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Add DTLSv1_listen documentation
Adds a new man page to cover the DTLSv1_listen() function. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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doc/ssl/DTLSv1_listen.pod
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doc/ssl/DTLSv1_listen.pod
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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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DTLSv1_listen - listen for incoming DTLS connections.
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *ssl, struct sockaddr *peer);
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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DTLSv1_listen() listens for new incoming DTLS connections. If a ClientHello is
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received that does not contain a cookie, then DTLSv1_listen() responds with a
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HelloVerifyRequest. If a ClientHello is received with a cookie that is verified
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then control is returned to user code to enable the handshake to be completed
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(for example by using SSL_accept()).
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=head1 NOTES
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Datagram based protocols can be susceptible to Denial of Service attacks. A
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DTLS attacker could, for example, submit a series of handshake initiation
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requests that cause the server to allocate state (and possibly perform
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cryptographic operations) thus consuming server resources. The attacker could
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also (with UDP) quite simply forge the source IP address in such an attack.
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As a counter measure to that DTLS includes a stateless cookie mechanism. The
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idea is that when a client attempts to connect to a server it sends a
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ClientHello message. The server responds with a HelloVerifyRequest which
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contains a unique cookie. The client then resends the ClientHello, but this time
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includes the cookie in the message thus proving that the client is capable of
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receiving messages sent to that address. All of this can be done by the server
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without allocating any state, and thus without consuming expensive resources.
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OpenSSL implements this capability via the DTLSv1_listen() function. The B<ssl>
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parameter should be a newly allocated SSL object with its read and write BIOs
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set, in the same way as might be done for a call to SSL_accept(). Typically the
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read BIO will be in an "unconnected" state and thus capable of receiving
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messages from any peer.
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When a ClientHello is received that contains a cookie that has been verified,
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then DTLSv1_listen() will return with the B<ssl> parameter updated into a state
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where the handshake can be continued by a call to (for example) SSL_accept().
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Additionally the B<struct sockaddr> location pointed to by B<peer> will be
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filled in with details of the peer that sent the ClientHello. Typically user
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code is expected to "connect" the underlying socket to the peer and continue the
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handshake in a connected state.
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Prior to calling DTLSv1_listen() user code must ensure that cookie generation
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and verification callbacks have been set up using
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SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb() and SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb()
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respectively.
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Since DTLSv1_listen() operates entirely statelessly whilst processing incoming
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ClientHellos it is unable to process fragmented messages (since this would
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require the allocation of state). An implication of this is that DTLSv1_listen()
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B<only> supports ClientHellos that fit inside a single datagram.
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=head1 RETURN VALUES
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From OpenSSL 1.1.0 a return value of >= 1 indicates success. In this instance
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the B<peer> value will be filled in and the B<ssl> object set up ready to
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continue the handshake.
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A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for
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example) be because of non-blocking IO, or some invalid message having been
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received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error queue with
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further information if appropriate. Typically user code is expected to retry the
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call to DTLSv1_listen() in the event of a non-fatal error. Any old errors on the
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error queue will be cleared in the subsequent call.
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A return value of <0 indicates a fatal error. This could (for example) be
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because of a failure to allocate sufficient memory for the operation.
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Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 fatal and non-fatal errors both produce return codes
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<= 0 (in typical implementations user code treats all errors as non-fatal),
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whilst return codes >0 indicate success.
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>,
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L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)>
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=head1 HISTORY
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DTLSv1_listen() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.8. Its return codes were clarified in
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OpenSSL 1.1.0.
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=cut
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@ -743,7 +743,8 @@ L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>,
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L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>,
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L<SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(3)>,
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L<SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(3)>,
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L<SSL_get_psk_identity(3)>
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L<SSL_get_psk_identity(3)>,
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L<DTLSv1_listen(3)|DTLSv1_listen(3)>
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=head1 HISTORY
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