Test for each of DSA, SHA1, and SHA224.
Use the symbolic names for SignatureScheme comparisons just added.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3326)
Put them into the TLSProxy::Message namespace along with the extension
type constants.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3326)
In draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 Appendix B we find that:
This section describes protocol types and constants. Values listed
as _RESERVED were used in previous versions of TLS and are listed
here for completeness. TLS 1.3 implementations MUST NOT send them
but might receive them from older TLS implementations.
Similarly, in section 4.2.3 we see:
Legacy algorithms Indicates algorithms which are being deprecated
because they use algorithms with known weaknesses, specifically
SHA-1 which is used in this context with either with RSA using
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or ECDSA. These values refer solely to
signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and
are not defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages.
Endpoints SHOULD NOT negotiate these algorithms but are permitted
to do so solely for backward compatibility. Clients offering
these values MUST list them as the lowest priority (listed after
all other algorithms in SignatureSchemeList). TLS 1.3 servers
MUST NOT offer a SHA-1 signed certificate unless no valid
certificate chain can be produced without it (see
Section 4.4.2.2).
However, we are currently sending the SHA2-based DSA signature schemes
and many SHA1-based schemes, which is in contradiction with the specification.
Because TLS 1.3 support will appear in OpenSSL 1.1, we are bound by
stability requirements to continue to offer the DSA signature schemes
and the deprecated hash algorithms. at least until OpenSSL 1.2.
However, for pure TLS 1.3 clients that do not offer lower TLS versions,
we can be compliant. Do so, and leave a note to revisit the issue when
we are permitted to break with sacred historical tradition.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3326)
Curiously enough out-of-order Silvermont benefited most from
optimization, 33%. [Originally mentioned "anomaly" turned to be
misreported frequency scaling problem. Correct results were
collected under older kernel.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3739)
Something environmental changed in travis so that it started preferring
the ubuntu clang-3.9 version instead of the llvm.org one. This breaks the
sanitiser based builds. This change forces travis to de-prioritise the
ubuntu clang packages.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3759)
Following on from the previous commit this fixes another instance where
we need to treat a -ve return from EVP_DigestVerify() as a bad signature.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3756)
Prior to 72ceb6a we treated all failures from the call to
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() as if it were a bad signature, and failures in
EVP_DigestUpdate() as an internal error. After that commit we replaced
this with the one-shot function EVP_DigestVerify() and treated a 0 return
as a bad signature and a negative return as an internal error. However,
some signature errors can be negative (e.g. according to the docs if the
form of the signature is wrong). Therefore we should treat all <=0
returns as a bad signature.
This fixes a boringssl test failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3756)
We were adding more tests than we had data for due to use of
sizeof instead of OSSL_NELEM. I also changed the 8 bit tests
for consistency, although they were already working.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3755)
This macro aborts the test which prevents later tests from executing. It also
bypasses the test framework output functionality.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3750)
In 1.0.2 and before OBJ_create() allowed the sn or ln parameter to be NULL.
Commit 52832e47 changed that so that it crashed if they were NULL.
This was causing problems with the built-in config oid module. If a long
name was provided OBJ_create() is initially called with a NULL ln and
therefore causes a crash.
Fixes#3733
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3753)
Per RFC 7905, the cipher suite names end in "_SHA256". The original
implementation targeted the -03 draft, but there was a -04 draft right
before the RFC was published to make the names consistent.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3748)
This is an implementation of a BIO filter that produce TAP compatible output
for the test framework. The current test indentation level is honoured.
The test output functions have been modified to not attempt to indent
their output and to not include the leading '#' character.
The filter is applied to bio_err only. bio_out is left unchanged, although
tests using bio_out have been modified to use bio_err instead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3732)
initialize some local variables
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3741)
The value of BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was clashing with the value for
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. In an SCTP enabled build
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE was used unconditionally with
the reasoning that it would be ignored if SCTP wasn't in use. Unfortunately
due to this clash, this wasn't the case. The BIO ended up going into peek
mode and was continually reading the same data over and over - throwing it
away as a replay.
Fixes#3723
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3724)
Ensure that we properly distinguish between successful return (PSK
provided), successful return (no PSK provided) and failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3670)
