Fixes CVE-2023-6237
If a large and incorrect RSA public key is checked with
EVP_PKEY_public_check() the computation could take very long time
due to no limit being applied to the RSA public key size and
unnecessarily high number of Miller-Rabin algorithm rounds
used for non-primality check of the modulus.
Now the keys larger than 16384 bits (OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
will fail the check with RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE error reason.
Also the number of Miller-Rabin rounds was set to 5.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23243)
If the value of a->length is large (>= 2^12), then an integer overflow will
occur for the signed type, which according to the C standard is UB.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23274)
Current PowerPC-related defines omit Darwin ppc64 case.
Use __POWERPC__ in place of __ppc__ + __ppc64__
Fixes#23220
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23245)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23253)
When parsing the stable section of a config such as this:
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
stbl_section = mstbl
[mstbl]
id-tc26 = min
Can lead to a SIGSEGV, as the parsing code doesnt recognize min as a
proper section name without a trailing colon to associate it with a
value. As a result the stack of configuration values has an entry with
a null value in it, which leads to the SIGSEGV in do_tcreate when we
attempt to pass NULL to strtoul.
Fix it by skipping any entry in the config name/value list that has a
null value, prior to passing it to stroul
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22988)
Use the number of processed bytes information (num) from the generic
cipher context for the partial block handling in cfb and ofb also in
s390x-legacy code. For more details see 4df92c1a14 ("Fix partial block
encryption in cfb and ofb for s390x").
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23201)
Fixes#22818
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22860)
Even in the good case there was memory leak here.
Add a simple test case to have at least some test coverage.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23234)
When a subsequent call to SXNET_add_id_asc fails
e.g. because user is a string larger than 64 char
or the zone is a duplicate zone id,
or the zone is not an integer,
a memory leak may be the result.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23234)
The AES-CTR assembly code uses v8-v15 registers, they are
callee-saved registers, they must be preserved before the
use and restored after the use.
Change-Id: If9192d1f0f3cea7295f4b0d72ace88e6e8067493
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23233)
The base type OSSL_PARAM getters will NULL deref if they are initalized
as null. Add NULL checks for those parameters that have no expectation
of returning null (int32/64/uint32/64/BN). Other types can be left as
allowing NULL, as a NULL setting may be meaningful (string, utf8str,
octet string, etc).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23083)
Fixes CVE-2023-6129
The POLY1305 MAC (message authentication code) implementation in OpenSSL for
PowerPC CPUs saves the the contents of vector registers in different order
than they are restored. Thus the contents of some of these vector registers
is corrupted when returning to the caller. The vulnerable code is used only
on newer PowerPC processors supporting the PowerISA 2.07 instructions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23200)
It would be helpful to be able to generate RSA's dmp1/dmq1/iqmp values
when not provided in the param list to EVP_PKEY_fromdata. Augment the
provider in ossl_rsa_fromdata to preform this generation iff:
a) At least p q n e and e are provided
b) the new parameter OSSL_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_PQ is set to 1
Fixes#21826
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21875)
There are several points during x509 extension creation which rely on
configuration options which may have been incorrectly parsed due to
invalid settings. Preform a value check for null in those locations to
avoid various crashes/undefined behaviors
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23183)
Most of the callers do not actually check for
the special -1 return condition because they do not
pass NULL to it. It is also extremely improbable that
any code depends on this -1 return value in this condition
so it can be safely changed to 0 return.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22930)
Partial fix for #8026
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22656)
If a name is passed to EVP_<OBJ>_fetch of the form:
name1:name2:name3
The names are parsed on the separator ':' and added to the store, but
during the lookup in inner_evp_generic_fetch, the subsequent search of
the store uses the full name1:name2:name3 string, which fails lookup,
and causes subsequent assertion failures in evp_method_id.
instead catch the failure in inner_evp_generic_fetch and return an error
code if the name_id against a colon separated list of names fails. This
provides a graceful error return path without asserts, and leaves room
for a future feature in which such formatted names can be parsed and
searched for iteratively
Add a simple test to verify that providing a colon separated name
results in an error indicating an invalid lookup.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23110)
Make EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md() and
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name() only work for RSA keys.
Since these calls use "digest" as a OSSL_PARAM, they should not
work for other key types.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20319)
If a call to EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md() fails then the caller
needs to free the label.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20319)
Sometimes the error handling returns an ASN1_STRING
object in *out although that was not passed in by the
caller, and sometimes the error handling deletes the
ASN1_STRING but forgets to clear the *out parameter.
Therefore the caller has no chance to know, if the leaked
object in *out shall be deleted or not.
This may cause a use-after-free error e.g. in asn1_str2type:
==63312==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x603000073280 at pc 0x7f2652e93b08 bp 0x7ffe0e1951c0 sp 0x7ffe0e1951b0
READ of size 8 at 0x603000073280 thread T0
#0 0x7f2652e93b07 in asn1_string_embed_free crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c:354
#1 0x7f2652eb521a in asn1_primitive_free crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c:204
#2 0x7f2652eb50a9 in asn1_primitive_free crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c:199
#3 0x7f2652eb5b67 in ASN1_item_free crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c:20
#4 0x7f2652e8e13b in asn1_str2type crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:740
#5 0x7f2652e8e13b in generate_v3 crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:137
#6 0x7f2652e9166c in ASN1_generate_v3 crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:92
#7 0x7f2653307b9b in do_othername crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:577
#8 0x7f2653307b9b in a2i_GENERAL_NAME crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:492
#9 0x7f26533087c2 in v2i_subject_alt crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:327
#10 0x7f26533107fc in do_ext_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:100
#11 0x7f2653310f33 in X509V3_EXT_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:45
#12 0x7f2653311426 in X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:312
#13 0x7f265331170c in X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:360
#14 0x564ed19d5f25 in req_main apps/req.c:806
#15 0x564ed19b8de0 in do_cmd apps/openssl.c:564
#16 0x564ed1985165 in main apps/openssl.c:183
#17 0x7f2651c4a082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
#18 0x564ed1985acd in _start (/home/ed/OPCToolboxV5/Source/Core/OpenSSL/openssl/apps/openssl+0x139acd)
0x603000073280 is located 16 bytes inside of 24-byte region [0x603000073270,0x603000073288)
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7f265413440f in __interceptor_free ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:122
#1 0x7f265315a429 in CRYPTO_free crypto/mem.c:311
#2 0x7f265315a429 in CRYPTO_free crypto/mem.c:300
#3 0x7f2652e757b9 in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c:191
#4 0x7f2652e75ec5 in ASN1_mbstring_copy crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c:38
#5 0x7f2652e8e227 in asn1_str2type crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:681
#6 0x7f2652e8e227 in generate_v3 crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:137
#7 0x7f2652e9166c in ASN1_generate_v3 crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:92
#8 0x7f2653307b9b in do_othername crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:577
#9 0x7f2653307b9b in a2i_GENERAL_NAME crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:492
#10 0x7f26533087c2 in v2i_subject_alt crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:327
#11 0x7f26533107fc in do_ext_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:100
#12 0x7f2653310f33 in X509V3_EXT_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:45
#13 0x7f2653311426 in X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:312
#14 0x7f265331170c in X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:360
#15 0x564ed19d5f25 in req_main apps/req.c:806
#16 0x564ed19b8de0 in do_cmd apps/openssl.c:564
#17 0x564ed1985165 in main apps/openssl.c:183
#18 0x7f2651c4a082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7f2654134808 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144
#1 0x7f265315a4fd in CRYPTO_malloc crypto/mem.c:221
#2 0x7f265315a4fd in CRYPTO_malloc crypto/mem.c:198
#3 0x7f265315a945 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:236
#4 0x7f2652e939a4 in ASN1_STRING_type_new crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c:341
#5 0x7f2652e74e51 in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c:150
#6 0x7f2652e75ec5 in ASN1_mbstring_copy crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c:38
#7 0x7f2652e8e227 in asn1_str2type crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:681
#8 0x7f2652e8e227 in generate_v3 crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:137
#9 0x7f2652e9166c in ASN1_generate_v3 crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c:92
#10 0x7f2653307b9b in do_othername crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:577
#11 0x7f2653307b9b in a2i_GENERAL_NAME crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:492
#12 0x7f26533087c2 in v2i_subject_alt crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c:327
#13 0x7f26533107fc in do_ext_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:100
#14 0x7f2653310f33 in X509V3_EXT_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:45
#15 0x7f2653311426 in X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:312
#16 0x7f265331170c in X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c:360
#17 0x564ed19d5f25 in req_main apps/req.c:806
#18 0x564ed19b8de0 in do_cmd apps/openssl.c:564
#19 0x564ed1985165 in main apps/openssl.c:183
#20 0x7f2651c4a082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23138)
The INT_MAX checks in param_build.c do not appear to be needed. Drop
them. This was noted during the discussion for PR #22967. This makes
param_build.c more consistent with params.c.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23143)
There is one remaining config setting for providers, soft_load, which is
enabled when provided in a config, regardless of its value. Augment it
to require a decisive value 1/0, yes/no, on/off, true/false, as we've
recently done for the activate setting.
Also, since it wasn't previously documented, add docs for it.
Fixes#23105
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23111)
CLA: trivial
Avoid doing the division via modulo where possible.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23097)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20727)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20727)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20727)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20727)
If a malformed config file is provided such as the following:
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
providers = provider_sect
[provider_sect]
= provider_sect
The config parsing library will crash overflowing the stack, as it
recursively parses the same provider_sect ad nauseum.
Prevent this by maintaing a list of visited nodes as we recurse through
referenced sections, and erroring out in the event we visit any given
section node more than once.
Note, adding the test for this revealed that our diagnostic code
inadvertently pops recorded errors off the error stack because
provider_conf_load returns success even in the event that a
configuration parse failed. The call path to provider_conf_load has been
updated in this commit to address that shortcoming, allowing recorded
errors to be visibile to calling applications.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22898)
Currently, a provider is activated from our config file using the
activate parameter. However, the presence of the config parameter is
sufficient to trigger activation, leading to a counterintuitive
situation in which setting "activate = 0" still activates the provider
Make activation more intuitive by requiring that activate be set to one
of yes|true|1 to trigger activation. Any other value, as well as
omitting the parameter entirely, prevents activation (and also maintains
backward compatibility.
It seems a bit heavyweight to create a test specifically to validate the
plurality of these settings. Instead, modify the exiting openssl config
files in the test directory to use variants of these settings, and
augment the default.cnf file to include a provider section that is
explicitly disabled
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22906)
As there is no default case for a->type or b->type in the switch()
statements, if the type does not fall into any defined cases
then memcmp() will be done on garbage data.
Adding default cases in both switches.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23082)
The [LP64D ABI][1] requires the floating-point registers f24-f31
(aka fs0-fs7) callee-saved. The low 64 bits of a LSX/LASX vector
register aliases with the corresponding FPR, so we must save and restore
the callee-saved FPR when we writes into the corresponding vector
register.
This ABI breakage can be easily demonstrated by injecting the use of a
saved FPR into the test in bio_enc_test.c:
static int test_bio_enc_chacha20(int idx)
{
register double fs7 asm("f31") = 114.514;
asm("#optimize barrier":"+f"(fs7));
return do_test_bio_cipher(EVP_chacha20(), idx) && fs7 == 114.514;
}
So fix it. To make the logic simpler, jump into the scalar
implementation earlier when LSX and LASX are not enumerated in AT_HWCAP,
or the input is too short.
[1]: https://github.com/loongson/la-abi-specs/blob/v2.20/lapcs.adoc#floating-point-registers
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22817)
Also add missing getter functionss OSSL_CMP_{CTX,HDR}_get0_geninfo_ITAVs() to CMP API.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21281)
In the event that a config file contains this sequence:
=======
openssl_conf = openssl_init
config_diagnostics = 1
[openssl_init]
oid_section = oids
[oids]
testoid1 = 1.2.3.4.1
testoid2 = A Very Long OID Name, 1.2.3.4.2
testoid3 = ,1.2.3.4.3
======
The leading comma in testoid3 can cause a heap buffer overflow, as the
parsing code will move the string pointer back 1 character, thereby
pointing to an invalid memory space
correct the parser to detect this condition and handle it by treating it
as if the comma doesn't exist (i.e. an empty long oid name)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22957)
This typedef is already created in aes_local.h as `typedef uint64_t u64;`.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22969)
In param_build.c, the functions OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string() and
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_ptr() use strlen() to compute the length of
the string when bsize is zero. However, the size_t returned by
strlen() might be too large (it is stored in an intermediate "int"),
so check for that.
There are analogous functions in params.c, but they do not use an
intermediate "int" to store the size_t returned by strlen(). So there
is some inconsistency between the implementations.
Credit to Viktor D and Tomas M for spotting these missing checks.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22967)
sscanf can return -1 on an empty input string. We need to appropriately
handle such an invalid case.
The instance in OSSL_HTTP_parse_url could cause an uninitialised read of
sizeof(unsigned int) bytes (typically 4). In many cases this uninit read
will immediately fail on the following check (i.e. if the read value
>65535).
If the top 2 bytes of a 4 byte unsigned int are zero then the value will
be <=65535 and the uninitialised value will be returned to the caller and
could represent arbitrary data on the application stack.
The OpenSSL security team has assessed this issue and consider it to be
a bug only (i.e. not a CVE).
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22961)
If p is set to 1 when calling BN_GF2m_mod_inv then an infinite loop will
result. Calling this function set 1 when applications call this directly
is a non-sensical value - so this would be considered a bug in the caller.
It does not seem possible to cause OpenSSL internal callers of
BN_GF2m_mod_inv to call it with a value of 1.
So, for the above reasons, this is not considered a security issue.
Reported by Bing Shi.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22960)
This fix removes explicit support for the SPT threading model in configurations.
This also reverts commit f63e1b48ac that were
required for SPT but broke other models.
Fixes: #22798
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22807)
