mirror/openssl
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git synced 2025-01-30 14:01:55 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Tidy up Suite B logic

Browse Source 
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2324)
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2017-01-30 22:02:11 +00:00
parent 6cbebb5516
commit f1adb0068f
1 changed files with 16 additions and 16 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

32
ssl/t1_lib.c
View File

@ -863,10 +863,10 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */ /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
if (curve != lu->curve) { if (curve != lu->curve) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
@ -882,23 +882,23 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0; return 0;
} }
/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
if (curve_id[0]) /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
&& sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0; return 0;
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { }
if (lu->hash != NID_sha256) { /*
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
return 0; * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
} * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
} else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { */
if (lu->hash != NID_sha384) { if (curve != lu->curve) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
} else {
return 0; return 0;
} }
} }