Controls 'rsa_keygen_pubexp' and 'rsa_keygen_primes' should also be allowed
for RSA-PSS keys.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21818)
CLA: trivial
Fixes: #21809
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21817)
Trace output of the communication with the client is dumped to stderr if
the -trace options is supplied
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21800)
This is useful for debugging purposes. The standard SSL_trace msgcallback
can be used with tserver.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21800)
We change the client TLS handshake keys as late as possible so that we
don't disturb the keys if we are writing early data. However for QUIC we
want to do this as early as possible (after ServerHello). Since we will
never do TLS early data with QUIC we just do it as early as possible if
early data is not being used.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21810)
Even in case of later failure we need to flush
the previous packets.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21700)
Raise errors when appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21700)
This improves tracking where the failure was triggered.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21700)
Make sure we free the stack of names we allocated in an error path.
Found by the reproducible error patch in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21796)
And use QTEST_FLAG_FAKE_TIME with test_ssl_trace().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21713)
Also adds saving the new trace to ssltraceref-new.txt in
test-runs which can be handy when the trace changes and
needs to be updated.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21713)
RFC says that successful decryption of HANDSHAKE el packet
triggers the discard on server side only.
On client we discard INITIAL el when we successfully send
a HANDSHAKE packet.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21713)
Fixes: #21358
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21391)
In some cases where a FIN has been received but with no data quic_read_actual
was failing to raise SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN. This meant that we could end up
blocking in SSL_read(_ex) for too long.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21780)
This really cannot be ever called with NULL store_ctx
and the check confuses Coverity.
Fixes Coverity 1538865
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21755)
If setting the crypto state has failed then memory might have been
partially allocated to fields within the partially constructed record
layer. We need to call tls_int_free() to properly free it.
Found by the reproducible error patch in openssl#21668
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21753)
This change is for feature request #21679.
Adds a couple of setters to aid with custom CRL validation.
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21737)
We shouldn't free the prev BIO in ssl_set_new_record_layer until it is
no longer referenced by s->rlayer.rrlnext.
Found by the reproducible error patch in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21741)
Make sure we free process_data_dest if it is not actually used.
Found by the reproducible error patch in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21741)
issue: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/21718
build break reported:
crypto/threads_pthread.c:76:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'pthread_mutexattr_settype'; did you mean 'pthread_mutexattr_destroy'? [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
76 | pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| pthread_mutexattr_destroy
crypto/threads_pthread.c:76:38: error: 'PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'PTHREAD_MUTEX_TIMED_NP'?
76 | pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| PTHREAD_MUTEX_TIMED_NP
This occurs because PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL is only defined in glibc if
__USE_UNIX98 or __USE_XOPEN2K8 is defined, which is derived from setting
__USE_POSIX_C_SOURCE or __XOPEN_SOURCE is selected in the glibc feature
set for a build. Since openssl selects no specific feature set from
glibc, the build break occurs
We could select a feature set of course, but that seems like a
significant discussion to have prior to doing so. Instead, the simpler
solution is to just not set the mutex type at all, given that
pthread_mutexattr_init sets the default mutex type, which should be akin
to normal anyway (i.e. no mutex error checking or allowed-recursive
behavior)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21726)
Fixes#21198
decoder objects were setting propq as NULL.
Added a set_ctx/settable_ctx to all decoders that should supply
a property query parameter to internal functions.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21219)
Recent leak discovered by valgrind:
==1007580== at 0x483C815: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:431)
==1007580== by 0x2C2689: CRYPTO_zalloc (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x295A17: BUF_MEM_new (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x295A78: BUF_MEM_new_ex (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x28CACE: mem_new (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x285EA8: BIO_new_ex (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x231894: convert_pubkey_ECC (tpm2_driver.c:221)
==1007580== by 0x232B73: create_ephemeral_key (tpm2_driver.c:641)
==1007580== by 0x232E1F: tpm_gen_keypair (tpm2_driver.c:695)
==1007580== by 0x22D60A: gen_keypair (se_driver_api.c:275)
==1007580== by 0x21FF35: generate_keypair (dhkey.c:142)
==1007580== by 0x24D4C8: __test_dhkey (dhkey_test.c:55)
led me to find that BIO_get_mem_data is informative only, it does not
transer ownership of a BIO_s_mems data structure to the caller.
Additionally treating it as such leads to the above leak, or possibly
data corruption in the event that BIO_set_close(bio, BIO_NOCLOSE) is not
set properly prior to calling BIO_free.
Made an attempt to fix it in a minimally invasive manner in the 3.1
branch, but based on discussion, its just not safe to do in an API
compatible way, so just document the sematics a little more clearly
here, and fix it properly in a future release
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21724)
(cherry picked from commit 66d1658b4d)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21033)
Found via the reproducible error injection in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21723)
The comments in quic_tls.c claimed that the dummybio was never used by
us. In fact that is not entirely correct since we set and cleared the
retry flags on it. This means that we have to manage it properly, and update
it in the event of set1_bio() call on the record layer method.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
This should result in a QUIC PROTOCOL_VIOLATION
We also add tests for a post-handshake KeyUpdate, and a NewSessionTicket
with an invalid max_early_data value.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
We already disallowed the sending of TLS KeyUpdate messages. We also treat
the receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate message as an unexpected message.
RFC 9001 section 6:
Endpoints MUST treat the receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate message as a connection
error of type 0x010a, equivalent to a fatal TLS alert of unexpected_message;
see Section 4.8.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
The max_early_data value must be 0xffffffff if the extension is present in
a NewSessionTicket message in QUIC. Otherwise it is a PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
