mirror/openssl
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git synced 2024-11-21 01:15:20 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Don't set peer_tmp until we have finished constructing it

Browse Source 
If we fail halfway through constructing the peer_tmp EVP_PKEY but we have
already stored it in s->s3->peer_tmp then if anything tries to use it then
it will likely fail. This was causing s_client to core dump in the
sslskewith0p test. s_client was trying to print out the connection
parameters that it had negotiated so far. Arguably s_client should not do
that if the connection has failed...but given it is existing functionality
it's easier to fix libssl.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2016-04-19 23:33:35 +01:00
parent 48c1e15ceb
commit ee85fc1dd6
1 changed files with 36 additions and 27 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

63
ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
View File

@ -1525,9 +1525,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
DH *dh;
BIGNUM *p, *g, *bnpub_key;
DH *dh = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
@ -1536,19 +1537,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
dh = DH_new();
if (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
DH_free(dh);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(s->s3->peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
DH_free(dh);
goto err;
goto dherr;
}
p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
@ -1558,39 +1553,53 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
NULL);
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
goto err;
goto dherr;
}
if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
goto f_err;
goto dherr;
}
if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
goto err;
goto dherr;
}
if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
goto err;
goto dherr;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
goto dherr;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto dherr;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
goto dhend;
dherr:
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
DH_free(dh);
EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
goto f_err;
dhend:
/*
* FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
* public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
*/
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */