In the dupctx fixups I missed a pointer that needed to be repointed to
the surrounding structures AES_KEY structure for the sm4/aes/aria
ccm/gcm variants. This caused a colliding use of the key and possible
use after free issues.
Fixes#22076
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22102)
We had some use of the C11 _Static_assert feature which can cause some
problems on some platforms. Everywhere we were using it, it is not really
required so remove it.
Fixes#22017
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22091)
Fixes#22089
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22090)
For some reason, the code here was made to got through the provider
specific init functions. This is very very dangerous if the provider
specific functions were to change in any way (such as changes to the
implementation context structure).
Instead, use the init functions from the base blake2 implementations
directly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22079)
This affects only RSA-PSS keys with params using
negative salt legth, or in case of out of memory.
This fixes a memory leak reported in #22049.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22061)
Pretty straightforward, just clone the requested context, no pointers to
fixup
Fixes#21887
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21933)
Same as chacha20 in the last commit, just clone the ctx and its
underlying tlsmac array if its allocated
Fixes#21887
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21933)
This cipher family has a dupctx function, but was failing because it was
attempting to memdup a field only if it was null
Fix the conditional check to get it working again
Fixes#21887
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21933)
create a dupctx method for aes_WRAP implementations of all sizes
Fixes#21887
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21933)
Add dupctx method support to to ciphers implemented with IMPLEMENT_aead_cipher
This includes:
aes-<kbits>-gcm
aria-<kbits>-ccm
aria-<kbits>-gcm
sm4-<kibs>-gcm
Fixes#21887
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21933)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21468)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21468)
Implement the dupctx method for the chacha20 cipher, so that
EVP_PKEY_CTX_copy works
Its pretty straightforward, its basically just a memdup. Checking the
pointers that might need fixing up:
in PROV_CHACHA20_CTX all members are statically declared, so memduping
should be fine
in PROV_CHACHA20_CTX->base (PROV_CIPHER_CTX):
Non statically declared members:
*tlsmac needs to get memduped to avoid double free
conditions, but only if base.alloced is set
*hw pointer is always assigned to the chacha20_hw global
variable, so can be left alone
*libctx can be left alone as provctx is always NULL in
chacha20_newctx
*ks appears unused by chacha20, so can be ignored
Fixes#20978
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21878)
Fixes#21198
decoder objects were setting propq as NULL.
Added a set_ctx/settable_ctx to all decoders that should supply
a property query parameter to internal functions.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21219)
When decoding 0 as the selection means to decode anything
you get.
However when exporting and then importing the key data 0 as
selection is not meaningful.
So we set it to OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL to make the export/import
function export/import everything that we have decoded.
Fixes#21493
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21519)
This is already correct in the rsa_kmgmt.c but other
implementations are wrong.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21519)
msblob only decodes public/private keys (not just params).
pvk only decodes private keys.
If the requested selection doesn't intersect with the above then don't
consider those decoders.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21603)
The hardware-assisted ARMv8.2 implementation is already in keccak1600-armv8.pl.
It is not called because the author mentioned that it's not actually obvious
that it will provide performance improvements. The test on Apple M1 Firestorm
shows that the ARMv8.2 implementation could improve about 36% for large blocks.
So let's enable ARMv8.2 accelerated SHA3 on Apple CPU family.
Fixes#21380
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21398)
The most expensive part of using a PKEY decoder is the
OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey() call. This builds up all of the decoder
chains, which is a complex and time consuming operation. However, if no
new providers have been loaded/unloaded since the last time it was called
we can expect the same results for the same parameters. Note that this
operation takes place *before* we event parse the data for decoding so it
is not dependent on the parsed data at all.
We introduce a cache for OSSL_DECODER_CTX objects. If we have been called
with the same parameters then we just duplicate an existing
OSSL_DECODER_CTX. This should be significantly faster than creating a new
one every time.
Partially addressed the issue in #15199
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21426)
The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items
authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length.
The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data
which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also
a security issue because such empty associated data then become
unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them.
Fixes CVE-2023-2975
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
The implementation is not usable there at all.
Fixes#21301
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21312)
(cherry picked from commit b256d32915)
This is defined in NIST SP 800-208 as the truncation to 192 bits of
SHA256. Unlike other truncated hashes in the SHA2 suite, this variant
doesn't have a different initial state, it is just a pure truncation
of the output.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21180)
Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
The FIPS provider accesses it's current state under lock.
This is overkill, little or no synchronisation is actually required in
practice (because it's essentially a read only setting). Switch to using
TSAN operations in preference.
Fixes#21179
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21187)
This can effectively reduce the binary size for platforms
that don't need ECX feature(~100KB).
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yi1.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20781)
The separate file is a Perl script that generates the appropriate define
directives for inclusion in core_names.h. By having this separation it
will be possible to prebuild data structures to give faster access when
looking up parameters by name.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20935)
Even if a DRBG has locking enabled on it, there are certain parameters
which are still safe to obtain even without a lock. The max_request
value is constant for all our DRBGs. The reseed_counter does not matter
if we get it wrong - so it is safe to avoid the lock. So if all we are
reading are those parameters then we take no lock at all.
Partially fixes#20286
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20970)
Previously the EVP layer would call lock and unlock functions on the
underlying DRBG implementation to say when a lock should be acquired and
released. This gives the DRBG implementation no say as to what kind of
lock should obtained (e.g. read/write) or even whether a lock is actually
needed or not.
In reality we know whether a DRBG is supposed to be in locking mode or
not because the "enable_locking()" function will have been called if
locks should be used. Therefore we re-interpret the lock and unlock
functions as "hints" from the EVP layer which we ignore. Instead we
acquire locks only when we need them. By knowing the context we can obtain
either a read or a write lock as appropriate.
This may mean that in some rare cases we acquire the locks more than once
for a single EVP call, if the EVP call makes several calls to the underlying
DRBG. But in practice almost all EVP calls only make one such call.
EVP_RAND_generate() is an example of a call where multiple DRBG calls may
be made. One of these gets the "max_request" parameter (which is constant
for all of our own DRBGs) and it may make several calls to the DRBG generate
call - but only if the requested size is very large which will rarely be
the case.
Partially fixes#20286
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20970)
Fixes#20993
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20994)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20949)
The expression "if (a+b>c) a=c-b" is incorrect if "a+b" overflows.
It should be replaced by "if (a>c-b) a=c-b", which avoids the
potential overflow and is much easier to understand.
This pattern is the root cause of CVE-2022-37454, a buffer overflow
vulnerability in the "official" SHA-3 implementation.
It has been confirmed that the addition in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c#L534
cannot overflow. So this is only a minor change proposal to avoid
a potentially vulnerable code pattern and to improve readability.
More information: https://github.com/github/codeql/pull/12036#issuecomment-1466056959
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20990)
Fixes#20889
There was an incorrect value passed to EC_POINT_point2oct() for the
buffer size of the param passed-in.
Added testcases.
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yi1.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20890)
Fixes#20710
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20745)
Cache the fetched MAC and MD implementation until propq changes.
No need to keep the output stored in the context.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20534)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20751)
Discovered during coverage testing.
Remove unneccesary check when using ossl_dh_get0_params() and
ossl_dsa_get0_params(). These point to addresses and can not fail
for any existing calls.
Make dsa keygen tests only available in the FIPS module - as they are
not used in the default provider.
Change ossl_ffc_set_digest() to return void as it cannot fail.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20359)
Add option for restricting digests available to DRBGs.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20521)
With less than C99 compilers, this macro isn't guaranteed to exist, and
the value passed to it is 32 bits, so explicitly ending it with 'UL' is
correct in all cases. We simply leave it to the compiler to extend it
appropriately for uint64_t.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20547)
Fix use after free error.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20528)
<stdint.h> may not exist with pre-C99 compilers. <openssl/e_os2.h> deals
with that, so include it instead.
Similarly, include "internal/numbers.h" rather than <limits.h>, to deal
with things that may be lacking in the latter.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20537)
Signed-off-by: Čestmír Kalina <ckalina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12256)
Signed-off-by: Čestmír Kalina <ckalina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12256)
In RISC-V we have multiple extensions, that can be
used to accelerate processing.
The known extensions are defined in riscv_arch.def.
From that file test functions of the following
form are generated: RISCV_HAS_$ext().
In recent commits new ways to define the availability
of these test macros have been defined. E.g.:
#define RV32I_ZKND_ZKNE_CAPABLE \
(RISCV_HAS_ZKND() && RISCV_HAS_ZKNE())
[...]
#define RV64I_ZKND_ZKNE_CAPABLE \
(RISCV_HAS_ZKND() && RISCV_HAS_ZKNE())
This leaves us with two different APIs to test capabilities.
Further, creating the same macros for RV32 and RV64 results
in duplicated code (see example above).
This inconsistent situation makes it hard to integrate
further code. So let's clean this up with the following steps:
* Replace RV32I_* and RV64I_* macros by RICSV_HAS_* macros
* Move all test macros into riscv_arch.h
* Use "AND" and "OR" to combine tests with more than one extension
* Rename include files for accelerated processing (remove extension
postfix).
We end up with compile time tests for RV32/RV64 and run-time tests
for available extensions. Adding new routines (e.g. for vector crypto
instructions) should be straightforward.
Testing showed no regressions.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20078)
CLA: trivial
When `cleanup_entropy()` is called to cleanup parent by calling
provided `OSSL_FUNC_rand_clear_seed_fn` method, incorrect random
context is passed to the method. So accessing that context creates
a segmentation fault. Parent context should be passed rather than
DRBG's own context.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20454)
CLA: trivial
In RSA, `(n,e)` and `(n,d)` identify public key and private key.
Modulus `n` is the common part. So I updated `rsa_has()` to validate
these pairs correctly. `OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR` is common part
for both public and private key, so I changed it to check `n` of
RSA and for `OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY`, `e` is checked. Before
this change, if `selection` was `OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY` and
only `e` and `d` was in the RSA structure, the function returns 1
while it was incorrect.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20455)
since this code is also under GCM_HW_SET_KEY_CTR_FN macro
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20491)
NIST SP 800-132 [1] section 5.1 says "[t]he length of the
randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least
128 bits", which implies that the salt for PBKDF2 must be at least 16
bytes long (see also Appendix A.2.1).
The FIPS 140-3 IG [2] section 10.3.A requires that "the lengths and the
properties of the Password and Salt parameters, as well as the desired
length of the Master Key used in a CAST shall be among those supported
by the module in the approved mode."
As a consequence, the salt length in the self test must be at least 16
bytes long for FIPS 140-3 compliance. Switch the self test to use the
only test vector from RFC 6070 that uses salt that is long enough to
fulfil this requirement. Since RFC 6070 does not provide expected
results for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256, use the output from [3], which was
generated with python cryptography, which was tested against the RFC
6070 vectors with HMAC-SHA1.
[1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-132
[2]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf
[3]: https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/PBKDF2/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20429)
The keccak XOF used for KMAC can be simplified by using klmd. This speeds up
XOF processing in cases where more than one result block is needed.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20431)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20386)
According to the documentation and my analysis tool RSA_public_decrypt()
can return -1 on error, but this is not checked. Fix it by changing the
error condition.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20250)
This reverts commit 09627a8ceb.
NIST isn't allowing EdDSA at this stage after all, so flag it as not
FIPS approved in the FIPS provider. Guidance for FIPS 140-3 is expected
later this month:
The use of EdDSA still remains non-approved.
Before the FIPS 186-5 and SP 800-186 algorithms / curves can be
used in the approved mode, the CMVP will need to do (at least)
the following:
* Incorporate FIPS 186-5 and SP 800-186 into SP 800-140C/D;
* Update IG 10.3.A to incorporate self-test requirements for the
new algorithms/curves.
* Write a new IG on this transition to clarify the issues raised in
this thread and elsewhere and provide a clear transition schedule.
The CMVP is working on all three of these items and hope to have
drafts public by the end of March.
Since security relevant changes are not permitted for new 140-2
submissions, and under the assumption that this transition away
from FIPS 186-4 algorithms will be 'soft' and not move modules to
the historical list, we do not plan on writing 140-2 guidance for
this transition.
It seems unlikely that all of these requirements will be completed before
we submit.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20343)
kbkdf_dup should use the appropriate type OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20314)
Avoid including QUIC related stuff in the FIPS sources.
Also avoid including libssl headers in ssl3_cbc.c.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19658)
Two key 3DES only sets two keys and the random generation errors out if fewer
than three keys are required. It shouldn't.
Fixes#20212
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20224)
Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19914)
Fixes#20084
In the 3.0 provider implementation the generic code that handles IV's
only allows a 12 byte IV. Older code intentionally added the ability for
the IV to be truncated.
As this truncation is unsafe, the documentation has been updated to
state that this in no longer allowed. The code has been updated to
produce an error when the iv length is set to any value other than 12.
NOTE: It appears that this additional padding may have originated from the code
which uses a 12 byte IV, that is then passed to CHACHA which zero pads it to 16 bytes.
Note that legacy behaviour in e_chacha20_poly1305.c has not been
updated.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20151)
CMVP's answer when questioned about this being:
X448 and X25519 uses Curve448 and Curve25519, respectfully, within an
ECDH scheme. Therefore, it is possible for a key agreement scheme
that uses Curve448 and Curve25519 to be used in the approved mode
and be viewed as an allowed algorithm if requirements of Scenario
X2 of IG D.8 and IG A.2 are met (or Scenario 3 of D.F and IG C.A for
FIPS 140-3). The use of EdDSA in the approved mode is not permitted
until FIPS 186-5 is published and part of CMVP guidance.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20079)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20109)
Context parameter OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE can now also be
retrieved for ECDSA and DSA.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20070)
CPACF does not support pre-hashing. This was considered correctly for
Ed25519ph, but not for Ed448ph which lead to errors in the test_evp suite
(test vector 20 - pre-hashing without context string). Fix this by using the
non-accelerated version of Ed448 also if no context string is provided, but
pre-hashing is performed.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20067)
In EC key generation, if allocation of struct ec_gen_ctx fails, values
provided by parameters are copied into the context at represented by a NULL
pointer. To fix this, prevent copy if allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20055)
CPACF does not directly support xofs. Emulate this by using single block
operations on an empty input block.
Fixes: affc070aab ("s390x: Optimize kmac")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19983)
Fixes#6277
Description:
Make each of the five EdDSA instances defined in RFC 8032 -- Ed25519,
Ed25519ctx, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph -- available via the EVP APIs.
The desired EdDSA instance is specified via an OSSL_PARAM.
All instances, except for Ed25519, allow context strings as input.
Context strings are passed via an OSSL_PARAM. For Ed25519ctx, the
context string must be nonempty.
Ed25519, Ed25519ctx, Ed448 are PureEdDSA instances, which means that
the full message (not a digest) must be passed to sign and verify
operations.
Ed25519ph, Ed448ph are HashEdDSA instances, which means that the input
message is hashed before sign and verify.
Testing:
All 21 test vectors from RFC 8032 have been added to evppkey_ecx.txt
(thanks to Shane Lontis for showing how to do that). Those 21 test
vectors are exercised by evp_test.c and cover all five instances.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19705)
Likewise for the related ECX key exchanges.
NIST is mandating this until FIPS 186-5 is finalised.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20020)
is used.
Fixes#19934
The existing code was looking for the digest size, and then returned
zero.
The example code in EVP_KDF-SS.pod has been corrected to not use a
digest.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19935)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19985)
Fixes#19909
I have enforced a maximum bound still but it is much higher.
Note also that TLS13 still uses the 2048 buffer size.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19923)
If x and y are all NULL, then it is unnecessary to do subsequent operations.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19905)
Now that ACVP test vectors exist, support has been added for this mode.
See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1.pdf
Note that the test vectors used fairly large values for the input key
and the context, so the contraints for these has been increased from
256 to 512 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19916)
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
the hash function output block (in bytes)."
Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
not use more than the digest length when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
J.-S. Coron shows in "Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other
Signature Schemes. Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2002, volume 2332
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 272 – 287. Springer Verlag,
2002." that longer salts than the output size of modern hash functions
do not increase security: "For example,for an application in which at
most one billion signatures will be generated, k0 = 30 bits of random
salt are actually sufficient to guarantee the same level of security as
RSA, and taking a larger salt does not increase the security level."
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19724)
This PR is based off the contributions in PR #9223 by Jemmy1228.
It has been modified and reworked to:
(1) Work with providers
(2) Support ECDSA and DSA
(3) Add a KDF HMAC_DRBG implementation that shares code with the RAND HMAC_DRBG.
A nonce_type is passed around inside the Signing API's, in order to support any
future deterministic algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18809)
Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19619)
