FIPS KAS requires use of ECC CDH.
The EC 'B' and 'K' curves have a cofactor that is not 1, and this
MUST be multiplied by the private key when deriving the shared secret.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25139)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24434)
The documentation currently describes SSL_CTX_set1_groups as a
preference order, but this does not match the typical interpretation of
"preference order" in OpenSSL and TLS. Typically, an application can
order more secure options ahead of less secure ones and pick up TLS's
usual downgrade protection guarantees.
TLS 1.3 servers need to balance an additional consideration: some
options will perform worse than others due to key share prediction. The
prototypical selection procedure is to first select the set of more
secure options, then select the most performant among those.
OpenSSL follows this procedure, but it *unconditionally* treats all
configured curves as equivalent security. Per discussion on GitHub,
OpenSSL's position is that this is an intended behavior.
While not supported by built-in providers, OpenSSL now documents that
external providers can extend the group list and CHANGES.md explicitly
cites post-quantum as a use case. With post-quantum providers, it's
unlikely that application developers actually wanted options to be
equivalent security. To avoid security vulnerabilities arising from
mismatched expectations, update the documentation to clarify the server
behavior.
Per the OTC decision in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22203#issuecomment-1744465829,
this documentation fix should be backported to stable branches.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23776)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25179)
FIPS providers need to specify identifiable names and versions. Allow
to customize the fips provider name prefix, via VERSION.dat which
already allows to customize version & buildinfo. With this patch
in-place it removes the need of patching code to set customized
provider name.
E.g. echo FIPS_VENDOR=ACME >> VERSION.dat, results in
```
$ OPENSSL_CONF=fips-and-base.cnf ../util/wrap.pl ../apps/openssl list -providers --verbose
Providers:
base
name: OpenSSL Base Provider
version: 3.4.0
status: active
build info: 3.4.0-dev
gettable provider parameters:
name: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
version: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
buildinfo: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
status: integer (arbitrary size)
fips
name: ACME FIPS Provider for OpenSSL
version: 3.4.0
status: active
build info: 3.4.0-dev
gettable provider parameters:
name: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
version: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
buildinfo: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
status: integer (arbitrary size)
security-checks: integer (arbitrary size)
tls1-prf-ems-check: integer (arbitrary size)
drbg-no-trunc-md: integer (arbitrary size)
```
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24368)
If there is no DSA support in the library we should not compile in support
for speed testing of DSA. We should skip it in much the same way that we
do for other algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25153)
Make sure we free the ecdsa_key object after we have finished using it.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25153)
Previously there was no test for the speed command. We just do some simple
testing, running the command with various options to confirm that it doesn't
crash or report errors. We use the new -testmode option to ensure that this
happens quickly and doesn't really run full speed tests.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25153)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25153)
We add a testmode option to the speed app which simply runs 1 iteration of
any speed tests. If anything fails along the way the app returns an error
code.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25153)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25131)
(cherry picked from commit 099a71b48b)
See FIPS 140-3 IG Section 10.3.A Part 11
Indicates ECDSA requires a sign and verify test.
Note 11 states that HashEdDSA is not required to be tested if PureEdDSA is tested.
Note 12 indicates that both ED25519 and X448 need to be tested.
Since ED uses the oneshot interface, additional API's needed to be exposed to the
FIPS provider using #ifdef FIPS_MODULE.
Changed ED25518 and ED448 to use fips=true in the FIPS provider.
Updated documentation for provider lists for EDDSA.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22112)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25127)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25127)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25127)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24821)
Except for Ed448 and RSA PSS where they are mandatory and allow respectively.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25020)
mingw is complaining on builds about the use of InterlockedExchange on a
uint32_t type, as the input parameter here is expected to be LONG
(defined as signed 32 bit on all versions of windows).
the input value (reader_idx) will never grow larger than the group size
of the lock (nominally 2, but always a reasonably small value), so it
should be safe to just cast it to the appropriate type here.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25015)
The check for fetchability PKCS12KDF doesn't make sense when we have a
different MAC mechanism
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25144)
Keep us from spinning forever doing huge amounts of math in the fuzzer
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25013)
Using this option disables the OpenSSL FIPS provider
self tests.
This is intended for debugging purposes only,
as it breaks FIPS compliance.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25063)
A newer PR is using setable3 now so these indicies should be fixed.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25118)
