Add -client_renegotiation flag support. The -client_renegotiation flag is
equivalent to SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION. Add support to the app,
the config code, and the documentation.
Add SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION to the SSL tests. We don't need to
always enable it, but there are so many tests so this is the easiest thing
to do.
Add a test where client tries to renegotiate and it fails as expected. Add
a test where server tries to renegotiate and it succeeds. The second test
is supported by a new flag, -immediate_renegotiation, which is ignored on
the client.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15184)
It can be useful to know what group was used for the handshake's
key exchange process even on non-TLS 1.3 connections. Allow this
API, new in OpenSSL 3.0.0, to be used on other TLS versions as well.
Since pre-TLS-1.3 key exchange occurs only on full handshakes, this
necessitates adding a field to the SSL_SESSION object to carry the
group information across resumptions. The key exchange group in the
SSL_SESSION can also be relevant in TLS 1.3 when the resumption handshake
uses the "psk_ke" key-exchange mode, so also track whether a fresh key
exchange was done for TLS 1.3.
Since the new field is optional in the ASN.1 sense, there is no need
to increment SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION (which incurs strong incompatibility
churn).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14750)
Following on from CVE-2021-3449 which was caused by a non-zero length
associated with a NULL buffer, other buffer/length pairs are updated to
ensure that they too are always in sync.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
The low level SRP implementation has been deprecated with no replacement.
Therefore the libssl level APIs need to be similarly deprecated.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14132)
This removes man unnecessary OPENSSL_NO_DH guards from libssl. Now that
libssl is entirely using the EVP APIs and implementations can be plugged
in via providers it is no longer needed to disable DH at compile time in
libssl. Instead it should detect at runtime whether DH is available from
the loaded providers.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
The configuration option 'no-rsa' was dropped with OpenSSL 1.1.0, so
this is simply a cleanup of the remains.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13700)
no-dh disables the low level API for DH. However, since we're now using
the high level EVP API in most places we don't need to disable quite so
much.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13368)
We instead set the encoded public key directly in the EVP_PKEY object.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13368)
We get DH related parameters directly from the EVP_PKEY instead of
downgrading to a DH object first.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13368)
These ctrls pass around a DH object which is now deprecated, so we
deprecate the ctrls themselves.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13368)
Previously a DH object was constructed and then assigned to an EVP_PKEY.
Instead we now construct the EVP_PKEY directly instead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13368)
Since SSLfatal() doesn't take a function code any more, we drop that
argument everywhere. Also, we convert all combinations of SSLfatal()
and ERR_add_data() to an SSLfatal_data() call.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13316)
We were missing a call to SSLfatal. A comment claimed that we had already
called it - but that is incorrect.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13229)
We do the same thing for the "get1" version. In reality this has broader
use than just TLS (it can also be used in CMS), and "encodedpoint" only
makes sense when you are talking about EC based algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13105)
Automatically rename all instances of _with_libctx() to _ex() as per
our coding style.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12970)
We fix 3 problems with safestack:
- Including an openssl header file without linking against libcrypto
can cause compilation failures (even if the app does not otherwise need
to link against libcrypto). See issue #8102
- Recent changes means that applications in no-deprecated builds will need
to include additional macro calls in the source code for all stacks that
they need to use - which is an API break. This changes avoids that
necessity.
- It is not possible to write code using stacks that works in both a
no-deprecated and a normal build of OpenSSL. See issue #12707.
Fixes#12707
Contains a partial fix for #8102. A similar PR will be needed for hash to
fully fix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
-Added EVP_SignFinal_with_libctx() and EVP_VerifyFinal_with_libctx()
-Renamed EVP_DigestSignInit_ex() and EVP_DigestVerifyInit_with_libctx() to
EVP_DigestSignInit_with_libctx() and EVP_DigestVerifyInit_with_libctx()
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11884)
- In order to not add many X509_XXXX_with_libctx() functions the libctx and propq may be stored in the X509 object via a call to X509_new_with_libctx().
- Loading via PEM_read_bio_X509() or d2i_X509() should pass in a created cert using X509_new_with_libctx().
- Renamed some XXXX_ex() to XXX_with_libctx() for X509 API's.
- Removed the extra parameters in check_purpose..
- X509_digest() has been modified so that it expects a const EVP_MD object() and then internally it does the fetch when it needs to (via ASN1_item_digest_with_libctx()).
- Added API's that set the libctx when they load such as X509_STORE_new_with_libctx() so that the cert chains can be verified.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12153)
The DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH value was incorrect in the header files. We
couldn't change it before due to ABI concerns. However 3.0 is not ABI
compatible so we can now fix it.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12179)
If EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() failed in libssl we did not provide a very
helpful error message. We provide a better one.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11914)
We were downgrading to legacy keys at various points in libssl in
order to get or set an encoded point. Now that the encoded point
functions work with provided keys this is no longer necessary.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11898)
This API requests that the TLS stack generate a (TLS 1.3)
NewSessionTicket message the next time it is safe to do so (i.e., we do
not have other data pending write, which could be mid-record). For
efficiency, defer actually generating/writing the ticket until there
is other data to write, to avoid producing server-to-client traffic when
not needed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11416)
An 'if' clause was nestled against a previous closing brace as it if was
an 'else if', but should properly stand on its own line.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11416)
... and only *define* them in the source files that need them.
Use DEFINE_OR_DECLARE which is set appropriately for internal builds
and not non-deprecated builds.
Deprecate stack-of-block
Better documentation
Move some ASN1 struct typedefs to types.h
Update ParseC to handle this. Most of all, ParseC needed to be more
consistent. The handlers are "recursive", in so far that they are called
again and again until they terminate, which depends entirely on what the
"massager" returns. There's a comment at the beginning of ParseC that
explains how that works. {Richard Levtte}
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10669)
We had a spot where a fatal error was occurring but we hadn't sent an
alert. This results in a later assertion failure.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11537)
The transfer of TLS encodedpoint to backends isn't yet fully supported
in provider implementations. This is a temporary measure so as not to
get stuck in other development.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11358)
We use AES-256-CBC to encrypt stateless session tickets. We should
ensure that the implementation is fetched from the appropriate provider.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11356)
The server-side ChangeCipherState processing stores the new cipher
in the SSL_SESSION object, so that the new state can be used if
this session gets resumed. However, writing to the session is only
thread-safe for initial handshakes, as at other times the session
object may be in a shared cache and in use by another thread at the
same time. Reflect this invariant in the code by only writing to
s->session->cipher when it is currently NULL (we do not cache sessions
with no cipher). The code prior to this change would never actually
change the (non-NULL) cipher value in a session object, since our
server enforces that (pre-TLS-1.3) resumptions use the exact same
cipher as the initial connection, and non-abbreviated renegotiations
have produced a new session object before we get to this point.
Regardless, include logic to detect such a condition and abort the
handshake if it occurs, to avoid any risk of inadvertently using
the wrong cipher on a connection.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
TLS 1.3 maintains a separate keys chedule in the SSL object, but
was writing to the 'master_key_length' field in the SSL_SESSION
when generating the per-SSL master_secret. (The generate_master_secret
SSL3_ENC_METHOD function needs an output variable for the master secret
length, but the TLS 1.3 implementation just uses the output size of
the handshake hash function to get the lengths, so the only natural-looking
thing to use as the output length was the field in the session.
This would potentially involve writing to a SSL_SESSION object that was
in the cache (i.e., resumed) and shared with other threads, though.
The thread-safety impact should be minimal, since TLS 1.3 requires the
hash from the original handshake to be associated with the resumption
PSK and used for the subsequent connection. This means that (in the
resumption case) the value being written would be the same value that was
previously there, so the only risk would be on architectures that can
produce torn writes/reads for aligned size_t values.
Since the value is essentially ignored anyway, just provide the
address of a local dummy variable to generate_master_secret() instead.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943)
When we use an EVP_PKEY_CTX in libssl we should be doing so with the
OPENSSL_CTX and property query string that were specified when the
SSL_CTX object was first created.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10854)
We modify libssl to use explicitly fetched ciphers, digests and other
algorithms as required based on the configured library context and
property query string for the SSL_CTX that is being used.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10854)
Backwards compatibility with the old ticket key call back is maintained.
This will be removed when the low level HMAC APIs are finally removed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10836)
Now that libssl knows about libctx we should use it wherever we generate
a random number.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10927)
Large GOST ClientKeyExchange messages are sent by VipNet CSP, one of
Russian certified products implementing GOST TLS, when a server
certificate contains 512-bit keys.
This behaviour was present in 1.0.2 branch and needs to be restored.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10376)
Server side RSA key transport code in a Client Key Exchange message
currently uses constant time code to check that the RSA decrypt is
correctly formatted. The previous commit taught the underlying RSA
implementation how to do this instead, so we use that implementation and
remove this code from libssl.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10411)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
This reverts commit 524006dd1b.
While this change did prevent the sigalgs from getting inadvertently
clobbered by SSL_set_SSL_CTX(), it also caused the sigalgs to not be
set when the cert_cb runs. This, in turn, caused significant breakage,
such as SSL_check_chain() failing to find any valid chain. An alternate
approach to fixing the issue from #7244 will follow.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9157)
Similarly to the previous commit we were storing the peer offered list
of ciphers in the session. In practice there is no need for this
information to be avilable from one resumption to the next since this
list is specific to a particular handshake. Since the session object is
supposed to be immutable we should not be updating it once we have decided
to resume. The solution is to remove the session list out of the session
object.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9162)
If we receive a KeyUpdate message (update requested) from the peer while
we are in the middle of a write, we should defer sending the responding
KeyUpdate message until after the current write is complete. We do this
by waiting to send the KeyUpdate until the next time we write and there is
no pending write data.
This does imply a subtle change in behaviour. Firstly the responding
KeyUpdate message won't be sent straight away as it is now. Secondly if
the peer sends multiple KeyUpdates without us doing any writing then we
will only send one response, as opposed to previously where we sent a
response for each KeyUpdate received.
Fixes#8677
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8773)
