Revert the behavior change of CMS_get1_certs() and CMS_get1_crls()

Fixes #26079

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26100)

(cherry picked from commit afd36cbef8)
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz 2024-12-03 12:40:01 +01:00
parent 5f9814d95c
commit e2ffc9e7d0
5 changed files with 65 additions and 22 deletions

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@ -81,7 +81,15 @@ OpenSSL 3.5
OpenSSL 3.4
-----------
### Changes between 3.3 and 3.4 [xx XXX xxxx]
### Changes between 3.4.0 and 3.4.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
* Reverted the behavior change of CMS_get1_certs() and CMS_get1_crls()
that happened in the 3.4.0 release. These functions now return NULL
again if there are no certs or crls in the CMS object.
*Tomáš Mráz*
### Changes between 3.3 and 3.4.0 [22 Oct 2024]
* For the FIPS provider only, replaced the primary DRBG with a continuous
health check module. This also removes the now forbidden DRBG chaining.

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@ -620,59 +620,91 @@ int CMS_add1_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl)
STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get1_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
if (!ossl_cms_get1_certs_ex(cms, &certs))
return NULL;
if (sk_X509_num(certs) == 0) {
sk_X509_free(certs);
return NULL;
}
return certs;
}
int ossl_cms_get1_certs_ex(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) **certs)
{
CMS_CertificateChoices *cch;
STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts;
int i, n;
if (certs == NULL)
return 0;
*certs = NULL;
pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
if (pcerts == NULL)
return NULL;
return 0;
/* make sure to return NULL only on error */
/* make sure to return NULL *certs only on error */
n = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts);
if ((certs = sk_X509_new_reserve(NULL, n)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((*certs = sk_X509_new_reserve(NULL, n)) == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i);
if (cch->type == 0) {
if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&certs, cch->d.certificate,
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(certs);
return NULL;
if (!X509_add_cert(*certs, cch->d.certificate,
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(*certs);
*certs = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
}
return certs;
return 1;
}
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *CMS_get1_crls(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
{
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
if (!ossl_cms_get1_crls_ex(cms, &crls))
return NULL;
if (sk_X509_CRL_num(crls) == 0) {
sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
return NULL;
}
return crls;
}
int ossl_cms_get1_crls_ex(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls)
{
STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) **pcrls;
CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch;
int i, n;
if (crls == NULL)
return 0;
*crls = NULL;
pcrls = cms_get0_revocation_choices(cms);
if (pcrls == NULL)
return NULL;
return 0;
/* make sure to return NULL only on error */
/* make sure to return NULL *crls only on error */
n = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(*pcrls);
if ((crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_reserve(NULL, n)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((*crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_reserve(NULL, n)) == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(*pcrls, i);
if (rch->type == 0) {
if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, rch->d.crl)
if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*crls, rch->d.crl)
|| !X509_CRL_up_ref(rch->d.crl)) {
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
return NULL;
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(*crls, X509_CRL_free);
*crls = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
}
return crls;
return 1;
}
int ossl_cms_ias_cert_cmp(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias, X509 *cert)

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@ -485,6 +485,9 @@ int ossl_cms_ecdh_envelope(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int decrypt);
int ossl_cms_rsa_envelope(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int decrypt);
int ossl_cms_rsa_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int verify);
int ossl_cms_get1_certs_ex(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) **certs);
int ossl_cms_get1_crls_ex(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls);
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CertificateChoices)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_DigestedData)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EncryptedData)

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@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
if (si_chains == NULL)
goto err;
}
if ((untrusted = CMS_get1_certs(cms)) == NULL)
if (!ossl_cms_get1_certs_ex(cms, &untrusted))
goto err;
if (sk_X509_num(certs) > 0
&& !ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&untrusted, certs,
@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
goto err;
if ((flags & CMS_NOCRL) == 0
&& (crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms)) == NULL)
&& !ossl_cms_get1_crls_ex(cms, &crls))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < scount; i++) {
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);

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@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ For enveloped data they are added to B<OriginatorInfo>.
CMS_add0_cert(), CMS_add1_cert() and CMS_add0_crl() and CMS_add1_crl() return
1 for success and 0 for failure.
CMS_get1_certs() and CMS_get1_crls() return the STACK of certificates or CRLs,
which is empty if there are none. They return NULL on error.
CMS_get1_certs() and CMS_get1_crls() return the STACK of certificates or CRLs
or NULL if there are none or an error occurs.
Besides out-of-memory, the only error which will occur
in practice is if the I<cms> type is invalid.