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x509_vfy.c: Improve comments (correcting typos etc.)

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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13606)
This commit is contained in:
Dr. David von Oheimb 2020-12-03 11:10:19 +01:00
parent f974b61077
commit e99505b4d0
1 changed files with 13 additions and 13 deletions
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26
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
/*-
* Inform the verify callback of an error.
* If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
* B<depth>.
* If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
* If 'x' is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
* 'depth'
* If 'err' is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
* unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
*
* Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
CHECK_CB(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS);
}
/*
* Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requrested
* Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested
* and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs
* because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2.
*/
@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
return 0;
/* Check pathlen */
/* Check path length */
CHECK_CB(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1
&& plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length,
ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
* multivalued RDN
* multi-valued RDN
*/
if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
last_object_loc))
@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
return 0;
}
/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
/* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */
if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
/* Check expiry */
/* Check expiration */
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
/*
* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
* certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
* be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
* be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more
* strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
* though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
* RFC5280 version
@ -1804,8 +1804,8 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
* when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
* According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
* we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the
* CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
* we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of
* the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
* In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
* not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
* xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
@ -2009,7 +2009,7 @@ int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
return 1;
}
/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
/* Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs */
X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
@ -3199,7 +3199,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
/*
* We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
* We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check
* trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
* Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
* look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.