While public keys and private keys use the same type (EVP_PKEY), just
with different contents, callers still need to distinguish between the
two to be able to know what functions to call with them (for example,
to be able to choose between EVP_PKEY_print_private() and
EVP_PKEY_print_public()).
The OSSL_STORE backend knows what it loaded, so it has the capacity to
inform.
Note that the same as usual still applies, that a private key EVP_PKEY
contains the public parts, but not necessarily the other way around.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12673)
Just like d2i_PrivateKey() / d2i_PrivateKey_ex(), there's a need to
associate an EVP_PKEY extracted from a PUBKEY to a library context and
a property query string. Without it, a provider-native EVP_PKEY can
only fetch necessary internal algorithms from the default library
context, even though an application specific context should be used.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12671)
If an attempt is made to load a provider and it fails, the fall-back mechanism
should be disabled to prevent the user getting some weird happening. E.g. a
failure to load the FIPS provider should not allow the default to load as a
fall-back.
The OSSL_PROVIDER_try_load() call has been added, to allow a provider to be
loaded without disabling the fall-back mechanism if it fails.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12625)
Also, document its unusual semantics of resetting the
cipher list (but preserving other configuration).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7274)
Including the ones that were added in commit
83b0634702 with a note that they "may go
away" and are now deprecated.
Remove the missingcrypto.txt entries for the now-deprecated functions.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12233)
Similiar to ecdh this supports the legacy kdf inside the provider dh key exchange.
The supporting EVP_PKEY_CTX macros have been changed into mehtods and moved into dh_ctrl.c
New kdfs such as SSKDF should be done as a seperate pass after doing the derive.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12575)
Following the previous commits where we moved the KDF bridge into
provider side code, we need to update the documentation accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12573)
The default and legacy providers currently return 1 for status and self test checks.
Added test to show the 3 different stages the self test can be run (for installation, loading and on demand).
For the fips provider:
- If the on demand self test fails, then any subsequent fetches should also fail. To implement this the
cached algorithms are flushed on failure.
- getting the self test callback in the fips provider is a bit complicated since the callback hangs off the core
libctx (as it is set by the application) not the actual fips library context. Also the callback can be set at
any time not just during the OSSL_provider_init() so it is calculated each time before doing any self test.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11752)
-Added EVP_SignFinal_with_libctx() and EVP_VerifyFinal_with_libctx()
-Renamed EVP_DigestSignInit_ex() and EVP_DigestVerifyInit_with_libctx() to
EVP_DigestSignInit_with_libctx() and EVP_DigestVerifyInit_with_libctx()
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11884)
-Public PKCS7 methods that create a PKCS7 object now have variants that also add a libctx and propq.
This includes PKCS7_new_with_libctx(), PKCS7_sign_with_libctx() and PKCS7_encrypt_with_libctx()
-Added SMIME_read_PKCS7_ex() so that a created PKCS7 object can be passed to the read.
-d2i_PKCS7_bio() has been modified so that after it loads the PKCS7 object it then resolves any subobjects that require
the libctx/propq (such as objects containing X509 certificates).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11884)
-Public CMS methods that create a CMS_ContentInfo object now have variants that also add a libctx and propq.
This includes CMS_ContentInfo_new_with_libctx(), CMS_sign_with_libctx(), CMS_data_create_with_libctx(),
CMS_digest_create_with_libctx(), CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt_with_libctx(), CMS_EnvelopedData_create_with_libctx().
-Added CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0_with_libctx().
-Added SMIME_read_CMS_ex() so that a new CMS_ContentInfo object (created using CMS_ContentInfo_new_with_libctx()) can
be passed to the read.
-d2i_CMS_bio() has been modified so that after it loads the CMS_ContentInfo() it then resolves any subobjects that require
the libctx/propq (such as objects containing X509 certificates).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11884)
The RAND_DRBG API did not fit well into the new provider concept as
implemented by EVP_RAND and EVP_RAND_CTX. The main reason is that the
RAND_DRBG API is a mixture of 'front end' and 'back end' API calls
and some of its API calls are rather low-level. This holds in particular
for the callback mechanism (RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) and the RAND_DRBG
type changing mechanism (RAND_DRBG_set()).
Adding a compatibility layer to continue supporting the RAND_DRBG API as
a legacy API for a regular deprecation period turned out to come at the
price of complicating the new provider API unnecessarily. Since the
RAND_DRBG API exists only since version 1.1.1, it was decided by the OMC
to drop it entirely.
Other related changes:
Use RNG instead of DRBG in EVP_RAND documentation. The documentation was
using DRBG in places where it should have been RNG or CSRNG.
Move the RAND_DRBG(7) documentation to EVP_RAND(7).
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12509)
It's not the best idea to set a whole bunch of parameters in one call,
that leads to functions that are hard to update. Better to re-model
this into several function made to set one parameter each.
This also renames "finalizer" to "constructor", which was suggested
earlier but got lost at the time.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12544)
To be able to implement this, there was a need for the standard
EVP_PKEY_set1_, EVP_PKEY_get0_ and EVP_PKEY_get1_ functions for
ED25519, ED448, X25519 and X448, as well as the corresponding
EVP_PKEY_assign_ macros. There was also a need to extend the list of
hard coded names that EVP_PKEY_is_a() recognise.
Along with this, OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_load() are implemented for all
those key types.
The deserializers for these key types are all implemented generically,
in providers/implementations/serializers/deserializer_der2key.c.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12544)
The OSSL_DESERIALIZER API makes the incorrect assumption that the
caller must cipher and other pass phrase related parameters to the
individual desserializer implementations, when the reality is that
they only need a passphrase callback, and will be able to figure out
the rest themselves from the input they get.
We simplify it further by never passing any explicit passphrase to the
provider implementation, and simply have them call the passphrase
callback unconditionally when they need, leaving it to libcrypto code
to juggle explicit passphrases, cached passphrases and actual
passphrase callback calls.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12544)
Fix EVP_EncodeBlock description using incorrect parameter name for encoding length
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12518)
Serialization will only encrypt, so there's no point telling
OSSL_SERIALIZER_CTX_set_passphrase_cb() that's going to happen.
We fix the declaration of OSSL_DESERIALIZER_CTX_set_passphrase_cb()
the same way.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12410)
EVP_PKEY is the fundamental type for provider side code, so we
implement specific support for it, in form of a special context
constructor.
This constructor looks up and collects all available KEYMGMT
implementations, and then uses those names to collect deserializer
implementations, as described in the previous commit.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12410)
This adds a method OSSL_DESERIALIZER, a deserializer context and basic
support to use a set of serializers to get a desired type of data, as
well as deserializer chains.
The idea is that the caller can call OSSL_DESERIALIZER_CTX_add_serializer()
to set up the set of desired results, and to add possible chains, call
OSSL_DESERIALIZER_CTX_add_extra(). All these deserializers are pushed
on an internal stack.
The actual deserialization is then performed using functions like
OSSL_DESERIALIZER_from_bio(). When performing deserialization, the
inernal stack is walked backwards, keeping track of the deserialized
data and its type along the way, until the data kan be processed into
the desired type of data.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12410)
- In order to not add many X509_XXXX_with_libctx() functions the libctx and propq may be stored in the X509 object via a call to X509_new_with_libctx().
- Loading via PEM_read_bio_X509() or d2i_X509() should pass in a created cert using X509_new_with_libctx().
- Renamed some XXXX_ex() to XXX_with_libctx() for X509 API's.
- Removed the extra parameters in check_purpose..
- X509_digest() has been modified so that it expects a const EVP_MD object() and then internally it does the fetch when it needs to (via ASN1_item_digest_with_libctx()).
- Added API's that set the libctx when they load such as X509_STORE_new_with_libctx() so that the cert chains can be verified.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12153)
This change applies the recommendation of the Linux Documentation Project
to the documentation files of OpenSSL. Additionally, util/find-doc-nits
was updated accordingly.
The change follows a suggestion of mspncp on https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12370
and incoporates the requested changes on the pull request
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12460)
The 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' configuration commands now silently
ignore TLS protocol version bounds when configurign DTLS-based contexts,
and conversely, silently ignore DTLS protocol version bounds when
configuring TLS-based contexts. The commands can be repeated to set
bounds of both types. The same applies with the corresponding
"min_protocol" and "max_protocol" command-line switches, in case some
application uses both TLS and DTLS.
SSL_CTX instances that are created for a fixed protocol version (e.g.
TLSv1_server_method()) also silently ignore version bounds. Previously
attempts to apply bounds to these protocol versions would result in an
error. Now only the "version-flexible" SSL_CTX instances are subject to
limits in configuration files in command-line options.
Expected to resolve#12394
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #12472
The 'cert_cb' / 'client_cert_cb' arguments had extra, a bit weird
documentation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12494)
Today, majority of web-browsers reject communication as allowed by the
security level 1. Instead key sizes and algorithms from security level
2 are required. Thus remove the now obsolete warning against using
security levels higher than 1. For example Ubuntu, compiles OpenSSL
with security level set to 2, and further restricts algorithm versions
available at that security level.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12444)
The documentation was off by one for the length this function could return.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12435)
If a presumably self-signed cert is last in chain we verify its signature
only if X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE is set. Upon this request we do the
signature verification, but not in case it is a (non-conforming) self-issued
CA certificate with a key usage extension that does not include keyCertSign.
Make clear when we must verify the signature of a certificate
and when we must adhere to key usage restrictions of the 'issuing' cert.
Add some comments for making internal_verify() easier to understand.
Update the documentation of X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12375)
The commit claimed to make things more consistent. In fact it makes it
less so. Revert back to the previous namig convention.
This reverts commit 765d04c946.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12186)
The commit claimed to make things more consistent. In fact it makes it
less so. Revert back to the previous namig convention.
This reverts commit d9c2fd51e2.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12186)
