In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
free if the caller frees them even on failure.
Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.
Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.
CVE-2022-4450
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
CVE-2022-4304
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
This function assumes that if the "gen" is an OtherName, then the "base"
is a rfc822Name constraint. This assumption is not true in all cases.
If the end-entity certificate contains an OtherName SAN of any type besides
SmtpUtf8Mailbox and the CA certificate contains a name constraint of
OtherName (of any type), then "nc_email_eai" will be invoked, with the
OTHERNAME "base" being incorrectly interpreted as a ASN1_IA5STRING.
Reported by Corey Bonnell from Digicert.
CVE-2022-4203
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20202)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20201)
Point out that options must be given before the final file/URI arg.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20156)
Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19914)
That function is a wrapper around evp_cipher_param_to_asn1_ex() which
can return 0 as an error value via its ret <= 0 check [1].
Furthermore, all other callers of this function check against <= 0
instead of < 0 and this is also in line with what the documentation
tells us. Fix the incomplete check by changing it to <= 0 as well.
CLA: trivial
[1] 114d99b46b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c (L164-L165)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20180)
If the user specifies an alternative build file than the default, this
alternative is recorded in $config{build_file}, not $target{build_file}.
Therefore, the former should be used, leaving the latter as a mere default.
This is a bug. While fixing it, document it better too.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20173)
Fix issue #20063.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20163)
Add missing `I` to `<b>`
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20169)
If no-module or no-shared is used, the symbols from
libcrypto should not be duplicated in legacy.a
Also the BIGNUM functions are currently not needed
in legacy.a at all.
Fixes#20124
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20137)
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19901 backported the
"Honor OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT as set and default to
UNCOMPRESSED" changeset to 3.0.
This commit updates:
- the HISTORY notes of the relevant documentation to mark the change
happened since 3.0.8.
- the `CHANGES.md file` to sync up with the tip of the `openssl-3.0`
branch
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20003)
X509V3_add1_i2d() can return both -1 and 0 as an error code. This check
only checked for 0. Change it into <= 0 to also catch the -1 error code.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20157)
We cannot dynamically load the legacy provider into an application
that is linked statically to libcrypto as this causes
a double loading of libcrypto (one static and one dynamic) and
on NonStop this leads to a segfault in atexit().
Fixes#17537
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19844)
Fixes#20084
In the 3.0 provider implementation the generic code that handles IV's
only allows a 12 byte IV. Older code intentionally added the ability for
the IV to be truncated.
As this truncation is unsafe, the documentation has been updated to
state that this in no longer allowed. The code has been updated to
produce an error when the iv length is set to any value other than 12.
NOTE: It appears that this additional padding may have originated from the code
which uses a 12 byte IV, that is then passed to CHACHA which zero pads it to 16 bytes.
Note that legacy behaviour in e_chacha20_poly1305.c has not been
updated.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20151)
Gives a performance enhancement of 16-38%, similar to the M1.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20141)
The lab tried doing a RSA decryption primitive using just n (using p, q) and d.
This failed for 2 reasons:
(1) e is required when importing
(2) Internally e is used for blinding.
Note n and e can be calculated using:
n = pq
e = (1/d) mod (p-1)(q-1)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20133)
The check is unnecessary as the condition is already checked
before the switch statement.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20121)
This reverts commit e787c57c53.
The current CI host system is Ubuntu 22.04, which ships with QEMU 6.2.
This QEMU release is too old for the required RISC-V extensions.
We would need at least QEMU 7.1 (Aug 2022) for this patch.
Let's revert the patch.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20139)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18704)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18704)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18704)
EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() returns a value <= 0 in case of an error, and
a value greater than 0 in case of success. Two callsites only check for
< 0 instead of <= 0. The other callsites perform this check correctly.
Change the two callsites to <= 0. Additionally correctly handle a zero
return value from EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv as success.
Fixes: #20116
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/201213)
The user_ssl field in an SSL_CONNECTION is no longer used - so remove it.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19748)
