Now that ACVP test vectors exist, support has been added for this mode.
See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1.pdf
Note that the test vectors used fairly large values for the input key
and the context, so the contraints for these has been increased from
256 to 512 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19916)
Since the fips provider version isn't frozen at 3.0.0, and the first
planned release with the fix in the fips provider is in 3.2.0,
we need to skip all the tests that expect implicit rejection
in all versions below 3.2.0
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19890)
Fixes#19858
During decryption, the last ciphertext is not fed to next block
correctly when the number of input blocks is exactly 4. Fix this
and add the corresponding test cases.
Thanks xu-yi-zhou for reporting this issue and proposing the fix.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19872)
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
since the 3.0.0 FIPS provider doesn't implement the Bleichenbacher
workaround, the decryption fails instead of providing a synthetic
plaintext, so skip them then
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling
of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned
ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities
(CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of
OpenSSL do it correctly.
Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in
application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods
as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in
application code.
To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection".
For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the
padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret
data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the
attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case
any part of padding check fails.
The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the
returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the
actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have
to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free
way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks.
Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla
NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the
other in heterogeneous environments.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
the hash function output block (in bytes)."
Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
not use more than the digest length when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
J.-S. Coron shows in "Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other
Signature Schemes. Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2002, volume 2332
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 272 – 287. Springer Verlag,
2002." that longer salts than the output size of modern hash functions
do not increase security: "For example,for an application in which at
most one billion signatures will be generated, k0 = 30 bits of random
salt are actually sufficient to guarantee the same level of security as
RSA, and taking a larger salt does not increase the security level."
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19724)
Rather than computing the PSS salt length again in core using
ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string, which calls rsa_ctx_to_pss and computes the
salt length, obtain it from the provider using the
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID param to handle the case where the
interpretation of the magic constants in the provider differs from that
of OpenSSL core.
Add tests that verify that the rsa_pss_saltlen:max,
rsa_pss_saltlen:<integer> and rsa_pss_saltlen:digest options work and
put the computed digest length into the CMS_ContentInfo struct when
using CMS. Do not add a test for the salt length generated by a provider
when no specific rsa_pss_saltlen option is defined, since that number
could change between providers and provider versions, and we want to
preserve compatibility with older providers.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19724)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18809)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18809)
This PR is based off the contributions in PR #9223 by Jemmy1228.
It has been modified and reworked to:
(1) Work with providers
(2) Support ECDSA and DSA
(3) Add a KDF HMAC_DRBG implementation that shares code with the RAND HMAC_DRBG.
A nonce_type is passed around inside the Signing API's, in order to support any
future deterministic algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18809)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19739)
This supports all the modes, suites and export mechanisms defined
in RFC9180 and should be relatively easily extensible if/as new
suites are added. The APIs are based on the pseudo-code from the
RFC, e.g. OSS_HPKE_encap() roughly maps to SetupBaseS(). External
APIs are defined in include/openssl/hpke.h and documented in
doc/man3/OSSL_HPKE_CTX_new.pod. Tests (test/hpke_test.c) include
verifying a number of the test vectors from the RFC as well as
round-tripping for all the modes and suites. We have demonstrated
interoperability with other HPKE implementations via a fork [1]
that implements TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) which uses HPKE.
@slontis provided huge help in getting this done and this makes
extensive use of the KEM handling code from his PR#19068.
[1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/ECH-draft-13c
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17172)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19346)
This test had commands that assumes that runner_loop() is used to perform
the tests. These tests still run fine because Unix accepts braces in file
names, but other operating systems might not.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19731)
(cherry picked from commit 20d3731006)
The providers indication should always indicate that this is not a
legacy request.
This makes a check for engines redundant as the default return is that
legacy is ok if there are no explicit providers.
Fixes#19662
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19671)
Also add negative test cases for CMAC and GMAC using
a cipher with wrong mode.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19401)
See Issue #19388.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19406)
Implement the AES-256-CTR cipher in the dasync engine.
Use that to reproduce the reported problems with the
devcrypto engine in our normal test environment.
See #17995 and #17532 for details.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19386)
This option runs the self tests at installation time. It fails for the 3.1
module.
Also changed the default behaviour to that set by the -self_test_onload
option.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19510)
Co-authored-by: Randall Steck <rsteck@thinqsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Mark J. Minnoch <mark@keypair.us>
Co-authored-by: Steve Weymann <steve@keypair.us>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19510)
Co-authored-by: Randall Steck <rsteck@thinqsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Mark J. Minnoch <mark@keypair.us>
Co-authored-by: Steve Weymann <steve@keypair.us>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19510)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19510)
These tests verify basic functionality and specifically test for
CVE-2022-3602.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f0f530216b)
Including RIPEMD160 in both the default and legacy providers shouldn't break
anyone and makes the algorithm available more readily.
Fixes#17722
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19375)
This should not happen but we should tolerate and send an HRR
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19317)
Mostly revamped from #16712
- fall thru -> fall through
- time stamp -> timestamp
- host name -> hostname
- ipv6 -> IPv6
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18895)
Adding extensions is fragile, with the TLSEXT_TYPE entry needing to be
located at TLSEXT_IDX in the array.
This adds a test to ensure extensions are in the correct order.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19269)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19040)
