mirror/openssl
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git synced 2025-04-06 20:20:50 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(): make sure to reject protection type mismatch

Browse Source 
Do not accept password-based if expected signature-based and no secret is available and
do not accept signature-based if expected password-based and no trust anchors available.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19729)
This commit is contained in:
Dr. David von Oheimb 2022-11-22 08:43:03 +01:00 committed by Dr. David von Oheimb
parent 318a9dfa5f
commit fc93335760
6 changed files with 71 additions and 38 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

5
crypto/cmp/cmp_err.c
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -98,8 +98,11 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CMP_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION), "missing protection"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_REFERENCE_CERT),
"missing reference cert"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET), "missing secret"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION),
"missing sender identification"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR),
"missing trust anchor"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE),
"missing trust store"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MULTIPLE_REQUESTS_NOT_SUPPORTED),

10
crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
View File

@ -565,8 +565,9 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection");
return 1;
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection");
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) {
/*
@ -616,8 +617,9 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
scrt = ctx->srvCert;
if (scrt == NULL) {
if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection");
return 1;
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection");
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR);
return 0;
}
if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg)) {
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,

2
crypto/err/openssl.txt
View File

@ -242,7 +242,9 @@ CMP_R_MISSING_PBM_SECRET:166:missing pbm secret
CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY:131:missing private key
CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION:143:missing protection
CMP_R_MISSING_REFERENCE_CERT:168:missing reference cert
CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET:178:missing secret
CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION:111:missing sender identification
CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR:179:missing trust anchor
CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE:144:missing trust store
CMP_R_MULTIPLE_REQUESTS_NOT_SUPPORTED:161:multiple requests not supported
CMP_R_MULTIPLE_RESPONSES_NOT_SUPPORTED:170:multiple responses not supported

11
doc/man3/OSSL_CMP_validate_msg.pod
View File

@ -19,8 +19,11 @@ This is the API for validating the protection of CMP messages,
which includes validating CMP message sender certificates and their paths
while optionally checking the revocation status of the certificates(s).
OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() validates the protection of the given I<msg>
using either password-based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm.
OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() validates the protection of the given I<msg>,
which must be signature-based or using password-based MAC (PBM).
In the former case a suitable trust anchor must be given in the CMP context
I<ctx>, and in the latter case the matching secret must have been set there
using L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(3)>.
In case of signature algorithm, the certificate to use for the signature check
is preferably the one provided by a call to L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_srvCert(3)>.
@ -61,7 +64,9 @@ return 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_new(3)>, L<OSSL_CMP_exec_certreq(3)>
L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_new(3)>, L<OSSL_CMP_exec_certreq(3)>,
L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(3)>, L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_srvCert(3)>,
L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_untrusted(3)>, L<OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_trusted(3)>
=head1 HISTORY

4
include/openssl/cmperr.h
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -69,7 +69,9 @@
# define CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY 131
# define CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION 143
# define CMP_R_MISSING_REFERENCE_CERT 168
# define CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET 178
# define CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION 111
# define CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR 179
# define CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE 144
# define CMP_R_MULTIPLE_REQUESTS_NOT_SUPPORTED 161
# define CMP_R_MULTIPLE_RESPONSES_NOT_SUPPORTED 170

77
test/cmp_vfy_test.c
View File

@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ static X509 *insta_cert = NULL, *instaca_cert = NULL;
static unsigned char rand_data[OSSL_CMP_TRANSACTIONID_LENGTH];
static OSSL_CMP_MSG *ir_unprotected, *ir_rmprotection;
/* secret value used for IP_waitingStatus_PBM.der */
static const unsigned char sec_1[] = {
'9', 'p', 'p', '8', '-', 'b', '3', '5', 'i', '-', 'X', 'd', '3',
'Q', '-', 'u', 'd', 'N', 'R'
};
static int flip_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *bitstr)
{
int bit_num = 7;
@ -147,20 +153,15 @@ static int execute_validate_cert_path_test(CMP_VFY_TEST_FIXTURE *fixture)
return res;
}
static int test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection(void)
static int test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection(int miss, int wrong)
{
/* secret value belonging to cmp-test/CMP_IP_waitingStatus_PBM.der */
const unsigned char sec_1[] = {
'9', 'p', 'p', '8', '-', 'b', '3', '5', 'i', '-', 'X', 'd', '3',
'Q', '-', 'u', 'd', 'N', 'R'
};
SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CMP_VFY_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up);
fixture->cert = NULL;
fixture->expected = 1;
if (!TEST_true(OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(fixture->cmp_ctx, sec_1,
sizeof(sec_1)))
fixture->expected = !miss && !wrong;
if (!TEST_true(miss ? OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_trusted(fixture->cmp_ctx, NULL)
: OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(fixture->cmp_ctx, sec_1,
wrong ? 4 : sizeof(sec_1)))
|| !TEST_ptr(fixture->msg = load_pkimsg(ip_waiting_f, libctx))) {
tear_down(fixture);
fixture = NULL;
@ -169,6 +170,21 @@ static int test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection(void)
return result;
}
static int test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_ok(void)
{
return test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection(0, 0);
}
static int test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_missing(void)
{
return test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection(1, 0);
}
static int test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_wrong(void)
{
return test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection(0, 1);
}
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
static int test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_bad(void)
{
@ -240,26 +256,16 @@ static int test_validate_msg_signature_trusted_expired(void)
}
#endif
static int test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert_wrong(void)
{
SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CMP_VFY_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up);
fixture->expected = 0;
if (!TEST_ptr(fixture->msg = load_pkimsg(ir_protected_f, libctx))
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_srvCert(fixture->cmp_ctx, clcert))) {
tear_down(fixture);
fixture = NULL;
}
EXECUTE_TEST(execute_validate_msg_test, tear_down);
return result;
}
static int test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(int bad_sig)
static int test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(int bad_sig, int miss, int wrong)
{
SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CMP_VFY_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up);
fixture->cert = srvcert;
fixture->expected = !bad_sig;
fixture->expected = !bad_sig && !wrong && !miss;
if (!TEST_ptr(fixture->msg = load_pkimsg(ir_protected_f, libctx))
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_srvCert(fixture->cmp_ctx, srvcert))
|| !TEST_true(miss ? OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(fixture->cmp_ctx,
sec_1, sizeof(sec_1))
: OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_srvCert(fixture->cmp_ctx,
wrong? clcert : srvcert))
|| (bad_sig && !flip_bit(fixture->msg->protection))) {
tear_down(fixture);
fixture = NULL;
@ -268,16 +274,26 @@ static int test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(int bad_sig)
return result;
}
static int test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert_missing(void)
{
return test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(0, 1, 0);
}
static int test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert_wrong(void)
{
return test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(0, 0, 1);
}
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
static int test_validate_msg_signature_bad(void)
{
return test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(1);
return test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(1, 0, 0);
}
#endif
static int test_validate_msg_signature_sender_cert_srvcert(void)
{
return test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(0);
return test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert(0, 0, 0);
}
static int test_validate_msg_signature_sender_cert_untrusted(void)
@ -650,6 +666,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_signature_trusted_ok);
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_signature_trusted_expired);
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert_missing);
#endif
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_signature_srvcert_wrong);
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
@ -667,8 +684,10 @@ int setup_tests(void)
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_unprotected_request);
#endif
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection);
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_ok);
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_missing);
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_wrong);
ADD_TEST(test_validate_msg_mac_alg_protection_bad);
#endif