mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-11-21 01:15:20 +08:00
Fix various typos, repeated words, align some spelling to LDP.
Partially revamped from #16712 - fall thru -> fall through - time stamp -> timestamp - host name -> hostname - ipv6 -> IPv6 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
This commit is contained in:
FdaSilvaYY
Pauli
parent
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commit
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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Acknowlegements
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===============
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Acknowledgements
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================
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Please see our [Thanks!][] page for the current acknowledgements.
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76
CHANGES.md
76
CHANGES.md
@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*Matt Caswell*
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* Fix a bug in the OPENSSL_LH_flush() function that breaks reuse of the memory
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occuppied by the removed hash table entries.
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occupied by the removed hash table entries.
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This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived
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process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will
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@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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* The EVP_get_cipherbyname() function will return NULL for algorithms such as
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"AES-128-SIV", "AES-128-CBC-CTS" and "CAMELLIA-128-CBC-CTS" which were
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previously only accessible via low level interfaces. Use EVP_CIPHER_fetch()
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previously only accessible via low-level interfaces. Use EVP_CIPHER_fetch()
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instead to retrieve these algorithms from a provider.
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*Shane Lontis*
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@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*David von Oheimb*
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* All of the low level EC_KEY functions have been deprecated.
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* All of the low-level EC_KEY functions have been deprecated.
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*Shane Lontis, Paul Dale, Richard Levitte, and Tomáš Mráz*
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@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*David von Oheimb*
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* All of the low level RSA functions have been deprecated.
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* All of the low-level RSA functions have been deprecated.
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*Paul Dale*
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@ -1188,11 +1188,11 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*Paul Dale*
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* All of the low level DH functions have been deprecated.
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* All of the low-level DH functions have been deprecated.
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*Paul Dale and Matt Caswell*
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* All of the low level DSA functions have been deprecated.
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* All of the low-level DSA functions have been deprecated.
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*Paul Dale*
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@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*Richard Levitte*
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* Deprecated low level ECDH and ECDSA functions.
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* Deprecated low-level ECDH and ECDSA functions.
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*Paul Dale*
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@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*Paul Dale*
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* All of the low level HMAC functions have been deprecated.
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* All of the low-level HMAC functions have been deprecated.
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*Paul Dale and David von Oheimb*
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@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*Rich Salz*
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* All of the low level CMAC functions have been deprecated.
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* All of the low-level CMAC functions have been deprecated.
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*Paul Dale*
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@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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*Richard Levitte*
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* All of the low level cipher functions have been deprecated.
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* All of the low-level cipher functions have been deprecated.
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*Matt Caswell and Paul Dale*
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@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
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As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
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key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
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certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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certificate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
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CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
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@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the large list of deprecated functions.
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when primes for RSA keys are computed.
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Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys,
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the 2-prime and 3-prime RSA modules were easy to distinguish, since
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`N = p*q = 1 (mod 3)`, but `N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3)`. Therefore fingerprinting
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`N = p*q = 1 (mod 3)`, but `N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3)`. Therefore, fingerprinting
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2-prime vs. 3-prime RSA keys was possible by computing N mod 3.
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This avoids possible fingerprinting of newly generated RSA modules.
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@ -1966,7 +1966,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.1
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ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING
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structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field
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holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which
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are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated
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are represented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated
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with a NUL (0) byte.
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Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using
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@ -2054,7 +2054,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.1
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* Fixed the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() function. It attempts to
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create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
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contained within an X509 certificate. However it was failing to correctly
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contained within an X509 certificate. However, it was failing to correctly
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handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which might
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occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may subsequently
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result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a potential denial of
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@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.1
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Fixed the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate
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functions. Previously they could overflow the output length argument in some
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cases where the input length is close to the maximum permissable length for
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cases where the input length is close to the maximum permissible length for
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an integer on the platform. In such cases the return value from the function
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call would be 1 (indicating success), but the output length value would be
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negative. This could cause applications to behave incorrectly or crash.
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@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.1
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when primes for RSA keys are computed.
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Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys,
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the 2-prime and 3-prime RSA modules were easy to distinguish, since
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N = p*q = 1 (mod 3), but N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3). Therefore fingerprinting
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N = p*q = 1 (mod 3), but N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3). Therefore, fingerprinting
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2-prime vs. 3-prime RSA keys was possible by computing N mod 3.
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This avoids possible fingerprinting of newly generated RSA modules.
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@ -2233,7 +2233,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.1
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* Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random
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number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the
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event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child
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processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not
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processes did not share the same RNG state. However, this protection was not
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being used in the default case.
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A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high
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@ -2275,7 +2275,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.1
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used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
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As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
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key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
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certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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certificate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
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CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
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([CVE-2019-1563])
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@ -3045,7 +3045,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0
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used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
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As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
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key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
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certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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certificate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
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CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
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([CVE-2019-1563])
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@ -3280,7 +3280,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0
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OpenSSL 1.0.2 and below had the ability to disable renegotiation using the
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(undocumented) SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS flag. Due to the opacity
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changes this is no longer possible in 1.1.0. Therefore the new
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changes this is no longer possible in 1.1.0. Therefore, the new
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SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION option from 1.1.1-dev has been backported to
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1.1.0 to provide equivalent functionality.
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@ -3371,7 +3371,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0
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During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is
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negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then
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this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependant on ciphersuite). Both clients
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this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients
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and servers are affected.
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat).
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@ -3543,7 +3543,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0
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place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming
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that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed connection in a timely
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manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed
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again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in
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again. Therefore, the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in
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nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if:
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1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event
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@ -4310,7 +4310,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0
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* Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run
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OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining
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the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably
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not well tested). Therefore the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option has been removed.
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not well tested). Therefore, the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option has been removed.
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*Matt Caswell*
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@ -4388,7 +4388,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0
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*Matt Caswell*
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* SSLv2 support has been removed. It still supports receiving a SSLv2
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* SSLv2 support has been removed. It still supports receiving an SSLv2
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compatible client hello.
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*Kurt Roeckx*
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@ -4842,7 +4842,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.2
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used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
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As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
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key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
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certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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certificate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
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CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
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([CVE-2019-1563])
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@ -5318,8 +5318,8 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.2
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has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to
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remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will
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be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for
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a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k
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to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an
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a message is 100k. Therefore, the attacker could force an additional 1500k
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to be consumed per connection. By opening many simultaneous connections an
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attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion.
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo.
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@ -6483,7 +6483,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.1
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message).
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The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
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defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
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defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore, the above idiom is actually
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undefined behaviour.
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For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
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@ -6519,8 +6519,8 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.1
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has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to
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remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will
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be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for
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a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k
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to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an
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a message is 100k. Therefore, the attacker could force an additional 1500k
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to be consumed per connection. By opening many simultaneous connections an
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attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion.
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo.
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@ -6586,7 +6586,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.1
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amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
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corruption.
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Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by
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Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by
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the `PEM_write_bio*` family of functions. These are mainly used within the
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OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
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from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
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@ -7252,7 +7252,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.1
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* Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
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When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
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could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
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could accept and complete an SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
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configured to send them.
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([CVE-2014-3568])
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@ -8269,7 +8269,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.0
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* Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
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When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
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could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
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could accept and complete an SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
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configured to send them.
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([CVE-2014-3568])
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@ -9518,7 +9518,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
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* Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
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extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
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have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an
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have new members for a hostname. The SSL data structure has an
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additional member `SSL_CTX *initial_ctx` so that new sessions can be
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stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
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SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
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@ -9542,7 +9542,7 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
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openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
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'-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
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testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
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testing the HostName extension for a specific single hostname ('-cert'
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and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
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negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by
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default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
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@ -10045,7 +10045,7 @@ OpenSSL 0.9.x
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The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not
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have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA.
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Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection
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Therefore, it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection
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of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software.
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*Lutz Jaenicke*
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@ -10225,7 +10225,7 @@ OpenSSL 0.9.x
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* Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
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extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
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have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an
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have new members for a hostname. The SSL data structure has an
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additional member `SSL_CTX *initial_ctx` so that new sessions can be
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stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
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SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
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@ -10249,7 +10249,7 @@ OpenSSL 0.9.x
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openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
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'-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
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testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
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testing the HostName extension for a specific single hostname ('-cert'
|
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and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
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negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by
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default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
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4
NEWS.md
4
NEWS.md
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ OpenSSL 3.0
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* Enhanced 'openssl list' with many new options.
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* Added migration guide to man7.
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* Implemented support for fully "pluggable" TLSv1.3 groups.
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* Added suport for Kernel TLS (KTLS).
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* Added support for Kernel TLS (KTLS).
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* Changed the license to the Apache License v2.0.
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* Moved all variations of the EVP ciphers CAST5, BF, IDEA, SEED, RC2,
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RC4, RC5, and DES to the legacy provider.
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@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ OpenSSL 3.0
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* Deprecated ERR_put_error(), ERR_get_error_line(), ERR_get_error_line_data(),
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ERR_peek_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_last_error_line_data() and
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ERR_func_error_string().
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* Added OSSL_PROVIDER_available(), to check provider availibility.
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* Added OSSL_PROVIDER_available(), to check provider availability.
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* Added 'openssl mac' that uses the EVP_MAC API.
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* Added 'openssl kdf' that uses the EVP_KDF API.
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* Add OPENSSL_info() and 'openssl info' to get built-in data.
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@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ descriptions below, `Text::Template` will serve as an example.
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$ cpan -f -i Text::Template
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Note: on VMS, you must quote any argument that contains upper case
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Note: on VMS, you must quote any argument that contains uppercase
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characters, so the lines above would be:
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$ cpan -i "Text::Template"
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@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ die "--type argument must be equal to 'lib' or 'dso'"
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# 0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libcrypto-opt.so.1.1]
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# 0x000000000000000e (SONAME) Library soname: [libssl-opt.so.1.1]
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#
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# We case-fold the variant tag to upper case and replace all non-alnum
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# We case-fold the variant tag to uppercase and replace all non-alnum
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# characters with "_". This yields the following symbol versions:
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#
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# $ nm libcrypto.so | grep -w A
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@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ if ( ! $reindex && $statefile ) {
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# Scan each C source file and look for reason codes. This is done by
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# looking for strings that "look like" reason codes: basically anything
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# consisting of all upper case and numerics which _R_ in it and which has
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# consisting of all uppercase and numerics which _R_ in it and which has
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# the name of an error library at the start. Should there be anything else,
|
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# such as a type name, we add exceptions here.
|
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# If a code doesn't exist in list compiled from headers then mark it
|
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