- Make slh_dsa_sign() return the siglen when sig is NULL.
- Remove the ability in fromdata to generate the public key root
given the private key and public key seed. This was messy and can
be done by key generation instead.
- Add common EVP_PKEY gettablesto SLH_DSA keys
(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_BITS, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_SECURITY_BITS, and
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MAX_SIZE).
- Update tests based on the above changes.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25882)
The keygen tests required "entropy" to be added via an additional
parameter for ACVP testing. This is required because TEST_RAND cant be
used to pass entropy to the FIPS provider, due to it not knowing the
lib ctx of the FIPS provider.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25882)
Also updated function comments.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25882)
Also made fromdata able to generate the public root key if the private
key seed + prf as well as the public key seed are passed to from data.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25882)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26753)
- Moved the codec code out of `ml_kem.c` into its own file in
the provider tree. Will be easier to share some code with
ML-DSA, and possible to use PROV_CTX, to do config lookups
directly in the functions doing the work.
- Update and fixes of the EVP_PKEY-ML-KEM(8) documentation, which
had accumulated some stale/inaccurate material, and needed new
text for the "prefer_seed" parameter.
- Test the "prefer_seed=no" behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26569)
- On import, if a seed is provided, the keys are regenerated.
- The seed is exported as a separate "seed" parameter, when available.
The "ml-kem.retain_seed" parameter is also exported, when false.
- The seed is optionally dropped after key generation.
* When the "ml-kem.retain_seed" keygen parameter is set to zero.
* When the "ml-kem.retain_seed" keygen parameter is not set to 1,
and the "ml-kem.retain_seed" provider config property is set
explictly false.
- The exported private key parameter "priv" is always the FIPS 203 |dk|.
- Private key decoding from PKCS#8 produces a transient "seed-only" form
of the key, in which "retain_seed" is set to false when the
"ml-kem.retain_seed" provider config property is set explictly false.
The full key is generated during "load" and the seed is retained
or not as specified.
- Import honours the "ml-kem.retain_seed" parameter when specified, or
otherwise honours the provider's "ml-kem.retain_seed" property.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26512)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26341)
This introduces support for ML-KEM-512 and ML-KEM-1024 using the same
underlying implementation parameterised by a few macros for the
associated types and constants.
KAT tests are added for ML-KEM 512 and 1024, to complement the previous
tests for ML-KEM-768.
MLKEM{512,768,1024} TLS "group" codepoints are updated to match the
final IANA assigments and to make the additional KEMs known to the TLS
layer.
The pure-QC MLKEMs are not in the default list of supported groups, and
need to be explicitly enabled by the application. Future work will
introduce support for hybrids, and for more fine-grained policy of
which keyshares a client should send by default, and when a server
should request (HRR) a new mutually-supported group that was not
sent.
Tests for ML-KEM key exchange added to sslapitest to make sure that our
TLS client MLKEM{512,768,1024} implementations interoperate with our TLS
server, and that MLKEM* are not negotiated in TLS 1.2.
Tests also added to excercise non-derandomised ML-KEM APIs, both
directly (bypassing the provider layer), and through the generic EVP KEM
API (exercising the provider). These make sure that RNG input is used
correctly (KAT tests bypass the RNG by specifying seeds).
The API interface to the provider takes an "const ML_KEM_VINFO" pointer,
(obtained from ossl_ml_kem_get_vinfo()). This checks input and output
buffer sizes before passing control to internal code that assumes
correctly sized (for each variant) buffers.
The original BoringSSL API was refactored to eliminate the opaque
public/private key structure wrappers, since these structures are an
internal detail between libcrypto and the provider, they are not part of
the public (EVP) API.
New "clangover" counter-measures added, refined with much appreciated
input from David Benjamin (Chromium).
The internal steps of "encrypt_cpa" were reordered to reduce the
working-set size of the algorithm, now needs space for just two
temporary "vectors" rather than three. The "decap" function now process
the decrypted message in one call, rather than three separate calls to
scalar_decode_1, scalar_decompress and scalar_add.
Some loops were unrolled, improving performance of en/decapsulate
(pre-expanded vectors and matrix) by around 5%.
To handle, however unlikely, the SHA3 primitives not behaving like
"pure" functions and failing, the implementation of `decap` was modifed:
- To use the KDF to compute the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) failure secret
first thing, and if that fails, bail out returning an error, a shared
secret is still returned at random from the RNG, but it is OK for the
caller to not use it.
- If any of the subsequently used hash primitives fail, use the computed
FO failure secret (OK, despite no longer constant-time) and return
success (otherwise the RNG would replace the result).
- We quite reasonably assume that chosen-ciphertext attacks (of the
correct length) cannot cause hash functions to fail in a manner the
depends on the private key content.
Support for ML-KEM-512 required adding a centered binomial distribution
helper function to deal with η_1 == 3 in just that variant.
Some additional comments were added to highlight how the code relates to
the ML-KEM specification in FIPS 203.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26172)
Add KATs for ML-KEM-768 under CCLA from https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/
These KATs test key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation for the
ML-KEM-768 algorithm.
Relevant notes:
- Added functionality to the ML-KEM key management to export/import. These may not
be fully implemented yet (see openssl/openssl#25885)
- Exposed some more low-level ML-KEM API's to the provider implementation to
allow for deterministic encapsulation/key generation
- Actually run 'mlkem_internal_test' with `make test`
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25938)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26637)
- Same UX as ML-KEM. The main ASN.1 private key syntax is the one from
Russ Housley's post on the LAMPS list, subsequently amended to tag the
seed instead of the key (each of the three parameter sets will have a
fixed size for the `expandedKey`):
ML-DSA-PrivateKey ::= CHOICE {
seed [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (32),
expandedKey OCTET STRING SIZE (2560 | 4032 | 4896)
both SEQUENCE {
seed OCTET STRING SIZE (32),
expandedKey OCTET STRING SIZE (2560 | 4032 | 4896) } }
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26638)
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26127)
The key generation algorithm requires a significant portion of the many
algorithms present in FIPS 204.
This work is derived from the BoringSSL code located at
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/master/crypto/mldsa/mldsa.cc
Instead of c++ templates it uses an ML_DSA_PARAMS object to store constants such as k & l.
To perform hash operations a temporary EVP_MD_CTX object is used, which is supplied with a
prefetched EVP_MD shake128 or shake256 object that reside in the ML_DSA_KEY object.
The ML_DSA_KEY object stores the encoded public and/or private key
whenever a key is loaded or generated. A public key is always present
if the private key component exists.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26127)
Increase the timeout for DTLS tests to 10 seconds.
But do that only for DTLS as this would waste time
for other tests, most of the TLS tests do not need
this at all.
Fixes#26491
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26502)
This drops OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION - which is a meaningless
name - everywhere apart from still existing (for API stability, in
case someone uses that macro).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26421)
The dtls server process exits too early when the input
has an EOF condition.
Reviewed-by: Frederik Wedel-Heinen <fwh.openssl@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26374)
This reverts commit 4439ed16c5742e5ffb0417d45677900e77b299f2.
Reviewed-by: Frederik Wedel-Heinen <fwh.openssl@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26374)
This reverts commit 3e94e2b11d73ed22c601f818b31b7c4ca281f5d1.
Reviewed-by: Frederik Wedel-Heinen <fwh.openssl@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26374)
This reverts commit 3d3bb26a13dcc67f99e66de6a44ae9ced117f64b.
Reviewed-by: Frederik Wedel-Heinen <fwh.openssl@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26374)
call to die() in perl templates is currently ignored.
any error printed by die() commad appears in template
output.
In order to make sure die() terminates processing we
must ensure we emite `undef` value. This is ensured
by adding a `BROKEN` callback to `fill_in()` Template
method. The callback must return undef to stop processing.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26064)
This avoids false psotivie failures on FreeBSD-CI which
suffers most from this issue.
Fixes#23992
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25613)
Similar to other KDFs, the input key should be 112 bits long.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25529)
Fixes#7940: Enhances the existing test for compression methods in the ClientHello message, aligning with RFC 8446 specifications.
Refactored the test code to improve modularity and maintainability, making it easier to extend and modify in the future.
Added checks for the appropriate alerts, ensuring that `SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER` or `SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR` are correctly triggered as per the RFC 8446 guidelines.
Expanded Test Coverage: Introduced additional test cases to cover scenarios involving:
- Lists of unknown compression methods
- Absence of any compression method
- Validation of a single null compression method, which should always succeed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25255)
The options in fipsprov.c are now generated using macros with fips_indicator_params.inc.
This should keep the naming consistent.
Some FIPS related headers have moved to providers/fips/include so that
they can use fips_indicator_params.inc.
securitycheck.h now includes fipsindicator.h, and fipsindicator.h includes
fipscommon.h.
fipsinstall.c uses OSSL_PROV_PARAM_ for the configurable FIPS options rather than
using OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_* as this was confusing as to which one should be used.
fips_names.h just uses aliases now for existing public names.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25162)
I realised that any application that passes AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
to and from a provider may also be interested in the full AlgorithmIdentifier
of the implementation invocation.
Likewise, any application that wants to get the full AlgorithmIdentifier
from an implementation invocation may also want to pass AlgorithmIdentifier
parameters to that same implementation invocation.
These amendments should be useful to cover all intended uses of the legacy
ctrls for PKCS7 and CMS:
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN
It should also cover a number of other cases that were previously implemented
through EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD, as well as all sorts of other cases where the
application has had to assemble a X509_ALGOR on their own.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25000)
This adds a FIPS indicator for KMAC key size.
Note that 112 bits keys are still smaller than the
sizes required to reach 128 bits for KMAC128 and
256 bits for KMAC256
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
HMAC has been changed to use a FIPS indicator for its key check.
HKDF and Single Step use a salt rather than a key when using HMAC,
so we need a mechanism to bypass this check in HMAC.
A seperate 'internal' query table has been added to the FIPS provider
for MACS. Giving HMAC a seprate dispatch table allows KDF's to ignore
the key check. If a KDF requires the key check then it must do the
check itself. The normal MAC dipatch table is used if the user fetches
HMAC directly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
The following API groups are extended with a new init function, as well
as an update and final function, to allow the use of explicitly fetched
signature implementations for any composite signature algorithm, like
"sha1WithRSAEncryption":
- EVP_PKEY_sign
- EVP_PKEY_verify
- EVP_PKEY_verify_recover
To support this, providers are required to add a few new functions, not
the least one that declares what key types an signature implementation
supports.
While at this, the validity check in evp_signature_from_algorithm() is
also refactored; the SIGNATURE provider functionality is too complex for
counters. It's better, or at least more readable, to check function
combinations.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
internally.
This is not using a strict check since there may be applications that
require the IV to be generated externally (e.g. java).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25178)
This reverts commit 5abd7e5f796a9564c5f020053833deee1b9f7c6e.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25192)
FIPS KAS requires use of ECC CDH.
The EC 'B' and 'K' curves have a cofactor that is not 1, and this
MUST be multiplied by the private key when deriving the shared secret.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25139)
Confirm that we correctly fail if supported_versions is missing from an
HRR.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25068)
This uses a FIPS indicator.
Since DSA KeyGen is only useful for DSA signing,
it reuses the DSA signing FIPS configuration option and settable ctx name.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24978)
Since FIPS provider performs lower bound check by default from v3.0, the
default value for new configurable item will be one.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24120)
Avoid using a fetched cipher that is decrypt-only
which is the case for 3DES from the fips provider.
Add a decrypt-only parameter to the EVP_CIPHER and test it
in libssl when fetching.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25028)
In FIPS 140-3, RSA Signing with X9.31 padding is not approved,
but verification is allowed for legacy purposes. An indicator has been added
for RSA signing with X9.31 padding.
A strict restriction on the size of the RSA modulus has been added
i.e. It must be 1024 + 256 * s (which is part of the ANSI X9.31 spec).
Added implementation comments to the X9.31 padding code
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24021)
This leaves 3DES with the FIPS query "FIPS=yes", which allows
Triple-DES to be used for Decryption by default.
Disallow CMAC using Triple-DES in FIPS.
This does not use a FIPS indicator.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24960)
This is a FIPS 140-3 requirement.
This uses a FIP indicator if either the FIPS configurable "dsa_sign_disabled" is set to 0,
OR OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_SIGN_CHECK is set to 0 in the dsa signing context.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24799)
