Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20061)
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21274)
This can effectively reduce the binary size for platforms
that don't need ECX feature(~100KB).
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yi1.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20781)
Add a new option to the `test' section of SSL test data structure.
This contains a space separated list of version checks, all of which must
pass.
Note that the version checks are as they as because:
- 3.1.0 doesn't have mandatory EMS support, so it can run the old tests.
- 3.1.1 (& later) will have mandatory EMS support, so they can't run them.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20762)
Make sure that a TLSv1.3 only client does not send a TLSv1.3 key_share.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19317)
Create new TLS_GROUP_ENTRY values for these groups.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19315)
This avoids the need to use SECLEVEL=1 in 12-ct.cnf.in.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18450)
This requires some code being pulled into the empty protocol
implementation so the state machinery works.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18307)
This is in line with the NEWS entry (erroneously) announcing such for 3.0.
Fixes#18194
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18236)
It is valid for name constraints to be in force but for there to be no
SAN extension in a certificate. Previous versions of OpenSSL mishandled
this.
Test for CVE-2021-4044
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Fix tests that were expecting a default security level of 1 to work with
the new default of 2.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16760)
Move them from test_renegotiation to renegotiation in ssl_new
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15415)
SHA1 is now in security level 0. SHA1 is required for DTLSv1.1. Therefore
ssl_test_new needed some adjustments in the event that DTLSv1.2 is disabled.
There are also adjustments required if using the FIPS module and DTLSv1.2
is disabled. The only DTLS version supported by the FIPS module is
DTLSv1.2.
Fixes #14956
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15047)
If we have TLSv1.3 enabled then we must have at least one TLSv1.3 capable
group available. This check was not always working
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14430)
Removed the related TODOs.
Also adjusted the DH parameters used for the DH test to be acceptable
for FIPS as that now allows only known safe prime parameters.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14367)
Even if EC and DH are disabled then we may still be able to use TLSv1.3
if we have groups that have been plugged in by an external provider.
Fixes#13767
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
The client-side cert verification callback function may not only return
as usual for success or 0 for failure, but also -1,
typically on failure verifying the server certificate.
This makes the handshake suspend and return control to the calling application
with SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY.
The app can for instance fetch further certificates or cert status information
needed for the verification.
Calling SSL_connect() again resumes the connection attempt
by retrying the server certificate verification step.
This process may even be repeated if need be.
The core implementation of the feature is in ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c,
splitting tls_process_server_certificate() into a preparation step
that just copies the certificates received from the server to s->session->peer_chain
(rather than having them in a local variable at first) and returns to the state machine,
and a post-processing step in tls_post_process_server_certificate() that can be repeated:
Try verifying the current contents of s->session->peer_chain basically as before,
but give the verification callback function the chance to pause connecting and
make the TLS state machine later call tls_post_process_server_certificate() again.
Otherwise processing continues as usual.
The documentation of the new feature is added to SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod
and SSL_want.pod.
This adds two tests:
* A generic test in test/helpers/handshake.c
on the usability of the new server cert verification retry feature.
It is triggered via test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.cnf.in (while the bulky auto-
generated changes to test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.cnf can be basically ignored).
* A test in test/sslapitest.c that demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach
for augmenting the cert chain provided by the server in between SSL_connect() calls.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13906)
Ensure we correctly detect if DTLS has been disabled in the client auth
test_ssl_new tests.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13587)
For key agreement only NIST curves that have a security strength of 112 bits or more are allowed.
Fixed tests so they obey these restrictions when testing in fips mode.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12745)
The previous commit fixed a bug with mte, stitched ciphersuites and
TLSv1.0. We now add a test for that scenario.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12670)
This has as effect that SHA1 and MD5+SHA1 are no longer supported at
security level 1, and that TLS < 1.2 is no longer supported at the
default security level of 1, and that you need to set the security
level to 0 to use TLS < 1.2.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
GH: #10787
Now that we have added the TLS-GROUP capability to the default provider
we can use that to discover the supported group list based on the loaded
providers.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11914)
There were a few RSA-PSS related tests that were disabled for non-default
library contexts. We now re-enable them.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
A small number of files contain references to the "OpenSSL license"
which has been deprecated and replaced by the "Apache License 2.0".
Amend the occurences.
Fixes#11649
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11663)
We load the FIPS module and make sure it is configured before running
the ssl_test_new tests.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11511)
We now run the tests twice: Once with no specific providers loaded and
just using the default libctx, and a second time with a non-default libctx
and the default provider.
In the second run we disable tests which use a PSS cert/key because we
don't yet have support for that.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11511)
The default is openssl.cnf The project seems to prefer xxx.conf these
days, but we should use the default convention.
Rename all foo.conf (except for Configurations) to foo.cnf
Fixes#11174
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11176)
Signature algorithms not using an MD weren't checked that they're
allowed by the security level.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #10785
Create a whole chain of Ed488 certificates so that we can use it at security
level 4 (192 bit). We had an 2048 bit RSA (112 bit, level 2) root sign the
Ed488 certificate using SHA256 (128 bit, level 3).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #10785
Now that we have TLSv1.3 FFDHE support there is no reason why we should
not allow TLSv1.3 to be used in a no-ec build. This commit enables that
to happen.
It also fixes no-ec which was previously broken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9156)
Add SSL_OP64_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, that can be set on either
an SSL or an SSL_CTX. When processing a ClientHello, if this flag
is set, do not indicate that the EMS TLS extension was received in
either the ssl3 object or the SSL_SESSION. Retain most of the
sanity checks between the previous and current session during
session resumption, but weaken the check when the current SSL
object is configured to not use EMS.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3910)
