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Correct some formatting errors in tls1_meth.c

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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18132)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2022-07-22 15:04:07 +01:00
parent 3de7695928
commit d4ee3456e9
1 changed files with 17 additions and 22 deletions
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39
ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c
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@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
return 0;
}
if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) {
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx);
if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
@ -176,10 +175,6 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
if (ivlen > 1) {
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
/*
* we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
* happen?? (steve)
*/
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
@ -203,9 +198,9 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
/*
* We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
* cipher doesn't support pipelining
*/
* We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
* cipher doesn't support pipelining
*/
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
@ -253,9 +248,9 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
} else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
/*
* We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
* padding on the provider side.
*/
* We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
* padding on the provider side.
*/
padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
/* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
@ -309,10 +304,10 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
int decrement_seq = 0;
/*
* When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
* So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
* Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
*/
* When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
* So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
* Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
*/
if (sending && !rl->use_etm)
decrement_seq = 1;
@ -338,10 +333,10 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
recs[0].length = outlen;
/*
* The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
* payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
* any explicit IV
*/
* The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
* payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
* any explicit IV
*/
if (!sending) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
@ -409,9 +404,9 @@ static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
}
/*
* If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
* with a random MAC if padding is invalid
*/
* If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
* with a random MAC if padding is invalid
*/
if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
recs[ctr].orig_len,
recs[ctr].data,