Probing for crypto cards during initialization by issuing an ioctl to the
zcrypt device driver can cause a lot of traffic and overhead, because it
runs for each and every application that uses OpenSSL, regardless if that
application will later perform ME or CRT operations or not.
Fix this by performing no probing during initialization, but detect the
crypto card availability only at the first ME/CRT operation that is subject
to be offloaded. If the ioctl returns ENODEV, then no suitable crypto
card is available in the system, and we disable further offloading
attempts by setting flag OPENSSL_s390xcex_nodev to 1.
Setting the global flag OPENSSL_s390xcex_nodev in case of ENODEV is
intentionally not made in a thread save manner, because the only thing
that could happen is that another thread, that misses the flag update,
also issues an ioctl and gets ENODEV as well.
The file descriptor is not closed in such error cases, because this could
cause raise conditions where we would close a foreign file if the same
file descriptor got reused by another thread. The file descriptor is finally
closed during termination by the atexit handler.
In case the ioctl returns ENOTTY then this indicates that the file descriptor
was closed (e.g. by a sandbox), but in the meantime the same file descriptor
has been reused for another file. Do not use the file descriptor anymore,
and also do not close it during termination.
Fixes: 79040cf29e
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25576)
The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.
These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
its final element).
Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().
The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:
https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html
The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
basis X9.62 forms.
This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).
Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
for non-sentinel values.
Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.
The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These
generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
problem values as noted above.
Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.
A closely related issue was earlier reported in
<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.
Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)
This is a follow-up to #23997
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25340)
In OpenSSL, it's actually OSSL_NELEM() in "internal/nelem.h".
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22097)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22097)
This commit also adds an implementation for P256 that avoids some
expensive initialization of Montgomery arithmetic structures in favor
of precomputation. Since ECC groups are not always cached by higher
layers this brings significant savings to TLS handshakes.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22746)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24332)
Otherwise following operations would bail out in bn_check_top().
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24265)
And create a new BN_generate_dsa_nonce() that corrects the BIGNUM top.
We do this to avoid leaking fixed top numbers via the public API.
Also add a slight optimization in ossl_bn_gen_dsa_nonce_fixed_top()
and make it LE/BE agnostic.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24265)
Co-authored-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24265)
In order to get asm code running on OpenBSD we must place
all constants into .rodata sections.
davidben@ also pointed out we need to adjust `x86_64-xlate.pl` perlasm
script to adjust read-olny sections for various flavors (OSes). Those
changes were cherry-picked from boringssl.
closes#23312
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23997)
GCC 13.1.0 were reporting a compilation warning with -O2/3 and
-Waggressive-loop-optimizations. GCC is raising an undefined behavior in the
while loop. Replace the while loop with a memset call at the top of the
function.
Fixes#21088
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23898)
If p is set to 1 when calling BN_GF2m_mod_inv then an infinite loop will
result. Calling this function set 1 when applications call this directly
is a non-sensical value - so this would be considered a bug in the caller.
It does not seem possible to cause OpenSSL internal callers of
BN_GF2m_mod_inv to call it with a value of 1.
So, for the above reasons, this is not considered a security issue.
Reported by Bing Shi.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22960)
The little-endian optimization is doing some type-punning in a way
violating the C standard aliasing rule by loading or storing through a
lvalue with type "unsigned int" but the memory location has effective
type "unsigned long" or "unsigned long long" (BN_ULONG). Convert these
accesses to use memcpy instead, as memcpy is defined as-is "accessing
through the lvalues with type char" and char is aliasing with all types.
GCC does a good job to optimize away the temporary copies introduced
with the change. Ideally copying to a temporary unsigned int array,
doing the calculation, and then copying back to `r_d` will make the code
look better, but unfortunately GCC would fail to optimize away this
temporary array then.
I've not touched the LE optimization in BN_nist_mod_224 because it's
guarded by BN_BITS2!=64, then BN_BITS2 must be 32 and BN_ULONG must be
unsigned int, thus there is no aliasing issue in BN_nist_mod_224.
Fixes#12247.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22816)
Test case amended from code initially written by Bernd Edlinger.
Fixes#21110
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22421)
Fixes#22216
Thanks to Leland Mills for investigation and testing.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22272)
clang-cl.exe defines __clang__ and _MSC_VER but not __GNUC__, so a clang-
specific guard is needed to get the correct ALIGNxx versions.
Fixes#21914
Change-Id: Icdc047b182ad1ba61c7b1b06a1e951eda1a0c33d
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21921)
bn_wexpand can fail as the result of a memory allocation failure. We
should not be calling ossl_assert() on its result because it can fail in
normal operation.
Found via the reproducible error injection in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21725)
The function BN_RECP_CTX_set did not check whether arg d is zero,
in which case an early failure should be returned to the invoker.
This is a similar fix to the cognate defect of CVE-2015-1794.
Fixes#21111
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21255)
Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
wvalue is always initialized at the beginning of each cycle
and used only within the cycle
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21145)
The change is limited to a single C file.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20912)
We no longer need to cast function pointers to PTR_SIZE_INT.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20748)
Bit-fiddling pointers is technically implementation defined behavior
in the C specification so the following code is not supported in all
platforms:
PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
void * a, b, c;
int boolean_flag;
mask = 0 - boolean_flag;
/* Not guaranteed to be a valid ptr to a or b on all platforms */
a = (void *)
((((PTR_SIZE_INT) b & ~mask) | (((PTR_SIZE_INT)) c & mask)));
Using a ternary conditional operator is supported on all platforms
(i.e. `a = boolean_flag ? b : c;`).
On most modern compilers/CPUs, this will be faster, since it will
get converted to a CMOV instruction.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20748)
This is about a timing leak in the topmost limb
of the internal result of RSA_private_decrypt,
before the padding check.
There are in fact at least three bugs together that
caused the timing leak:
First and probably most important is the fact that
the blinding did not use the constant time code path
at all when the RSA object was used for a private
decrypt, due to the fact that the Montgomery context
rsa->_method_mod_n was not set up early enough in
rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, when BN_BLINDING_create_param
needed it, and that was persisted as blinding->m_ctx,
although the RSA object creates the Montgomery context
just a bit later.
Then the infamous bn_correct_top was used on the
secret value right after the blinding was removed.
And finally the function BN_bn2binpad did not use
the constant-time code path since the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
was not set on the secret value.
In order to address the first problem, this patch
makes sure that the rsa->_method_mod_n is initialized
right before the blinding context.
And to fix the second problem, we add a new utility
function bn_correct_top_consttime, a const-time
variant of bn_correct_top.
Together with the fact, that BN_bn2binpad is already
constant time if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set,
this should eliminate the timing oracle completely.
In addition the no-asm variant may also have
branches that depend on secret values, because the last
invocation of bn_sub_words in bn_from_montgomery_word
had branches when the function is compiled by certain
gcc compiler versions, due to the clumsy coding style.
So additionally this patch stream-lined the no-asm
C-code in order to avoid branches where possible and
improve the resulting code quality.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20281)
This reverts commit b1892d21f8.
Except for the moving derive_kdk to a separate function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20281)
Change-Id: Ia94e528a2d55934435de6a2949784c52eb38d82f
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20621)
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20519)
(cherry picked from commit d4765408c7)
This file was only recently introduced and the missing header slipped through
the review process.
Fixes#20461
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20470)
BN_priv_rand_range_ex() and BN_add() both return a 0 on failure and a 1
on success. In case of failure, the algorithm should fail. However, the
branch that it goes through on failure is "goto end", not "goto err".
Therefore, the algorithm will return 1 which indicates success instead
of 0 for failure, leading to potential problems for the callers.
Fix it by changing the goto to "goto err" instead of "goto end".
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20279)
_umul128() is x86_64 (x64) only, while __umulh() works everywhere, but
doesn't generate optimal code on x64
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20244)
S390x has to ability to offload modular exponentiation and CRT operations to
Crypto Express Adapters. This possible performance optimization was not yet
used by OpenSSL. Add support for offloading and implement an optimized
version of RSA and DH with it.
The environment variable OPENSSL_s390xcap now recognizes the token "nocex" to
prevent offloading.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20113)
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
CVE-2022-4304
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
If no-module or no-shared is used, the symbols from
libcrypto should not be duplicated in legacy.a
Also the BIGNUM functions are currently not needed
in legacy.a at all.
Fixes#20124
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20137)
Test included
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20033)
This allows calls with s==NULL and len==0 to be safe. It probably already
was, but address sanitizers could still complain.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20033)
Otherwise the alloca can cause an exception.
Issue reported by Jiayi Lin.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20005)
