We should confirm that Signature Algorithms are actually available
through the loaded providers before we offer or select them.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11834)
This mode is severely untested and unmaintained, is seems not to be
used very much.
Closes#4679Closes#6292
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12023)
This is a follow-up of PR #12013.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12026)
Discussions are ongoing but the OMC has approved the in-principle addition
of these algorithms to the upcoming FIPS validation.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12020)
`crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c` contained code sections guarded by a
`ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2` define.
The relevant comment read:
> /*
> * Note that by default ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is undefined. While it's great
> * code processing 4 points in parallel, corresponding serial operation
> * is several times slower, because it uses 29x29=58-bit multiplication
> * as opposite to 64x64=128-bit in integer-only scalar case. As result
> * it doesn't provide *significant* performance improvement. Note that
> * just defining ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is not sufficient to make it work,
> * you'd need to compile even asm/ecp_nistz256-avx.pl module.
> */
Without diminishing the quality of the original submission, it's evident
that this code has been basically unreachable without modifications to
the library source code and is under-tested.
This commit removes these sections from the codebase.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12019)
Calling 'OSSL_PROVIDER_available(NULL, "default")' would search for
the "default" provider, and in doing so, activate it if necessary,
thereby detecting that it's available... and then immediately free
it, which could deactivate that provider, even though it should stay
available.
We solve this by incrementing the refcount for activated fallbacks one
extra time, thereby simulating an explicit OSSL_PROVIDER_load(), and
compensate for it with an extra ossl_provider_free() when emptying the
provider store.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11926)
There are cases where the fallback providers aren't treated right.
For example, the following calls, in that order, will end up with
a failed EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(), even thought the default provider
does supply an implementation of the "RSA" keytype.
EVP_KEYMGMT *rsameth = NULL;
OSSL_PROVIDER_available(NULL, "default");
rsameth = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(NULL, "RSA", NULL);
For good measure, this also tests that explicit loading of the default
provider won't fail.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11926)
This can happen if the 32-bit counter overflows
and the last block is not a multiple of 16 bytes.
Fixes#12012
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12016)
Merge test/P[12]ss.cnf into one config file
Merge CAss.cnf and Uss.cnf into ca-and-certs.cnf
Remove Netscape cert extensions, add keyUsage comment from some cnf files
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11347)
PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(), i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(),
PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(), and i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp() are affected
by this.
Fixes#11845
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11855)
Correct "EC_KEY_point2buf" to "EC_POINT_point2buf". The former does not exist.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11988)
Reason turns out that "git log -2" is picking up a merge
commit and a random commit message from the master branch.
Restore the expected behavior by using
git log -1 $env:APPVEYOR_PULL_REQUEST_HEAD_COMMIT
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11981)
The underlying functions remain and these are widely used.
This undoes the deprecation part of PR8442
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12001)
the openssl speed command could not benchmark FFDH speed, but it could
benchmark ECDH, making comparisons between the two hard
this commit adds this feature
fixes#9475
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hubert@kario.pl>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10887)
There is a problem casting ULONG_MAX to double which clang-10 is warning about.
ULONG_MAX typically cannot be exactly represented as a double. ULONG_MAX + 1
can be and this fix uses the latter, however since ULONG_MAX cannot be
represented exactly as a double number we subtract 65535 from this number,
and the result has at most 48 leading one bits, and can therefore be
represented as a double integer without rounding error. By adding
65536.0 to this number we achive the correct result, which should avoid the
warning.
The addresses a symptom of the underlying problem: we print doubles via an
unsigned long integer. Doubles have a far greater range and should be printed
better.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11955)
A CAVEATS section is present in this manual. That section name is
borrowed from OpenBSD, where mdoc(7) explains it like this:
CAVEATS
Common misuses and misunderstandings should be explained in this
section.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11963)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11976)
As of the previous commit, when a zero-length (string) parameter
is present in the parameters passed to a provider for a given operation,
we will produce an object corresponding to that zero-length parameter,
indicating to the underlying cryptographic operation that the parameter
was passed. However, rsa_cms_decrypt() was relying on the previous
behavior, and unconditionally tried to call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label() even when the implicit default label
was used (and thus the relevant local variable was still NULL).
In the new setup that distinguishes present-but-empty and absent
more clearly, it is an error to attempt to set a NULL parameter,
even if it is zero-length.
Exercise more caution when setting parameters, and do not call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label() when there is not actually a
label provided.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
Prior to this commit, if a string (or octet string) parameter
was present but indicated it was zero-length, we would return success
but with a NULL output value. This can be problematic in cases where
there is a protocol-level distinction between parameter-absent and
parameter-present-but-zero-length, which is uncommon but can happen.
Since OPENSSL_malloc() returns NULL for zero-length allocation requests,
make a dummy allocation for this case, to give a signal that the string
parameter does exist but has zero length.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
Add an extra EVP test that provides empty input key material. It
currently fails, since we lose the information about "key present but
zero length" as we deserialize parameters in the provider.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11920)
Following on from the previous commit, add a test to check that we fail
to create an EVP_PKEY_CTX if an algorithm is not available in any provider,
*unless* it is an algorithm that has no provider support.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11826)
If we failed to fetch an EVP_KEYMGMT then we were falling back to legacy.
This is because some algorithms (such as MACs and KDFs used via an old
style EVP_PKEY) have not been transferred to providers.
Unfortunately this means that you cannot stop some algorithms from being
used by not loading the provider.
For example if you wanted to prevent RSA from being used, you might expect
to just not load any providers that make it available. Unfortunately that
doesn't work because we simply fall back to legacy if we fail to fetch
the EVP_KEYMGMT.
Instead we should fail *unless* the key type is one of those legacy key
types that we have not transferred.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11826)
Some older compilers use "unknown function" if they dont support __func, so the
test using ERR_PUT_error needed to compensate for this when comparing against the
expected value.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11967)
for signing certificate V2 and signing certificate extensions.
CAdES: lowercase name for now internal methods.
crypto/cms: generated file changes.
Add some CHANGES entries.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8098)
