Commit 8bfb7506d210841f2ee4eda8afe96441a0e33fa5 updated
`BIO_f_base64(3)` to improve the documentation of the
`BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL` flag. In particular, the updated text
states that when this flag is used, all newlines in the input are
ignored. This is incorrect, as the following program proves:
```c
unsigned char *in_buf =
"IlRoZSBxdWljayBicm93biBmb3gganVt\ncHMgb3ZlciBhIGxhenkgZG9nLiI=\n";
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
BIO *b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
if (b64 == NULL) return 1;
BIO_set_flags(b64, BIO_get_flags(b64) | BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL);
int in_len = strlen(in_buf);
BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(in_buf, in_len);
if (in == NULL) return 2;
in = BIO_push(b64, in);
unsigned char *out_buf = calloc(in_len, sizeof(unsigned char));
if (out_buf == NULL) return 3;
size_t out_len;
int r = BIO_read_ex(in, out_buf, in_len, &out_len);
printf("rv = %d\n", r);
printf("decoded = %s\n", out_buf);
return 0;
}
```
Update the text of `BIO_f_base64(3)` to clarify that when the flag
is set, the data must be all on one line (with or without a trailing
newline character).
Signed-off-by: Fraser Tweedale <ftweedal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18568)
(cherry picked from commit 0edcbacca99ab2b716da395f204610fc2775ea83)
Inspired by BoringSSL fix by David Benjamin.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18511)
This partially fixes a bug where, on x86_64, BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime
would sometimes return m, the modulus, when it should have returned
zero. Thanks to Guido Vranken for reporting it. It is only a partial fix
because the same bug also exists in the "rsaz" codepath.
The bug only affects zero outputs (with non-zero inputs), so we believe
it has no security impact on our cryptographic functions.
The fx is to delete lowercase bn_from_montgomery altogether, and have the
mont5 path use the same BN_from_montgomery ending as the non-mont5 path.
This only impacts the final step of the whole exponentiation and has no
measurable perf impact.
See the original BoringSSL commit
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/13c9d5c69d04485a7a8840c12185c832026c8315
for further analysis.
Original-author: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18511)
If the asnum or rdi fields are NULL and the ASIdentifiers are otherwise
subsets then this will result in a crash. Of note is that rdi will usually
be NULL.
Reported by Theo Buehler (@botovq)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18514)
(cherry picked from commit 01fc9b6bce82f0534d6673659a0e59a71f57ee82)
Namely the smime certificates used in test_cms
will expire soon and affect tests.
Fixes#15179
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18481)
When TLS-1.3 is used and the server does not send any CA names
the ca_dn will be NULL. sk_X509_NAME_num() returns -1 on null
argument.
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17986)
(cherry picked from commit 89dd85430770d39cbfb15eb586c921958ca7687f)
This can be reproduced with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1653520461 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./cms-test ./corpora/cms/3eff1d2f1232bd66d5635db2c3f9e7f23830dfd1
log file: cms-3eff1d2f1232bd66d5635db2c3f9e7f23830dfd1-32454-test.out
ERROR_INJECT=1653520461
#0 0x7fd5d8b8eeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x402fc4 in my_realloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:129
#2 0x7fd5d8893c49 in sk_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:198
#3 0x7fd5d8893c49 in OPENSSL_sk_insert crypto/stack/stack.c:242
#4 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push include/openssl/x509v3.h:168
#5 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in crl_set_issuers crypto/x509/x_crl.c:111
#6 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:246
#7 0x7fd5d85dc032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#8 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#9 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#10 0x7fd5d85db2b5 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:259
#11 0x7fd5d85dc813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#12 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#13 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#14 0x7fd5d85dca28 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:633
#15 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#16 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#17 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#18 0x7fd5d85dd7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#19 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#20 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#21 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#22 0x7fd5d85a77e0 in ASN1_item_d2i_bio crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c:69
#23 0x402845 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/cms.c:43
#24 0x402bbb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#25 0x402626 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#26 0x7fd5d7c81f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#27 0x402706 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/cms-test+0x402706)
=================================================================
==29625==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fd5d8b8309f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x7fd5d87c2430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fd5d889501f in OPENSSL_sk_new_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:209
#3 0x7fd5d85dcbc3 in sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null include/openssl/asn1t.h:928
#4 0x7fd5d85dcbc3 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:577
#5 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#6 0x7fd5d85db104 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:178
#7 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#8 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#9 0x7fd5d88f86d9 in X509V3_EXT_d2i crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c:142
#10 0x7fd5d88d6d3c in crl_set_issuers crypto/x509/x_crl.c:97
#11 0x7fd5d88d6d3c in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:246
#12 0x7fd5d85dc032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#13 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#14 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#15 0x7fd5d85db2b5 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:259
#16 0x7fd5d85dc813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#17 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#18 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#19 0x7fd5d85dca28 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:633
#20 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#21 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#22 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#23 0x7fd5d85dd7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#24 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#25 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#26 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#27 0x7fd5d85a77e0 in ASN1_item_d2i_bio crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c:69
#28 0x402845 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/cms.c:43
#29 0x402bbb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#30 0x402626 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#31 0x7fd5d7c81f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18391)
(cherry picked from commit e9007e09792e3735d4973743634ff55d354fc7d8)
Prior to the crash there is an out of memory error
in X509_verify_cert which makes the chain NULL or
empty. The error is ignored by ssl_add_cert_chain,
and ssl_security_cert_chain crashes due to the
unchecked null pointer.
This is reproducible with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1652848273 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./server-test ./corpora/server/47c8e933c4ec66fa3c309422283dfe0f31aafae8# ./corpora/server/47c8e933c4ec66fa3c309422283dfe0f31aafae8
#0 0x7f3a8f766eba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x403ba4 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7f3a8f39a430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7f3a8f46bd3b in sk_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:180
#4 0x7f3a8f46bd3b in OPENSSL_sk_insert crypto/stack/stack.c:242
#5 0x7f3a8f4a4fd8 in sk_X509_push include/openssl/x509.h:99
#6 0x7f3a8f4a4fd8 in X509_verify_cert crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c:286
#7 0x7f3a8fed726e in ssl_add_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:959
#8 0x7f3a8fed726e in ssl3_output_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:1015
#9 0x7f3a8fee1c50 in tls_construct_server_certificate ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c:3812
#10 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in write_state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:843
#11 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:443
#12 0x7f3a8fe84b3f in SSL_do_handshake ssl/ssl_lib.c:3718
#13 0x403202 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/server.c:740
#14 0x40371b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#15 0x402856 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#16 0x7f3a8e859f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#17 0x402936 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/server-test+0x402936)
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==8400==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000158 (pc 0x7f3a8f4d822f bp 0x7ffc39b76190 sp 0x7ffc39b760a0 T0)
==8400==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==8400==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7f3a8f4d822f in x509v3_cache_extensions crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:386
#1 0x7f3a8f4d9d3a in X509_check_purpose crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:84
#2 0x7f3a8f4da02a in X509_get_extension_flags crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:921
#3 0x7f3a8feff7d2 in ssl_security_cert_sig ssl/t1_lib.c:2518
#4 0x7f3a8feff7d2 in ssl_security_cert ssl/t1_lib.c:2542
#5 0x7f3a8feffa03 in ssl_security_cert_chain ssl/t1_lib.c:2562
#6 0x7f3a8fed728d in ssl_add_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:963
#7 0x7f3a8fed728d in ssl3_output_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:1015
#8 0x7f3a8fee1c50 in tls_construct_server_certificate ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c:3812
#9 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in write_state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:843
#10 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:443
#11 0x7f3a8fe84b3f in SSL_do_handshake ssl/ssl_lib.c:3718
#12 0x403202 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/server.c:740
#13 0x40371b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#14 0x402856 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#15 0x7f3a8e859f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#16 0x402936 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/server-test+0x402936)
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:386 in x509v3_cache_extensions
==8400==ABORTING
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18376)
(cherry picked from commit dc0ef292f7df4ce0c49c64b47726a6768f9ac044)
This is reproducible with my error injection patch:
$ ERROR_INJECT=1653267699 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./x509-test ./corpora/x509/5f4034ae85d6587dcad4da3e812e80f3d312894d
ERROR_INJECT=1653267699
#0 0x7fd485a6ad4f in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cc:36
#1 0x55c12d268724 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7fd484f51a75 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7fd484ed778d in EVP_DigestInit_ex crypto/evp/digest.c:139
#4 0x7fd4850a9849 in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c:44
#5 0x55c12d268951 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:44
#6 0x55c12d268239 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#7 0x55c12d267c7f in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#8 0x7fd483a42082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
#9 0x55c12d267e5d in _start (/home/ed/OPCToolboxV5/Source/Core/OpenSSL/openssl/fuzz/x509-test+0x3e5d)
=================================================================
==1058475==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 268 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fd485a5dc3e in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:163
#1 0x7fd484d2eb9b in BUF_MEM_grow crypto/buffer/buffer.c:97
#2 0x7fd4850b2913 in X509_NAME_oneline crypto/x509/x509_obj.c:43
#3 0x7fd4850a982f in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c:41
#4 0x55c12d268951 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:44
#5 0x55c12d268239 in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#6 0x55c12d267c7f in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#7 0x7fd483a42082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 268 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18370)
This happens for instance with
fuzz/corpora/asn1/65cf44e85614c62f10cf3b7a7184c26293a19e4a
and causes the OPENSSL_malloc below to choke on the
zero length allocation request.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18363)
This happens usually if an template object is created
and there is an out of memory error before the ASN1_OP_NEW_POST
method is called, but asn1_item_embed_free calls now the
ASN1_OP_FREE_POST which may crash because the object is not
properly initialized. Apparently that is only an issue with
the ASN1_OP_FREE_POST handling of crypot/x509/x_crl.c, which
ought to be tolerant to incomplete initialized objects.
The error can be reproduced with the reproducible error injection patch:
$ ERROR_INJECT=1652890550 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./asn1-test ./corpora/asn1/0ff17293911f54d1538b9896563a4048d67d9ee4
#0 0x7faae9dbeeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x408dc4 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7faae99f2430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7faae97f09e5 in ASN1_STRING_type_new crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c:341
#4 0x7faae98118f7 in asn1_primitive_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:318
#5 0x7faae9812401 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:78
#6 0x7faae9812401 in asn1_template_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:240
#7 0x7faae9812315 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:137
#8 0x7faae9812315 in asn1_template_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:240
#9 0x7faae9812a54 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:137
#10 0x7faae9812a54 in ASN1_item_ex_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:39
#11 0x7faae980be51 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:325
#12 0x7faae980c813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#13 0x7faae980d288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#14 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#15 0x7faae980caf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#16 0x7faae980d7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#17 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#18 0x7faae980dd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#19 0x7faae980de35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#20 0x40712c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/asn1.c:301
#21 0x40893b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#22 0x406b86 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#23 0x7faae8eb1f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==1194==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000010 (pc 0x7faae9b0625f bp 0x7fffffe41a00 sp 0x7fffffe41920 T0)
==1194==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==1194==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7faae9b0625f in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:258
#1 0x7faae9811255 in asn1_item_embed_free crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c:113
#2 0x7faae9812a65 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:150
#3 0x7faae9812a65 in ASN1_item_ex_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:39
#4 0x7faae980be51 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:325
#5 0x7faae980c813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#6 0x7faae980d288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#7 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#8 0x7faae980caf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#9 0x7faae980d7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#10 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#11 0x7faae980dd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#12 0x7faae980de35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#13 0x40712c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/asn1.c:301
#14 0x40893b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#15 0x406b86 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#16 0x7faae8eb1f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV crypto/x509/x_crl.c:258 in crl_cb
==1194==ABORTING
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18360)
(cherry picked from commit 557825acd622f98fc21423aba092e374db84f483)
This is a backport of the following commit from master:
commit 61b0fead5e6079ca826594df5b9ca00e65883cb0
Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu Nov 19 13:58:21 2020 +0000
Don't Overflow when printing Thawte Strong Extranet Version
When printing human readable info on the Thawte Strong Extranet extension
the version number could overflow if the version number == LONG_MAX. This
is undefined behaviour.
Issue found by OSSFuzz.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13452)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18347)
This is a backport of the following commit from master:
commit 415e6ac80405e13b20b083315747e431274fbd33
Author: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Sep 21 15:48:27 2021 -0700
increase x509 code coverage metrics
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16651)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18347)
rotated_mac is a 64-byte aligned buffer of size 64 and rotate_offset is secret.
Consider a weaker leakage model(CL) where only cacheline base address is leaked,
i.e address/32 for 32-byte cacheline(CL32).
Previous code used to perform two loads
1. rotated_mac[rotate_offset ^ 32] and
2. rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]
which would leak 2q + 1, 2q for 0 <= rotate_offset < 32
and 2q, 2q + 1 for 32 <= rotate_offset < 64
The proposed fix performs load operations which will always leak 2q, 2q + 1 and
selects the appropriate value in constant-time.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18050)
This allows handshake to proceed if the maximum TLS version enabled is <1.3
Fixes#13583
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18213)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17085)
Added keys for Paul Dale and Tomáš Mráz.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18156)
Except on VMS where it is safe.
This fixes CVE-2022-1292.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This is used with the pyca/cryptography test suite
(cherry picked from commit a09fb26ba90e46c4f731b5a597051b4d4b9aea3e)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16340)
This reverts commit 850ed18505631286abbd23d355d4b48f28ad89a9.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16340)
This fixes an internal error alert from the server and
an unexpected connection failure in the release version,
but a failed assertion and a server crash in the
debug version.
Reproduce this issue with a DTLS server/client like that:
./openssl s_server -dtls -mtu 1500
./openssl s_client -dtls -maxfraglen 512
In the debug version a crash happens in the Server now:
./openssl s_server -dtls -mtu 1500
Using default temp DH parameters
ACCEPT
ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c:269: OpenSSL internal error: Assertion failed: len == written
Aborted (core dumped)
While in the release version the handshake exceeds the
negotiated max fragment size, and fails because of this:
$ ./openssl s_server -dtls -mtu 1500
Using default temp DH parameters
ACCEPT
ERROR
4057152ADA7F0000:error:0A0000C2:SSL routines:do_dtls1_write:exceeds max fragment size:ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c:826:
shutting down SSL
CONNECTION CLOSED
From the client's point of view the connection fails
with an Internal Error Alert:
$ ./openssl s_client -dtls -maxfraglen 512
Connecting to ::1
CONNECTED(00000003)
40B76343377F0000:error:0A000438:SSL routines:dtls1_read_bytes:tlsv1 alert internal error:ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c:613:SSL alert number 80
and now the connection attempt fails unexpectedly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18093)
(cherry picked from commit e915c3f5381cd38ebdc1824c3ba9896ea7160103)
This causes the DTLS server to enter an error state:
./openssl s_server -dtls
./openssl s_client -dtls -maxfraglen 512 -sess_out s1.txt
[...]
Q
./openssl s_client -dtls -sess_in s1.txt
CONNECTED(00000003)
^C
./openssl s_client -dtls
CONNECTED(00000003)
140335537067840:error:14102410:SSL routines:dtls1_read_bytes:sslv3 alert handshake failure:ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c:614:SSL alert number 40
At this point the dtls server needs to be restarted,
because verify_cookie_callback always fails, because
the previous cookie is checked against the current one.
The reason for this is not fully understood.
In wireshark we see the following each time:
c->s Client Hello (without cookie)
s->c Hello Verify Request (with new cookie)
s->c Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Handshake Failure)
c->s Client Hello (echoes new cookie)
The client gives up when the Alert arrives.
The Alert is triggered because the server calls
verify_cookie_callback with the previous cookie,
although it just sent the current cookie in the
Hello Verify Request.
However this does only happen because no Alert message
is sent when the client re-connects the session with
the missing -maxfraglen option.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18094)
This is specific for OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable branch
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18080)
Even though the function is not part of the public api, it is not
entirely removed, in order to minimize the chance of breakage,
because it is exported from libcrypto. Instead, we keep a dummy
implementation.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17975)
This commit removes the entire initialization and cleanup of the
error string hash table (`int_error_hash`) if `no-err` is configured.
The only operative function remaining is `ERR_get_next_error_library()`.
That is the reason why the `err_string_lock` and hence the
`do_err_strings_init()` function can't be removed entirely.
Fixes#17971
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17975)
Fixes#18010.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18034)
(cherry picked from commit bc6bac8561ead83d6135f376ffcbbb0b657e64fe)
A cherry-pick from the master branch incorrectly introduced a usage of
3 argument SSLfatal. In 1.1.1 the function code is also required.
Fixes#17999
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18000)
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17936)
(cherry picked from commit db44b55aaa42141921217183667800425227b658)
Repeated HRR must be rejected.
Fixes#17934
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17936)
(cherry picked from commit d204a50b898435fbf937316d5693008cebf62eef)
libctx was left in cherry-pick from master/3.0 cherry-pick
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17970)
For TLSv1.3, limit ticket lifetime hint to 1 week per RFC8446
Fixes#17948
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17952)
(cherry picked from commit 0089cc7f9d42f6e39872161199fb8b6a99da2492)
The symbol OPENSSL_s390xcap_P and the OPENSSL_cpuid_setup function are not
exported by the version script of OpenSSL. However, if someone uses the
static library without the version script, these symbols all of a sudden
become global symbols and their usage in assembler code does not correctly
reflect that for PIC. Since these symbols should never be used outside of
OpenSSL, hide them inside the binary.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17946)
(cherry picked from commit 37816ef5757e458be9648481e56bf698ee3bfbb1)
The assert added cannot ever fail because (current & 0xFFFF) != 0 from the
while loop and the trailing zero bit count therefore cannot be as large as 32.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17892)
(cherry picked from commit 81487b65b9eb8148471e729b8c1959521d62c69e)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17897)
(cherry picked from commit 70cd9a51911e9a4e2f24e29ddd84fa9fcb778b63)
