if we have a malloc |x = OPENSSL_malloc(...)| sometimes we check |x|
for NULL and sometimes we treat it as a boolean |if(!x) ...|. Standardise
the approach in libssl.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The SSL variable |in_handshake| seems misplaced. It would be better to have
it in the STATEM structure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Change various state machine functions to use the prefix ossl_statem
instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Clean up and remove lots of code that is now no longer needed due to the
move to the new state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This is the first drop of the new state machine code.
The rewrite has the following objectives:
- Remove duplication of state code between client and server
- Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS
- Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location
so that it is easier to validate
- Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions
- Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid
transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues
where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something
else)
- Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better
understand each)
- message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the
event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a
message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc
- handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now
- Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all
the state changes local to a file
This builds on previous state machine related work:
- Surface CCS processing in the state machine
- Version negotiation rewrite
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This patch updates the "DEFAULT" cipherstring to be
"ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL". COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT is now defined
internally by a flag on each ciphersuite indicating whether it should be
excluded from DEFAULT or not. This gives us control at an individual
ciphersuite level as to exactly what is in DEFAULT and what is not.
Finally all DES, RC4 and RC2 ciphersuites are added to COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
and hence removed from DEFAULT.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
There are many places (nearly 50) where we malloc and then memset.
Add an OPENSSL_zalloc routine to encapsulate that.
(Missed one conversion; thanks Richard)
Also fixes GH328
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.
Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Move PSK premaster secret algorithm to ssl_generate_master secret so
existing key exchange code can be used and modified slightly to add
the PSK wrapping structure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could
only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it
directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified.
Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to
ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears
any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag
after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite
unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely
undocumented).
The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client
side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished
message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send
application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message.
This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the
implementation of ssl3_write:
/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
* last handshake message in the same packet as the first
* use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
* session-id reuse */
It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing
is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay.
This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well
as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
We always free the handshake buffer when digests are freed so move
it into ssl_free_digest_list()
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This reverts commit d480e182fe.
Commit broke TLS handshakes due to fragility of digest caching: that will be
fixed separately.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Remove support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites. These two
ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH
ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked
since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new
export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to
fix them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run
OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining
the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably
not well tested). Therefore it is being removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Move per-connection state out of the CERT structure: which should just be
for shared configuration data (e.g. certificates to use).
In particular move temporary premaster secret, raw ciphers, peer signature
algorithms and shared signature algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Following the version negotiation rewrite all of the previous code that was
dedicated to version negotiation can now be deleted - all six source files
of it!!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
This commit changes the way that we do server side protocol version
negotiation. Previously we had a whole set of code that had an "up front"
state machine dedicated to the negotiating the protocol version. This adds
significant complexity to the state machine. Historically the justification
for doing this was the support of SSLv2 which works quite differently to
SSLv3+. However, we have now removed support for SSLv2 so there is little
reason to maintain this complexity.
The one slight difficulty is that, although we no longer support SSLv2, we
do still support an SSLv3+ ClientHello in an SSLv2 backward compatible
ClientHello format. This is generally only used by legacy clients. This
commit adds support within the SSLv3 code for these legacy format
ClientHellos.
Server side version negotiation now works in much the same was as DTLS,
i.e. we introduce the concept of TLS_ANY_VERSION. If s->version is set to
that then when a ClientHello is received it will work out the most
appropriate version to respond with. Also, SSLv23_method and
SSLv23_server_method have been replaced with TLS_method and
TLS_server_method respectively. The old SSLv23* names still exist as
macros pointing at the new name, although they are deprecated.
Subsequent commits will look at client side version negotiation, as well of
removal of the old s23* code.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Remove RFC2712 Kerberos support from libssl. This code and the associated
standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
For a local variable:
TYPE *p;
Allocations like this are "risky":
p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
could get memory corruption. Instead do this:
p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
After the finale, the "real" final part. :) Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Add OPENSSL_clear_free which merges cleanse and free.
(Names was picked to be similar to BN_clear_free, etc.)
Removed OPENSSL_freeFunc macro.
Fixed the small simple ones that are left:
CRYPTO_free CRYPTO_free_locked OPENSSL_free_locked
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine. This gets X509_.*free:
x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Start ensuring all OpenSSL "free" routines allow NULL, and remove
any if check before calling them.
This gets DH_free, DSA_free, RSA_free
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Change ssl_set_handshake_header from return void to returning int, and
handle error return code appropriately.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Ensure that all functions have their return values checked where
appropriate. This covers all functions defined and called from within
libssl.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
These ciphers are removed:
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
They were defined in a long-expired IETF internet-draft:
draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
I left many "#if 0" lines, usually because I thought we would
probably want to revisit them later, or because they provided
some useful internal documentation tips.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
An expired IETF Internet-Draft (seven years old) that nobody
implements, and probably just as good as NSA DRBG work.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Not interested in helping the NSA in the slightest.
And anyway, it was never implemented, #if'd out.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the
serverinfo checks are no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
While RFC6367 focuses on Camellia-GCM cipher suites, it also adds a few
cipher suites that use SHA-2 based HMAC that can be very easily
added.
Tested against gnutls 3.3.5
PR#3443
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including
sensible defaults based on bits of security.
The "parameters" which can be selected include: ciphersuites,
curves, key sizes, certificate signature algorithms, supported
signature algorithms, DH parameters, SSL/TLS version, session tickets
and compression.
In some cases prohibiting the use of a parameters will mean they are
not advertised to the peer: for example cipher suites and ECC curves.
In other cases it will abort the handshake: e.g DH parameters or the
peer key size.
Documentation to follow...
Add auto DH parameter support. This is roughly equivalent to the
ECDH auto curve selection but for DH. An application can just call
SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 1);
and appropriate DH parameters will be used based on the size of the
server key.
Unlike ECDH there is no way a peer can indicate the range of DH parameters
it supports. Some peers cannot handle DH keys larger that 1024 bits for
example. In this case if you call:
SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 2);
Only 1024 bit DH parameters will be used.
If the server key is 7680 bits or more in size then 8192 bit DH parameters
will be used: these will be *very* slow.
The old export ciphersuites aren't supported but those are very
insecure anyway.
If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake.
Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.
If an application calls the macro SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
return either the old "shared" extra certificates or those associated
with the current certificate.
This means applications which call SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file
and retrieve the additional chain using SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
will still work. An application which only wants to check the shared
extra certificates can call the new macro
SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only
New ctrl sets current certificate based on certain criteria. Currently
two options: set the first valid certificate as current and set the
next valid certificate as current. Using these an application can
iterate over all certificates in an SSL_CTX or SSL structure.
Replace the full ciphersuites with "EDH-" in their labels with "DHE-"
so that all DHE ciphersuites are referred to in the same way.
Leave backward-compatible aliases for the ciphersuites in question so
that configurations which specify these explicitly will continue
working.
This change normalizes the SSL_CK_DHE_ #defines to use the common term
"DHE", while permitting older code that uses the more uncommon "EDH"
constants to compile properly.
DHE is the standard term used by the RFCs and by other TLS
implementations. It's useful to have the internal variables use the
standard terminology.
This patch leaves a synonym SSL_kEDH in place, though, so that older
code can still be built against it, since that has been the
traditional API. SSL_kEDH should probably be deprecated at some
point, though.
ECDHE is the standard term used by the RFCs and by other TLS
implementations. It's useful to have the internal variables use the
standard terminology.
This patch leaves a synonym SSL_kEECDH in place, though, so that older
code can still be built against it, since that has been the
traditional API. SSL_kEECDH should probably be deprecated at some
point, though.
PR#3169
This patch, which currently applies successfully against master and
1_0_2, adds the following functions:
SSL_[CTX_]select_current_cert() - set the current certificate without
disturbing the existing structure.
SSL_[CTX_]get0_chain_certs() - get the current certificate's chain.
SSL_[CTX_]clear_chain_certs() - clear the current certificate's chain.
The patch also adds these functions to, and fixes some existing errors
in, SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod.
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.
This change adds support for ALPN[1] in OpenSSL. ALPN is the IETF
blessed version of NPN and we'll be supporting both ALPN and NPN for
some time yet.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-00
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Use the enc_flags field to determine whether we should use explicit IV,
signature algorithms or SHA256 default PRF instead of hard coding which
versions support each requirement.
Revise DTLS code. There was a *lot* of code duplication in the
DTLS code that generates records. This makes it harder to maintain and
sometimes a TLS update is omitted by accident from the DTLS code.
Specifically almost all of the record generation functions have code like
this:
some_pointer = buffer + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH;
... Record creation stuff ...
set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL_MT_SOMETHING, message_len);
...
write_handshake_message(ssl);
Where the "Record creation stuff" is identical between SSL/TLS and DTLS or
in some cases has very minor differences.
By adding a few fields to SSL3_ENC to include the header length, some flags
and function pointers for handshake header setting and handshake writing the
code can cope with both cases.
Note: although this passes "make test" and some simple DTLS tests there may
be some minor differences in the DTLS code that have to be accounted for.
client hello message. Previously this could only be retrieved on an initial
connection and it was impossible to determine the cipher IDs of any uknown
ciphersuites.
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
to test if a chain is correctly configured.
Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
details in s_client.
Also add ctrl to set client certificate types. If not used sensible values
will be included based on supported signature algorithms: for example if
we don't include any DSA signing algorithms the DSA certificate type is
omitted.
Fix restriction in old code where certificate types would be truncated
if it exceeded TLS_CT_NUMBER.
the permitted signature algorithms for server and client authentication
are the same but it is now possible to set different algorithms for client
authentication only.
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
to have similar checks in it.
Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
TLS v1.2. These are sent as an extension for clients and during a certificate
request for servers.
TODO: add support for shared signature algorithms, respect shared algorithms
when deciding which ciphersuites and certificates to permit.
enabled instead of requiring an application to hard code a (possibly
inappropriate) parameter set and delve into EC internals we just
automatically use the preferred curve.
Tidy some code up.
Don't allocate a structure to handle ECC extensions when it is used for
default values.
Make supported curves configurable.
Add ctrls to retrieve shared curves: not fully integrated with rest of
ECC code yet.
structure.
Before this the only way to add a custom chain was in the parent SSL_CTX
(which is shared by all key types and SSL structures) or rely on auto
chain building (which is performed on each handshake) from the trust store.
The cipher definitions of these ciphersuites have been around since SSLeay
but were always disabled. Now OpenSSL supports DH certificates they can be
finally enabled.
Various additional changes were needed to make them work properly: many
unused fixed DH sections of code were untested.
New function to retrieve compression method from SSL_SESSION structure.
Delete SSL_SESSION_get_id_len and SSL_SESSION_get0_id functions
as they duplicate functionality of SSL_SESSION_get_id. Note: these functions
have never appeared in any release version of OpenSSL.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
Remove unnecessary code for srp and to add some comments to
s_client.
- the callback to provide a user during client connect is
no longer necessary since rfc 5054 a connection attempt
with an srp cipher and no user is terminated when the
cipher is acceptable
- comments to indicate in s_client the (non-)usefulness of
th primalaty tests for non known group parameters.
checking added, SHA256 PRF support added.
At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2 as the
new signature format is not yet implemented.
with the appropriate parameters which calls OBJ_bsearch(). A compiler will
typically inline this.
This avoids the need for cmp_xxx variables and fixes unchecked const issues
with CHECKED_PTR_OF()
of handshake failure
2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to
make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH
(required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates).
3. Changes to EVP
- adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey
- Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with
ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to
pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation.
- added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really
GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go
in some header file, available during libssl compilation
4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data
5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to
make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work
and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes
6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods
SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST
7. Implementation of these methods.
8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST
ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with
CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by
SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant.
This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if
non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST
include compatibility with CryptoPro.
9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is
another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it
does no harm for draft-conforming implementation.
10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done.
When I've written currently commited code I haven't read
EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that
it does an internal digest ctx copying.
This implementation was tested against
1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server
2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
(draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt), and do some cleanups and
bugfixes on the way. In particular, this fixes the buffer bounds
checks in ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext() and in ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext().
Note that the opaque PRF Input TLS extension is not compiled by default;
see CHANGES.
This change resolves a number of problems and obviates multiple kludges.
A new feature is that you can now say "AES256" or "AES128" (not just
"AES", which enables both).
In some cases the ciphersuite list generated from a given string is
affected by this change. I hope this is just in those cases where the
previous behaviour did not make sense.
have a uniform representation for those over all architectures, so a
little bit of hackery is needed.
Contributed by nagendra modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu>
I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.
New macros SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg().
Message callback imlementation for SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 (no SSL 2.0 yet).
New '-msg' option for 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server'
that enable a message callback that displays all protocol messages.
In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert if
client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use.
Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0
if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the
client will at least see that alert.
Fix SSL[_CTX]_ctrl prototype (void * instead of char * for generic
pointer).
Add/update some OpenSSL copyright notices.
His comments are:
. adds use of replay cache to protect against replay attacks
. adds functions kssl_tgt_is_available() and
kssl_keytab_is_available() which are used within s3_lib.c
and ssl_lib.c to determine at runtime whether or not
KRB5 ciphers can be supported during the current session.
applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and
don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy().
Note: this is almost identical to the patch submitted to openssl-dev
by Verdon Walker <VWalker@novell.com> except some redundant
EVP_add_digest_()/EVP_cleanup() calls were removed and some changes
made to avoid compiler warnings.
