 -
TLSv1.2 to fragment such alerts across multiple records (some of which
could be empty). In practice it make no sense to send an empty alert
record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3 prohibts this altogether and other
libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not support this at all. Supporting it adds
significant complexity to the record layer, and its removal is unlikely
to cause inter-operability issues.
The DTLS code for this never worked anyway and it is not supported at a
protocol level for DTLS. Similarly fragmented DTLS handshake records only
work at a protocol level where at least the handshake message header
exists within the record. DTLS code existed for trying to handle fragmented
handshake records smaller than this size. This code didn't work either so
has also been removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3476)
- Mostly missing fall thru comments
- And uninitialized value used in sslapitest.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3440)
Add "single part" digest sign and verify functions. These sign and verify
a message in one function. This simplifies some operations and it will later
be used as the API for algorithms which do not support the update/final
mechanism (e.g. PureEdDSA).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3409)
The function SSL_set_SSL_CTX() can be used to swap the SSL_CTX used for
a connection as part of an SNI callback. One result of this is that the
s->cert structure is replaced. However this structure contains information
about any custom extensions that have been loaded. In particular flags are
set indicating whether a particular extension has been received in the
ClientHello. By replacing the s->cert structure we lose the custom
extension flag values, and it appears as if a client has not sent those
extensions.
SSL_set_SSL_CTX() should copy any flags for custom extensions that appear
in both the old and the new cert structure.
Fixes#2180
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3425)
It is invalid if we receive an HRR but no change will result in
ClientHello2.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3414)
If an HRR gets sent without a key_share (e.g. cookie only) then the code
fails when it should not.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3414)
It is illegal in a TLSv1.3 ClientHello to send anything other than the
NULL compression method. We should send an alert if we find anything else
there. Previously we were ignoring this error.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3410)
When using the -trace option with TLSv1.3 all records appear as "application
data". This adds the ability to see the inner content type too.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3408)
This trace option does not appear in Configure as a separate option and is
undocumented. It can be switched on using "-DOPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO",
however this does not compile in master or in any 1.1.0 released version.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3408)
The TLSv1.3 spec says that a server SHOULD send supported_groups in the
EE message if there is a group that it prefers to the one used in the
key_share. Clients MAY act on that. At the moment we don't do anything
with it on the client side, but that may change in the future.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3395)
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_ex() et al were always processing data as if it was
V2 format, even if it was V1. This bug was masked because, although we had
a test which loaded V1 serverinfo data from a file, the function
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() transparently converts V1 data to V2 before
calling SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_ex().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3382)
|version| "could" be used uninitialized here, not really, but the
compiler doesn't understand the flow
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3373)
Ensure that serverinfo only gets added for the first Certificate in a list.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3298)
We already did this for ServerHello and EncryptedExtensions. We should be
doing it for Certificate and HelloRetryRequest as well.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3298)
This enables us to know what messages the extensions are relevant for in
TLSv1.3. The new file format is not compatible with the previous one so
we call it SERVERINFOV2.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3298)
Add padding callback for application control
Standard block_size callback
Documentation and tests included
Configuration file/s_client/s_srver option
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3130)
This fixes a segfault if a NULL parse_cb is passed to
SSL_CTX_add_{client,server}_custom_ext, which was supported in the
pre-1.1.1 implementation.
This behaviour is consistent with the other custom_ext_*_old_cb_wrap
functions, and with the new SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext function.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3310)
Previously, init and finalization function for extensions are called
per extension block, rather than per message. This commit changes
that behaviour, and now they are called per message. The parse
function is still called per extension block.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3244)
Because NST messages arrive post-handshake, the session may have already
gone into the cache. Once in the cache a session must be immutable -
otherwise you could get multi-thread issues.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3008)
Provide a way to test whether the SSL_SESSION object can be used to resume a
sesion or not.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3008)
TLSv1.3 will do the same thing as TLSv1.2 with tickets with regards to session
ids, i.e. it will create a synthetic session id when the session is established,
so it is reasonable to check the session id length, even in TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3008)
Ensure that there are ciphersuites enabled for the maximum supported
version we will accept in a ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3316)
Ensure that there are ciphersuites enabled for the maximum supported
version we are claiming in the ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3316)
The function tls_early_post_process_client_hello() was overwriting the
passed "al" parameter even if it was successful. The caller of that
function, tls_post_process_client_hello(), sets "al" to a sensible default
(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), but this was being overwritten to be INTERNAL_ERROR.
The result is a "no shared cipher" error (and probably other similar errors)
were being reported back to the client with an incorrect INTERNAL_ERROR
alert.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3314)
We were allocating the write buffer based on the size of max_send_fragment,
but ignoring it when writing data. We should fragment handshake messages
if they exceed max_send_fragment and reject application data writes that
are too large.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
There was code existing which attempted to handle the case where application
data is received after a reneg handshake has started in SCTP. In normal DTLS
we just fail the connection if this occurs, so there doesn't seem any reason
to try and work around it for SCTP. In practice it didn't work properly
anyway and is probably a bad idea to start with.
Fixes#3251
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
ECDHE is not properly defined for SSLv3. Commit fe55c4a2 prevented ECDHE
from being selected in that protocol. However, historically, servers do
still select ECDHE anyway so that commit causes interoperability problems.
Clients that previously worked when talking to an SSLv3 server could now
fail.
This commit introduces an exception which enables a client to continue in
SSLv3 if the server selected ECDHE.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3204)
doing the pms assignment after log is successful
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3278)
X509_STORE_add_cert and X509_STORE_add_crl are changed to return
success if the object to be added was already found in the store, rather
than returning an error.
Raise errors if empty or malformed files are read when loading certificates
and CRLs.
Remove NULL checks and allow a segv to occur.
Add error handing for all calls to X509_STORE_add_c{ert|tl}
Refactor these two routines into one.
Bring the unit test for duplicate certificates up to date using the test
framework.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2830)
This resulted in the SCT timestamp check always failing, because the
timestamp appeared to be in the future.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3138)
SSLv3 does not support TLS extensions, and thus, cannot provide any
curves for ECDH(E). With the removal of the default (all) list of curves
being used for connections that didn't provide any curves, ECDHE is no
longer possible.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3181)
