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https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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Fix typo in rsautl.
Add support for settable verify time in X509_verify_cert(). Document rsautl utility.
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson
parent
4af6e2432b
commit
bbb720034a
92
CHANGES
92
CHANGES
@ -3,57 +3,61 @@
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_______________
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Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [xx XXX 2000]
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*) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate
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verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a
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number of criteria: subject name, authority key id
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and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates
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by the same criteria. The main comparison function is
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X509_check_issued() which performs these checks.
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Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this
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without completely rewriting the lookup code.
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Authority and subject key identifier are now cached.
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The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced
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by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an
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LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with
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the same hash value.
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As a result various functions (which were all internal
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use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE
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structure. This will break anything that messed round
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with X509_STORE internally.
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*) Allow the verify time to be set by an application,
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rather than always using the current time.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate
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verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a
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number of criteria: subject name, authority key id
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and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates
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by the same criteria. The main comparison function is
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X509_check_issued() which performs these checks.
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The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an
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exact match, rather than just subject name.
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Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this
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without completely rewriting the lookup code.
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The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval
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of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however
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this can be worked round by performing a lookup first
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(which will fill the cache with candidate certificates)
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and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably
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the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP
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entirely (maybe later...).
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Authority and subject key identifier are now cached.
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The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably.
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The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced
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by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an
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LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with
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the same hash value.
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As a result various functions (which were all internal
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use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE
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structure. This will break anything that messed round
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with X509_STORE internally.
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All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer()
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callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it
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can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way
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to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this
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work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques
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in future. A very simple version which uses a simple
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STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided
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using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack().
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The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an
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exact match, rather than just subject name.
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The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents
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in the X509_STORE_CTX structure.
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The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval
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of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however
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this can be worked round by performing a lookup first
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(which will fill the cache with candidate certificates)
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and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably
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the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP
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entirely (maybe later...).
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X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used
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to customise the verify behaviour.
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[Steve Henson]
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The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably.
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All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer()
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callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it
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can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way
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to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this
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work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques
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in future. A very simple version which uses a simple
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STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided
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using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack().
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The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents
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in the X509_STORE_CTX structure.
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X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used
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to customise the verify behaviour.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which
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excludes S/MIME capabilities.
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@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
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argv++;
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}
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if(need_priv && (key_type == KEY_PRIVKEY)) {
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if(need_priv && (key_type != KEY_PRIVKEY)) {
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BIO_printf(bio_err, "A private key is needed for this operation\n");
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goto end;
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}
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@ -800,7 +800,9 @@ RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa);
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#endif /* !SSLEAY_MACROS */
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int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t *t);
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int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *s);
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ASN1_TIME * X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *t);
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ASN1_TIME * X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj);
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const char * X509_get_default_cert_area(void );
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@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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int i,ok=0,n;
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X509 *xs,*xi;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
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time_t *ptime;
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int (*cb)();
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cb=ctx->verify_cb;
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@ -438,8 +439,9 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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ctx->error_depth=n-1;
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n--;
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xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi),
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X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0)
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if(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->check_time;
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else ptime = NULL;
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if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
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xs=xi;
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else
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{
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@ -485,7 +487,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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pkey=NULL;
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i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs));
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i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
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if (i == 0)
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{
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ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
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@ -503,7 +505,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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xs->valid=1;
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}
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i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs));
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i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
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if (i == 0)
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{
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ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
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@ -540,6 +542,11 @@ end:
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}
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int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
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{
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return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
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}
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int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
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{
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char *str;
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ASN1_TIME atm;
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@ -594,7 +601,7 @@ int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
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atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
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atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
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X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset*60);
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X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
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if(ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
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{
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@ -614,10 +621,17 @@ int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
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}
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ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
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{
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return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
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}
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ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
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{
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time_t t;
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time(&t);
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if(in_tm) t = *in_tm;
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else time(&t);
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t+=adj;
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if(!s) return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
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if(s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
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@ -855,6 +869,17 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
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}
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void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
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{
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ctx->flags |= flags;
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}
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void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
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{
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ctx->check_time = t;
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ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
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}
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IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
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@ -380,6 +380,8 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose);
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int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust);
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int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
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int purpose, int trust);
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void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags);
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void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t);
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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181
doc/apps/rsautl.pod
Normal file
181
doc/apps/rsautl.pod
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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rsautl - RSA utility
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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B<openssl> B<rsautl>
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[B<-in file>]
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[B<-out file>]
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[B<-inkey file>]
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[B<-pubin>]
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[B<-certin>]
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[B<-sign>]
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[B<-verify>]
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[B<-encrypt>]
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[B<-decrypt>]
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[B<-pkcs>]
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[B<-ssl>]
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[B<-raw>]
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[B<-hexdump>]
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[B<-asn1parse>]
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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The B<rsautl> command can be used to sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt
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data using the RSA algorithm.
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=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS
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=over 4
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=item B<-in filename>
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This specifies the input filename to read data from or standard input
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if this option is not specified.
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=item B<-out filename>
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specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
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default.
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=item B<-inkey file>
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the input key file, by default it should be an RSA private key.
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=item B<-pubin>
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the input file is an RSA public key.
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=item B<-certin>
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the input is a certificate containing an RSA public key.
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=item B<-sign>
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sign the input data and output the signed result. This requires
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and RSA private key.
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=item B<-verify>
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verify the input data and output the recovered data.
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=item B<-encrypt>
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encrypt the input data using an RSA public key.
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=item B<-decrypt>
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decrypt the input data using an RSA private key.
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=item B<-pkcs, -ssl, -raw>
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the padding to use, PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default) SSL v2 or no padding
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respectively.
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=item B<-hexdump>
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hex dump the output data.
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=item B<-asn1parse>
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asn1parse the output data, this is useful when combined with the
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B<-verify> option.
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=back
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=head1 NOTES
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B<rsautl> because it uses the RSA algorithm directly can only be
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used to sign or verify small pieces of data.
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=head1 EXAMPLES
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Sign the some data using a private key:
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openssl rsautl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig
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Recover the signed data
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openssl rsautl -sign -in sig -inkey key.pem
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Examine the raw signed data:
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openssl rsautl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -raw -hexdump
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0000 - 00 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
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0010 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
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0020 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
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0030 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
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0040 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
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0050 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
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0060 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
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0070 - ff ff ff ff 00 68 65 6c-6c 6f 20 77 6f 72 6c 64 .....hello world
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The PKCS#1 block formatting is evident from this. If this was done using
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encrypt and decrypt the block would have been of type 2 (the second byte)
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and random padding data visible instead of the 0xff bytes.
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It is possible to analyse the signature of certificates using this
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utility in conjunction with B<asn1parse>. Consider the self signed
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example in certs/pca-cert.pem . Running B<asn1parse> as follows yields:
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openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem
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0:d=0 hl=4 l= 742 cons: SEQUENCE
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4:d=1 hl=4 l= 591 cons: SEQUENCE
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8:d=2 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
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10:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02
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13:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :00
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16:d=2 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
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18:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :md5WithRSAEncryption
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29:d=3 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
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31:d=2 hl=2 l= 92 cons: SEQUENCE
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33:d=3 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
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35:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
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37:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :countryName
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42:d=5 hl=2 l= 2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :AU
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....
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599:d=1 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
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601:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :md5WithRSAEncryption
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612:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
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614:d=1 hl=3 l= 129 prim: BIT STRING
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The final BIT STRING contains the actual signature. It can be extracted with:
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openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out sig -noout -strparse 614
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The certificate public key can be extracted with:
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openssl x509 -in test/testx509.pem -pubout -noout >pubkey.pem
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The signature can be analysed with:
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openssl rsautl -in sig -verify -asn1parse -inkey pubkey.pem -pubin
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0:d=0 hl=2 l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE
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2:d=1 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
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4:d=2 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :md5
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14:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
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16:d=1 hl=2 l= 16 prim: OCTET STRING
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0000 - f3 46 9e aa 1a 4a 73 c9-37 ea 93 00 48 25 08 b5 .F...Js.7...H%..
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This is the parsed version of an ASN1 DigestInfo structure. It can be seen that
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the digest used was md5. The actual part of the certificate that was signed can
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be extracted with:
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openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out tbs -noout -strparse 4
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and its digest computed with:
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openssl md5 -c tbs
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MD5(tbs)= f3:46:9e:aa:1a:4a:73:c9:37:ea:93:00:48:25:08:b5
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which it can be seen agrees with the recovered value above.
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>
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