This was pointed out by a false-positive
-fsanitizer warning ;-)
However from the cryptographical POV the
code is wrong:
A point R^0 on the wrong curve
is infinity on the wrong curve.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11475)
a9612d6c03 introduced possible memory leaks in EC_GROUP_cmp and EC_POINTs_mul, and a possible BN_CTX_end without BN_CTX_start in ec_field_inverse_mod_ord.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11452)
Note: This PR has not attempted to move the curves into the provider dispatch table.
Mappings between the curve name / nid have been added to the inbuilt curve table.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11133)
Use of the low level ECDSA and EC_KEY_METHOD functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10960)
Previous macros suggested that from 3.0, we're only allowed to
deprecate things at a major version. However, there's no policy
stating this, but there is for removal, saying that to remove
something, it must have been deprecated for 5 years, and that removal
can only happen at a major version.
Meanwhile, the semantic versioning rule is that deprecation should
trigger a MINOR version update, which is reflected in the macro names
as of this change.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10364)
Also added blanks lines after declarations in a couple of places.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9916)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present.
This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code.
This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent.
It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero).
The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks.
CVE-2019-1547
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9827)
This fixes the "verifying the alias" case.
Actually, while working on it, I realized that conceptually we were
testing the 2 different behaviours of `EC_GROUP_check_named_curve()` at
the same time, and actually not in the proper way.
I think it's fair to assume that overwriting the curve name for an
existing group with `NID_undef` could lead to the unexpected behaviour
we were observing and working around.
Thus I decided to separate the lookup test in a dedicated simpler test
that does what the documentation of `EC_GROUP_check_named_curve()`
suggests: the lookup functionality is meant to find a name for a group
generated with explicit parameters.
In case an alternative alias is returned by the lookup instead of the
expected nid, to avoid doing comparisons between `EC_GROUP`s with
different `EC_METHOD`s, the workaround is to retrieve the `ECPARAMETERS`
of the "alias group" and create a new explicit parameters group to use
in `EC_GROUP_cmp()`.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555)
New function to return internal pointer for field.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8195)
Previously, the API version limit was indicated with a numeric version
number. This was "natural" in the pre-3.0.0 because the version was
this simple number.
With 3.0.0, the version is divided into three separate numbers, and
it's only the major number that counts, but we still need to be able
to support pre-3.0.0 version limits.
Therefore, we allow OPENSSL_API_COMPAT to be defined with a pre-3.0.0
style numeric version number or with a simple major number, i.e. can
be defined like this for any application:
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=3
Since the pre-3.0.0 numerical version numbers are high, it's easy to
distinguish between a simple major number and a pre-3.0.0 numerical
version number and to thereby support both forms at the same time.
Internally, we define the following macros depending on the value of
OPENSSL_API_COMPAT:
OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
OPENSSL_API_1_0_0
OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
OPENSSL_API_3
They indicate that functions marked for deprecation in the
corresponding major release shall not be built if defined.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
This is in preparation for a switch to MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH versioning
and calling the next major version 3.0.0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
Some EC functions exist in *_GFp and *_GF2m forms, in spite of the
implementations between the two curve types being identical. This
commit provides equivalent generic functions with the *_GFp and *_GF2m
forms just calling the generic functions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder
implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint).
ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit
forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification
path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case.
With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and
is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it.
While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized
that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given
EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the
corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and
again in every single implementation (and actually some
implementations lacked some of the tests).
I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are
independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to
be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes
these changes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.
For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.
For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
We check that the curve name associated with the point is the same as that
for the curve.
Fixes#6302
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6323)
This is based on RT#3810, which added dedicated modular inversion.
ECDSA verify results improves as well, but not as much.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5001)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
We already test in EC_POINT_oct2point that points are on the curve. To
be on the safe side, move this check to
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_* so as to also check point coordinates
received through some other method.
We do not check projective coordinates, though, as
- it's unlikely that applications would be receiving this primarily
internal representation from untrusted sources, and
- it's possible that the projective setters are used in a setting where
performance matters.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Instead of overriding a default operation move default operation to a
separate function which is then explicitly included in any EC_METHOD
that uses it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Add support for optional overrides of various private key operations
in EC_METHOD.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Those even order that do not play nicely with Montgomery arithmetic
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
New functions to return internal pointer for order and cofactor. This
avoids the need to allocate a new BIGNUM which to copy the value to.
Simplify code to use new functions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
