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Propagate the request for prediction resistance to the get entropy call

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Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5402
This commit is contained in:
Kurt Roeckx 2018-02-18 19:26:55 +01:00
parent a080c3e816
commit eb238134e0
5 changed files with 29 additions and 19 deletions
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3
crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h
View File

@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool);
/* DRBG entropy callbacks. */
size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance);
void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len);

14
crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
View File

@ -327,7 +327,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
drbg->min_entropylen,
drbg->max_entropylen, 0);
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
@ -411,7 +412,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
int prediction_resistance)
{
unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
size_t entropylen = 0;
@ -435,7 +437,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
drbg->min_entropylen,
drbg->max_entropylen,
prediction_resistance);
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
} else if (reseeded == 0) {
/* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0);
RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
}
}
@ -627,7 +631,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
}
if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) {
if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
return 0;
}

5
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
View File

@ -171,8 +171,9 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
* its entropy will be used up first.
*/
size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance)
{
size_t ret = 0;
size_t entropy_available = 0;

6
include/openssl/rand_drbg.h
View File

@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
* Object "use" functions.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
int prediction_resistance);
int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
@ -95,7 +96,8 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *dctx, int idx);
typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len,
size_t max_len);
size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance);
typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char **pout,

20
test/drbgtest.c
View File

@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ typedef struct test_ctx_st {
} TEST_CTX;
static size_t kat_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance)
{
TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
/* Reseed DRBG with test entropy and additional input */
t.entropy = td->entropyreseed;
t.entropylen = td->entropyreseedlen;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen)
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen, 0)
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len, 0,
td->adin2, td->adin2len))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat2, td->kat2len, buff, td->kat2len)))
@ -415,12 +416,12 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
/* Test explicit reseed with too large additional input */
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1) > 0)
|| RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1, 0) > 0)
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with entropy source failure */
t.entropylen = 0;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
@ -428,7 +429,7 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
@ -436,7 +437,7 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
@ -504,7 +505,8 @@ static HOOK_CTX *get_hook_ctx(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
/* Intercepts and counts calls to the get_entropy() callback */
static size_t get_entropy_hook(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance)
{
size_t ret;
HOOK_CTX *ctx = get_hook_ctx(drbg);
@ -512,8 +514,8 @@ static size_t get_entropy_hook(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
if (ctx->fail != 0)
return 0;
ret = ctx->get_entropy(
drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len);
ret = ctx->get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
prediction_resistance);
if (ret != 0)
ctx->reseed_count++;