In TLSv1.2 a pre-master secret value is passed from the client to the
server encrypted using RSA PKCS1 type 2 padding in a ClientKeyExchange
message. As well as the normal formatting rules for RSA PKCA1 type 2
padding TLS imposes some additional rules about what constitutes a well
formed key. Specifically it must be exactly the right length and
encode the TLS version originally requested by the client (as opposed to
the actual negotiated version) in its first two bytes.
All of these checks need to be done in constant time and, if they fail,
then the TLS implementation is supposed to continue anyway with a random
key (and therefore the connection will fail later on). This avoids
padding oracle type attacks.
This commit implements this within the RSA padding code so that we keep
all the constant time padding logic in one place. A later commit will
remove it from libssl.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10411)
Serialization is needed to be able to take a provider object (such as
the provider side key data) and output it in PEM form, DER form, text
form (for display), and possibly other future forms (XML? JSON? JWK?)
The idea is that a serializer should be able to handle objects it has
intimate knowledge of, as well as object data in OSSL_PARAM form. The
latter will allow libcrypto to serialize some object with a different
provider than the one holding the data, if exporting of that data is
allowed and there is a serializer that can handle it.
We will provide serializers for the types of objects we know about,
which should be useful together with any other provider that provides
implementations of the same type of object.
Serializers are selected by method name and a couple of additional
properties:
- format used to tell what format the output should be in.
Possibilities could include "format=text",
"format=pem", "format=der", "format=pem-pkcs1"
(traditional), "format=der-pkcs1" (traditional)
- type used to tell exactly what type of data should be
output, for example "type=public" (the public part of
a key), "type=private" (the private part of a key),
"type=domainparams" (domain parameters).
This also adds a passphrase callback function type,
OSSL_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK, which is a bit like OSSL_CALLBACK, but it
takes a few extra arguments to place the result in.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10394)
Exporting data from a provider owned domainparams or key is quite an
ordeal, with having to figure out what parameter keys an
implementation supports, call the export function a first time to find
out how large each parameter buffer must be, allocate the necessary
space for it, and call the export function again.
So how about letting the export function build up the key data params
and call back with that? This change implements exactly such a
mechanism.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10414)
The old version always sets the top 2 bits, so the most significate byte
of the primes was always >= 0xC0. We now use 256 bits to represent
1/sqrt(2) = 0x0.B504F333F9DE64845...
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #10246
This is the EVP operation that corresponds to creating direct RSA, DH
and DSA keys and set their numbers, to then assign them to an EVP_PKEY,
but done entirely using an algorithm agnostic EVP interface.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10187)
Previous macros suggested that from 3.0, we're only allowed to
deprecate things at a major version. However, there's no policy
stating this, but there is for removal, saying that to remove
something, it must have been deprecated for 5 years, and that removal
can only happen at a major version.
Meanwhile, the semantic versioning rule is that deprecation should
trigger a MINOR version update, which is reflected in the macro names
as of this change.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10364)
Now that we have an EVP namemap containing all aliases that providers
know about for any given algorithm, it is possible that an application
attempts to look up a digest or a cipher via EVP_get_digestbyname() or
EVP_get_cipherbyname() with an algorithm name that is unknown to the
legacy method database. Therefore we extend those functions to
additionally check the aliases in the namemap when searching for a
method in the event that our initial lookup attempt fails.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10324)
Because the algorithm to use is decided already when creating an
EVP_PKEY_CTX regardless of how it was created, it turns out that it's
unnecessary to provide the KEYEXCH method explicitly, and rather
always have it be fetched implicitly.
This means fewer changes for applications that want to use new key
exchange algorithms / implementations.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10305)
With provided algorithms, the library context is ever present, so of
course it should be specified alongside the algorithm name and
property query string.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10308)
rsa_set0_all_params() is used to set all the primes, exponents and
coefficients. rsa_get0_all_params() is used to get all the primes,
exponents and coefficients.
"All" includes p, q, dP, dQ and qInv without making them separate.
All arrays of numbers are implemented as stacks to make dynamic use
easier.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10190)
This works as much as possible EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(), except it takes
data that's relevant for providers, algorithm name and property query
string instead of NID and engine.
Additionally, if EVP_PKEY_CTX_new() or EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id() was
called, the algorithm name in the EVP_PKEY context will be set to the
short name of the given NID (explicit or the one of the given
EVP_PKEY), thereby giving an easier transition from legacy methods to
provided methods.
The intent is that operations will use this information to fetch
provider methods implicitly as needed.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10184)
Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according
to the naming conventions below
For the public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory), the guard
names try to match the path specified in the include directives, with
all letters converted to upper case and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. For the
private header files files, an extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
