Original definition depended on __LONG_MAX__ that is not guaranteed to
be present. As we don't support platforms with int narrower that 32 bits
it's appropriate to make defition inconditional.
PR: 3165
Based on a suggested workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771):
if the TLS Client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less
that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512.
To enable it use an unused extension number (for example 0x4242) using
e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_wtf=0x4242
WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
PR: 2809
DTLS/SCTP requires DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks to be protected with
SCTP-AUTH. It is checked if this has been activated successfully for
the local and remote peer. Due to a bug, however, the
gauth_number_of_chunks field of the authchunks struct is missing on
FreeBSD, and was therefore not considered in the OpenSSL implementation.
This patch sets the corresponding pointer for the check correctly
whether or not this bug is present.
(cherry picked from commit f596e3c491)
PR: 2808
With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key. Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
(cherry picked from commit 9fb523adce)
Don't require a public key in tls1_set_ec_id if compression status is
not needed. This fixes a bug where SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE wouldn't work.
(cherry picked from commit 5ff68e8f6d)
This fixes problems in POD list formatting: extra or missing =back
sequences.
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod around line 90: =back without =over
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store.pod around line 73: =back without =over
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod around line 82: =back without =over
doc/crypto/evp.pod around line 40: '=item' outside of any '=over'
crypto/des/des.pod around line 184: You forgot a '=back' before '=head1'
PR#3147
Newer pod2man considers =item [1-9] part of a numbered list, while =item
0 starts an unnumbered list. Add a zero effect formatting mark to override
this.
doc/apps/smime.pod around line 315: Expected text after =item, not a
number
...
PR#3146
Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.
This is a forward-port of commits:
4af793036ff4c93b46ed3da721dac92583270191
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
Removing RSA+MD5 from the default signature algorithm list
prevents its use by default.
If a broken implementation attempts to use RSA+MD5 anyway the sanity
checking of signature algorithms will cause a fatal alert.