Move them from test_renegotiation to renegotiation in ssl_new
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15415)
SHA1 is now in security level 0. SHA1 is required for DTLSv1.1. Therefore
ssl_test_new needed some adjustments in the event that DTLSv1.2 is disabled.
There are also adjustments required if using the FIPS module and DTLSv1.2
is disabled. The only DTLS version supported by the FIPS module is
DTLSv1.2.
Fixes #14956
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15047)
If we have TLSv1.3 enabled then we must have at least one TLSv1.3 capable
group available. This check was not always working
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14430)
Removed the related TODOs.
Also adjusted the DH parameters used for the DH test to be acceptable
for FIPS as that now allows only known safe prime parameters.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14367)
Even if EC and DH are disabled then we may still be able to use TLSv1.3
if we have groups that have been plugged in by an external provider.
Fixes#13767
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
The client-side cert verification callback function may not only return
as usual for success or 0 for failure, but also -1,
typically on failure verifying the server certificate.
This makes the handshake suspend and return control to the calling application
with SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY.
The app can for instance fetch further certificates or cert status information
needed for the verification.
Calling SSL_connect() again resumes the connection attempt
by retrying the server certificate verification step.
This process may even be repeated if need be.
The core implementation of the feature is in ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c,
splitting tls_process_server_certificate() into a preparation step
that just copies the certificates received from the server to s->session->peer_chain
(rather than having them in a local variable at first) and returns to the state machine,
and a post-processing step in tls_post_process_server_certificate() that can be repeated:
Try verifying the current contents of s->session->peer_chain basically as before,
but give the verification callback function the chance to pause connecting and
make the TLS state machine later call tls_post_process_server_certificate() again.
Otherwise processing continues as usual.
The documentation of the new feature is added to SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod
and SSL_want.pod.
This adds two tests:
* A generic test in test/helpers/handshake.c
on the usability of the new server cert verification retry feature.
It is triggered via test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.cnf.in (while the bulky auto-
generated changes to test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.cnf can be basically ignored).
* A test in test/sslapitest.c that demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach
for augmenting the cert chain provided by the server in between SSL_connect() calls.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13906)
Ensure we correctly detect if DTLS has been disabled in the client auth
test_ssl_new tests.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13587)
For key agreement only NIST curves that have a security strength of 112 bits or more are allowed.
Fixed tests so they obey these restrictions when testing in fips mode.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12745)
The previous commit fixed a bug with mte, stitched ciphersuites and
TLSv1.0. We now add a test for that scenario.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12670)
This has as effect that SHA1 and MD5+SHA1 are no longer supported at
security level 1, and that TLS < 1.2 is no longer supported at the
default security level of 1, and that you need to set the security
level to 0 to use TLS < 1.2.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
GH: #10787
Now that we have added the TLS-GROUP capability to the default provider
we can use that to discover the supported group list based on the loaded
providers.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11914)
There were a few RSA-PSS related tests that were disabled for non-default
library contexts. We now re-enable them.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
A small number of files contain references to the "OpenSSL license"
which has been deprecated and replaced by the "Apache License 2.0".
Amend the occurences.
Fixes#11649
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11663)
We load the FIPS module and make sure it is configured before running
the ssl_test_new tests.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11511)
We now run the tests twice: Once with no specific providers loaded and
just using the default libctx, and a second time with a non-default libctx
and the default provider.
In the second run we disable tests which use a PSS cert/key because we
don't yet have support for that.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11511)
The default is openssl.cnf The project seems to prefer xxx.conf these
days, but we should use the default convention.
Rename all foo.conf (except for Configurations) to foo.cnf
Fixes#11174
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11176)
Signature algorithms not using an MD weren't checked that they're
allowed by the security level.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #10785
Create a whole chain of Ed488 certificates so that we can use it at security
level 4 (192 bit). We had an 2048 bit RSA (112 bit, level 2) root sign the
Ed488 certificate using SHA256 (128 bit, level 3).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #10785
Now that we have TLSv1.3 FFDHE support there is no reason why we should
not allow TLSv1.3 to be used in a no-ec build. This commit enables that
to happen.
It also fixes no-ec which was previously broken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9156)
Add SSL_OP64_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, that can be set on either
an SSL or an SSL_CTX. When processing a ClientHello, if this flag
is set, do not indicate that the EMS TLS extension was received in
either the ssl3 object or the SSL_SESSION. Retain most of the
sanity checks between the previous and current session during
session resumption, but weaken the check when the current SSL
object is configured to not use EMS.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3910)
When computing the end-point shared secret, don't take the
terminating NULL character into account.
Please note that this fix breaks interoperability with older
versions of OpenSSL, which are not fixed.
Fixes#7956
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7957)
Check that we use an RSA certificate if an RSA key exchange ciphersuite
is being used and we have both RSA and RSA-PSS certificates configured.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7099)
Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some
applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit
function call is required for a client to indicate support for
post-handshake auth.
Fixes#6933.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't
get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3).
Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts.
Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left
over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used.
Fixes#6804
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
The spec does not prohib certs form using compressed points. It only
requires that points in a key share are uncompressed. It says nothing
about point compression for certs, so we should not fail if a cert uses a
compressed point.
Fixes#5743
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6055)
If a server has been configured to use an ECDSA certificate, we should
allow it regardless of whether the server's own supported groups list
includes the certificate's group.
Fixes#2033
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5601)
With the current mechanism, old cipher strings that used to work in 1.1.0,
may inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites causing connections to
fail. This is confusing for users.
In reality TLSv1.3 are quite different to older ciphers. They are much
simpler and there are only a small number of them so, arguably, they don't
need the same level of control that the older ciphers have.
This change splits the configuration of TLSv1.3 ciphers from older ones.
By default the TLSv1.3 ciphers are on, so you cannot inadvertently disable
them through your existing config.
Fixes#5359
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5392)
Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
We now have a split in the signature algorithms codepoint space for
whether the certificate's key is for rsaEncryption or a PSS-specific
key, which should let us get rid of some special-casing that we
previously needed to try to coax rsaEncryption keys into performing PSS.
(This will be done in a subsequent commit.)
Send the new PSS-with-PSS-specific key first in our list, so that
we prefer the new technology to the old one.
We need to update the expected certificate type in one test,
since the "RSA-PSS+SHA256" form now corresponds to a public key
of type rsaEncryption, so we should expect the server certificate
type to be just "RSA". If we want to get a server certificate
type of "RSA-PSS", we need to use a new signature algorithm
that cannot be represented as signature+hash, so add a test for that
as well.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
