Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18918)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19090)
We need to reencode X509_req_info_st if member data updated.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19090)
Also constify X509_REQ_get0_pubkey() and X509_REQ_check_private_key().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18930)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18931)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18931)
Code signing certificates have other properties as for example described in
CA Browser Forum documents. This leads to "unsupported certificate purpose" errors when
verifying signed objects.
This patch adds the purpose "codesign" to the table in X.509 certificate verification and
the verification parameter "code_sign" to X509_VERIFY_PARAM.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18567)
This allows reverting the recent workaround on cmp_ctx_test regarding X509_new()
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16043)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18840)
If an IP address prefix value is supplied that is too large then a crash
can result. v2i_IPAddrBlocks() should sanity check the prefix value, as
should X509v3_addr_add_prefix().
Reported by Theo Buehler (@botovq)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18523)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18668)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18668)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18668)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18668)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18759)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18759)
The problem of producing to-the-point diagnostics will be fixed in a follow-up PR.
Fixes#18691
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18758)
range_should_be_prefix() was misidentifying whether an IP address range
should in fact be represented as a prefix. This was due to a bug introduced
in commit 42d7d7dd which made this incorrect change:
- OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
+ if (memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0)
+ return -1;
This error leads to incorrect DER being encoded/accepted.
Reported by Theo Buehler (@botovq)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18524)
As the potential failure of the OPENSSL_strdup(),
it should be better to check the return value and
return error if fails.
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18593)
If the asnum or rdi fields are NULL and the ASIdentifiers are otherwise
subsets then this will result in a crash. Of note is that rdi will usually
be NULL.
Reported by Theo Buehler (@botovq)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18514)
This can be reproduced with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1653520461 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./cms-test ./corpora/cms/3eff1d2f1232bd66d5635db2c3f9e7f23830dfd1
log file: cms-3eff1d2f1232bd66d5635db2c3f9e7f23830dfd1-32454-test.out
ERROR_INJECT=1653520461
#0 0x7fd5d8b8eeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x402fc4 in my_realloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:129
#2 0x7fd5d8893c49 in sk_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:198
#3 0x7fd5d8893c49 in OPENSSL_sk_insert crypto/stack/stack.c:242
#4 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push include/openssl/x509v3.h:168
#5 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in crl_set_issuers crypto/x509/x_crl.c:111
#6 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:246
#7 0x7fd5d85dc032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#8 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#9 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#10 0x7fd5d85db2b5 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:259
#11 0x7fd5d85dc813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#12 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#13 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#14 0x7fd5d85dca28 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:633
#15 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#16 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#17 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#18 0x7fd5d85dd7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#19 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#20 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#21 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#22 0x7fd5d85a77e0 in ASN1_item_d2i_bio crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c:69
#23 0x402845 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/cms.c:43
#24 0x402bbb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#25 0x402626 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#26 0x7fd5d7c81f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#27 0x402706 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/cms-test+0x402706)
=================================================================
==29625==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fd5d8b8309f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x7fd5d87c2430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fd5d889501f in OPENSSL_sk_new_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:209
#3 0x7fd5d85dcbc3 in sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null include/openssl/asn1t.h:928
#4 0x7fd5d85dcbc3 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:577
#5 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#6 0x7fd5d85db104 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:178
#7 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#8 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#9 0x7fd5d88f86d9 in X509V3_EXT_d2i crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c:142
#10 0x7fd5d88d6d3c in crl_set_issuers crypto/x509/x_crl.c:97
#11 0x7fd5d88d6d3c in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:246
#12 0x7fd5d85dc032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#13 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#14 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#15 0x7fd5d85db2b5 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:259
#16 0x7fd5d85dc813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#17 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#18 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#19 0x7fd5d85dca28 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:633
#20 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#21 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#22 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#23 0x7fd5d85dd7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#24 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#25 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#26 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#27 0x7fd5d85a77e0 in ASN1_item_d2i_bio crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c:69
#28 0x402845 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/cms.c:43
#29 0x402bbb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#30 0x402626 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#31 0x7fd5d7c81f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18391)
This is reproducible with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1653267699 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./x509-test ./corpora/x509/5f4034ae85d6587dcad4da3e812e80f3d312894d
ERROR_INJECT=1653267699
#0 0x7fd485a6ad4f in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cc:36
#1 0x55c12d268724 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7fd484f51a75 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7fd484ed778d in EVP_DigestInit_ex crypto/evp/digest.c:139
#4 0x7fd4850a9849 in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c:44
#5 0x55c12d268951 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:44
#6 0x55c12d268239 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#7 0x55c12d267c7f in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#8 0x7fd483a42082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
#9 0x55c12d267e5d in _start (/home/ed/OPCToolboxV5/Source/Core/OpenSSL/openssl/fuzz/x509-test+0x3e5d)
=================================================================
==1058475==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 268 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fd485a5dc3e in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:163
#1 0x7fd484d2eb9b in BUF_MEM_grow crypto/buffer/buffer.c:97
#2 0x7fd4850b2913 in X509_NAME_oneline crypto/x509/x509_obj.c:43
#3 0x7fd4850a982f in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c:41
#4 0x55c12d268951 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:44
#5 0x55c12d268239 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#6 0x55c12d267c7f in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#7 0x7fd483a42082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 268 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18371)
This happens usually if an template object is created
and there is an out of memory error before the ASN1_OP_NEW_POST
method is called, but asn1_item_embed_free calls now the
ASN1_OP_FREE_POST which may crash because the object is not
properly initialized. Apparently that is only an issue with
the ASN1_OP_FREE_POST handling of crypot/x509/x_crl.c, which
ought to be tolerant to incomplete initialized objects.
The error can be reproduced with the reproducible error injection patch:
$ ERROR_INJECT=1652890550 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./asn1-test ./corpora/asn1/0ff17293911f54d1538b9896563a4048d67d9ee4
#0 0x7faae9dbeeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x408dc4 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7faae99f2430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7faae97f09e5 in ASN1_STRING_type_new crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c:341
#4 0x7faae98118f7 in asn1_primitive_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:318
#5 0x7faae9812401 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:78
#6 0x7faae9812401 in asn1_template_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:240
#7 0x7faae9812315 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:137
#8 0x7faae9812315 in asn1_template_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:240
#9 0x7faae9812a54 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:137
#10 0x7faae9812a54 in ASN1_item_ex_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:39
#11 0x7faae980be51 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:325
#12 0x7faae980c813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#13 0x7faae980d288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#14 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#15 0x7faae980caf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#16 0x7faae980d7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#17 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#18 0x7faae980dd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#19 0x7faae980de35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#20 0x40712c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/asn1.c:301
#21 0x40893b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#22 0x406b86 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#23 0x7faae8eb1f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==1194==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000010 (pc 0x7faae9b0625f bp 0x7fffffe41a00 sp 0x7fffffe41920 T0)
==1194==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==1194==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7faae9b0625f in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:258
#1 0x7faae9811255 in asn1_item_embed_free crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c:113
#2 0x7faae9812a65 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:150
#3 0x7faae9812a65 in ASN1_item_ex_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:39
#4 0x7faae980be51 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:325
#5 0x7faae980c813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#6 0x7faae980d288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#7 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#8 0x7faae980caf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#9 0x7faae980d7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#10 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#11 0x7faae980dd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#12 0x7faae980de35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#13 0x40712c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/asn1.c:301
#14 0x40893b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#15 0x406b86 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#16 0x7faae8eb1f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV crypto/x509/x_crl.c:258 in crl_cb
==1194==ABORTING
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18360)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14417)
X509V3_add_value() will return 0 on malloc failure, which could lead to
err logic in X509V3_parse_list().
Fix this by adding return value check of X509V3_add_value().
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18077)
Since the potential failure of memory allocation, it
should be better to check the return value of the
OPENSSL_strndup(), like x509v3_add_len_value().
And following the comment of 'if (astrlen < 0)',
return -1 if fails.
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17737)
X509_TRUST_get0() is checking < 0, the code here was checking == -1. Both are
equivalent in this situation but gcc-12 has conniptions about a subsequent
possible NULL dereference (which isn't possible).
Fixes#17665
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17668)
Including e_os.h with a path from a header file doesn't work well on
certain exotic platform. It simply fails to build.
Since we don't seem to be able to stop ourselves, the better move is
to move e_os.h to an include directory that's part of the inclusion
path given to the compiler.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17641)
The function X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() can be called with a 0
default purpose. If the main purpose was set to X509_PURPOSE_ANY this
would case the function to incorrectly return an error response.
Fixes#17367
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17382)
Since we may fail to get the lock, for example there is no lock, the
X509_STORE_lock() will return 0.
Therefore, we should check it in order to prevent the dirty data.
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17575)
Where name constraints apply, X509_verify() would incorrectly report an
internal error in the event that a certificate has no SAN extension.
CVE-2021-4044
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17175)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17175)
Also slightly improve the style of the respective code in crypto/x509/v3_san.c.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17145)
This does not change the semantics of expected usage because only either one may be given.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17145)
The condition `userlen == -1` isn't possible because this is already checked
on line 159 above and the subsequent strlen(3) call guarantees that it's value
is positive.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16987)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16918)
We try EVP_PKEY_dup() and if it fails we re-decode it using the
legacy method as provided keys should be duplicable.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16648)
When building the certificate chain, prioritise any Cert(0) Full(0)
certificates from TLSA records over certificates received from the peer.
This is important when the server sends a cross cert, but TLSA records include
the underlying root CA cert. We want to construct a chain with the issuer from
the TLSA record, which can then match the TLSA records (while the associated
cross cert may not).
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Mráz <tomas@openssl.org>
We should not assume that the type of an ASN.1 value is UTF8String as
expected. We must actually check it, otherwise we could get a NULL ptr
deref, or worse memory errors.
Reported by David Benjamin.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16443)
Previously if an error path is entered a leak could result.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
sscanf() call in ipv4_from_asc does not check that
the string is terminated immediately after the last digit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16201)
The ASN1_STRING_get0_data(3) manual explitely cautions the reader
that the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated, and the function
X509_alias_set1(3) does not sanitize the data passed into it in any
way either, so we must assume the return value from X509_alias_get0(3)
is merely a byte array and not necessarily a string in the sense
of the C language.
I found this bug while writing manual pages for X509_print_ex(3)
and related functions. Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org> checked my
patch to fix the same bug in LibreSSL, see
http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/t_x509a.c#rev1.9
As an aside, note that the function still produces incomplete and
misleading results when the data contains a NUL byte in the middle
and that error handling is consistently absent throughout, even
though the function provides an "int" return value obviously intended
to be 1 for success and 0 for failure, and even though this function
is called by another function that also wants to return 1 for success
and 0 for failure and even does so in many of its code paths, though
not in others. But let's stay focussed. Many things would be nice
to have in the wide wild world, but a buffer overflow must not be
allowed to remain in our backyard.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16108)
If the user set nmflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT and X509_NAME_print_ex(3)
failed, the error return value of 0 was misinterpreted as an indicator
of success, causing X509_print_ex(3) to ignore the error, continue
printing, and potentially return successfully even though not all
the content of the certificate was printed.
The X509_NAME_print_ex(3) manual page explains that this function
indicates failure by returning 0 if nmflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT
and by returning -1 if nmflags != XN_FLAG_COMPAT.
Note that just checking for <= 0 in all cases would not be correct
either because X509_NAME_print_ex(3) returns 0 to indicate that it
successfully printed zero bytes in some cases, for example when all
three of the following conditions hold:
1. nmflags != XN_FLAG_COMPAT
2. indent == 0 (which X509_print_ex(3) does use in some cases)
3. the name object is NULL or empty
Thanks to Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org> for finding the bug,
and Joel Sing <jsing@openbsd.org> for contributing an idea for the
fix.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16009)
Distinguish between not being able to extract a public key versus not knowing
the key's type.
Alternative to #15921
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15944)
Since the DH check is used only in DHE-PSK ciphersuites, it's
easy to miss it when updating the RSA mapping. Add cross-references
so that they remain consistent.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15853)
Previously all the SubjectPublicKeyInfo decoders were specific to a key
type. We would iterate over all them until a match was found for the correct
key type. Each one would fully decode the key before then testing whether
it was a match or not - throwing it away if not. This was very inefficient.
Instead we introduce a generic SubjectPublicKeyInfo decoder which figures
out what type of key is contained within it, before subsequently passing on
the data to a key type specific SubjectPublicKeyInfo decoder.
Fixes#15646
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15662)
Fixes#5430
Added the configuration file option "date_opt" to the openssl applications ca,
crl and x509.
Added ASN1_TIME_print_ex which supports the new datetime format using the
flag ASN1_DTFLGS_ISO8601
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14384)
The X509_PUBKEY_get0() was attempting to recreate any errors that might
have occurred from the earlier decode process when obtaining the EVP_PKEY.
This is brittle at best and the approach would only work with legacy keys.
We remove this and just report an error directly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15504)
The function pem_read_bio_key_legacy() is a fallback route if we
failed to load a key via a provider. We should be using the legacy
specific d2i functions to force legacy otherwise we end up using a
provider anyway
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15504)
We should use a provider to decode a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure if
we can. We should only use the legacy route if we are forcing legacy, or
if an ENGINE is in use.
Fixes#15393Fixes#15327
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15504)
If we are decoding a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure then we must use all
of the data and must not have bytes "left over".
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15504)
When a key (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) is embedded in some other structure
it may use an implicit tag. However the decoders can only handle the
universal class and don't know how to interpret the implicit tag.
Therefore we modify the data into a form the decoders can handle.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15504)
Identify digest from sigalg params for RSA-PSS and fallback
to SHA-256 for EDDSA.
Fixes#15477
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15618)
