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Split out ECDHE from tls_process_key_exchange()
Continuing from the previous commit. Refactor tls_process_key_exchange() to split out into a separate function the ECDHE aspects. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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@ -1489,6 +1489,89 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
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#endif
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}
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static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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PACKET encoded_pt;
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const unsigned char *ecparams;
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int curve_nid;
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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/*
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* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
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* public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
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* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
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*/
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if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
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*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
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* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
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*/
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if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
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*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
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return 0;
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}
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curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
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if (curve_nid == 0) {
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*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
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SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
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if (pctx == NULL
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|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
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|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
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|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
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*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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pctx = NULL;
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if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
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*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
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PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
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PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
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*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
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* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
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* and ECDSA.
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*/
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if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
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*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
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else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
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*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
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/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
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return 1;
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#else
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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return 0;
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#endif
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}
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MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
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{
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EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
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@ -1528,87 +1611,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
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} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
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if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
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goto err;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
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PACKET encoded_pt;
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const unsigned char *ecparams;
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int curve_nid;
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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/*
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* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
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* public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
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* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
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*/
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if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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goto f_err;
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}
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/*
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* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
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* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
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*/
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if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
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if (curve_nid == 0) {
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al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
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SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
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goto f_err;
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}
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/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
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if (pctx == NULL
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|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
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|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
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|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
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al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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goto f_err;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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pctx = NULL;
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if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
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goto f_err;
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}
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if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
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PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
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PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
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goto f_err;
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}
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/*
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* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
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* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
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* and ECDSA.
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*/
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if (0) ;
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
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pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
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pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
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# endif
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/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
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} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
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if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
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goto err;
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} else if (alg_k) {
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al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
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/* if it was signed, check the signature */
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if (pkey != NULL) {
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