Add a changes entry to cover the deprecation of the low level digest functions:
MD2, MD4, MD5, MDC2, RIPEMD160, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 and
Whirlpool
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10802)
The existing documentation for the new-session callback was unclear
about the requirements on the callback with respect to reference-handling
of the session object being created. Be more explicit about the
(non-)requirements on the callback code for "success" (1) and "ignore"
(0) return values.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10848)
Prepopulation of the stored namemap from the legacy method object
database happened on first EVP fetch. However, there are moments when
that prepopulation needs to happen even though no fetching has been
performed yet. We therefore move pre-population to happen when the
namemap is constructed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10846)
These fields are purely application data, and applications don't reach
into the bowels of the FIPS module, so these fields are never used
there.
Fixes#10835
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10837)
Use of the low level RC5 functions has been informally discouraged for a long
time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10834)
Use of the low level RC4 functions has been informally discouraged for a long
time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10834)
Use of the low level RC2 functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10834)
Use of the low level SEED functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10833)
Added an API to optionally set a self test callback.
The callback has the following 2 purposes
(1) Output information about the KAT tests.
(2) Allow the ability to corrupt one of the KAT's
The fipsinstall program uses the API.
Some KATS are not included in this PR since the required functionality did not yet exist in the provider.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10374)
The returned -2 was to mark when these operations are unsupported.
However, that breaks away from the previous API and expectations, and
there's not enough justification for that not being zero.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10815)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10794)
providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm_hw.c had an AES
specific GCM update function, while
providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aria_gcm_hw.c had the more
general implementation.
This moves them around to have the more general implementation in the
common source, and place the AES specialiation where it belongs.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10783)
For provider only keys where the initialization didn't catch, we may
end up crashing because the legacy code path didn't check that it had
support carefully enough. This only happens if the caller didn't
check if initialization worked or not.
For the one-shot case, it's very simply handling the case where the
key has no legacy implementation an fall back to the standard
init+update+final mechanism.
While at it, EVP_DigestSignFinal() and EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() got a
slight code cleanup.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10806)
The test can be moved into the EVP tests and the separate executable removed.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10821)
We test with both an implicitly fetched digest and an explicitly fetched
digest.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10796)
If we're using an explicitly fetched digest in an EVP_DigestUpdate
operation, then we should still go the legacy route if
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT has been set because we are being used in the
context of a legacy signature algorithm and EVP_DigestInit has not been
called.
This fixes a seg fault in EVP_DigestSignUpdate()
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10796)
Applications should instead use the higher level EVP APIs, e.g.
EVP_Encrypt*() and EVP_Decrypt*().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10742)
Applications should instead use the higher level EVP APIs, e.g.
EVP_Encrypt*() and EVP_Decrypt*().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10741)
This regexp was used a bit too uncontrolled, which had it split flag
values where it should not have.
Fixes#10792
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10793)
The legacy module implements WHIRLPOOL, so we must ensure it has the
full functionality, even when libcrypto stops exporting the symbols.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10779)
Use of the low level Whirlpool functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_Digest,
EVP_DigestInit_ex, EVP_DigestUpdate and EVP_DigestFinal_ex.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10779)
Use of the low level RIPEMD160 functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_Digest,
EVP_DigestInit_ex, EVP_DigestUpdate and EVP_DigestFinal_ex.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10789)
In commit e79ae962fb the tests were adapted to use the
new BIO_f_prefix() API which was introduced in 319cee9e2f.
This location was missed, because it is compiled only when
tracing is enabled.
Fixes#10731
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10732)
This is very simply to allow the common case, where the KEYMGMT is
fetched first, and all names are needed at that time to secure that
they are found.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10647)
