Add fips checks for dh key agreement

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12745)
This commit is contained in:
Shane Lontis 2020-08-29 12:54:00 +10:00 committed by Matt Caswell
parent 0645110ebd
commit b8237707d4
3 changed files with 75 additions and 24 deletions

View File

@ -37,14 +37,14 @@
* Verify that the passed in L, N pair for DH or DSA is valid.
* Returns 0 if invalid, otherwise it returns the security strength.
*/
static int ffc_validate_LN(size_t L, size_t N, int type)
static int ffc_validate_LN(size_t L, size_t N, int type, int verify)
{
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (L == 1024 && N == 160)
return 80;
#endif
if (type == FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH) {
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/* Allow legacy 1024/160 in non fips mode */
if (L == 1024 && N == 160)
return 80;
#endif
/* Valid DH L,N parameters from SP800-56Ar3 5.5.1 Table 1 */
if (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256))
return 112;
@ -53,8 +53,12 @@ static int ffc_validate_LN(size_t L, size_t N, int type)
#endif
} else if (type == FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DSA) {
/* Valid DSA L,N parameters from FIPS 186-4 Section 4.2 */
if (L == 1024 && N == 160)
return 80;
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
/* In fips mode 1024/160 can only be used for verification */
if (verify)
#endif
if (L == 1024 && N == 160)
return 80;
if (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256))
return 112;
if (L == 3072 && N == 256)
@ -513,8 +517,10 @@ int ffc_params_FIPS186_4_gen_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, FFC_PARAMS *params,
if (N == 0)
N = (L >= 2048 ? SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH : SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) * 8;
def_name = default_mdname(N);
if (def_name == NULL)
if (def_name == NULL) {
*res = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
goto err;
}
md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, def_name, NULL);
}
if (md == NULL)
@ -532,7 +538,7 @@ int ffc_params_FIPS186_4_gen_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, FFC_PARAMS *params,
* A.1.1.3 Step (3)
* Check that the L,N pair is an acceptable pair.
*/
if (L <= N || !ffc_validate_LN(L, N, type)) {
if (L <= N || !ffc_validate_LN(L, N, type, verify)) {
*res = FFC_CHECK_BAD_LN_PAIR;
goto err;
}
@ -773,6 +779,7 @@ err:
return ok;
}
/* Note this function is only used for verification in fips mode */
int ffc_params_FIPS186_2_gen_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, FFC_PARAMS *params,
int mode, int type, size_t L, size_t N,
int *res, BN_GENCB *cb)
@ -793,6 +800,7 @@ int ffc_params_FIPS186_2_gen_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, FFC_PARAMS *params,
size_t seed_len = params->seedlen;
int verify = (mode == FFC_PARAM_MODE_VERIFY);
unsigned int flags = verify ? params->flags : 0;
const char *def_name;
*res = 0;
@ -801,7 +809,12 @@ int ffc_params_FIPS186_2_gen_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, FFC_PARAMS *params,
} else {
if (N == 0)
N = (L >= 2048 ? SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH : SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) * 8;
md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, default_mdname(N), NULL);
def_name = default_mdname(N);
if (def_name == NULL) {
*res = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
goto err;
}
md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, def_name, NULL);
}
if (md == NULL)
goto err;
@ -809,16 +822,15 @@ int ffc_params_FIPS186_2_gen_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, FFC_PARAMS *params,
N = EVP_MD_size(md) * 8;
qsize = N >> 3;
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* FIPS 186-4 states that validation can only be done for this pair.
* (Even though the original spec allowed L = 512 + 64*j (j = 0.. 8))
* The original spec allowed L = 512 + 64*j (j = 0.. 8)
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
* says that 512 can be used for legacy verification.
*/
if (L != 1024 || N != 160) {
if (L < 512) {
*res = FFC_CHECK_BAD_LN_PAIR;
goto err;
}
#endif
if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
&& qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH
&& qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
@ -827,9 +839,6 @@ int ffc_params_FIPS186_2_gen_verify(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, FFC_PARAMS *params,
goto err;
}
if (L < 512)
L = 512;
L = (L + 63) / 64 * 64;
if (seed_in != NULL) {

View File

@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
# We make separate GOAL variables for each algorithm, to make it easy to
# switch each to the Legacy provider when needed.
$DH_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$ECX_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$ECDH_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$KDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
IF[{- !$disabled{dh} -}]
SOURCE[$DH_GOAL]=dh_exch.c
SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=dh_exch.c
SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=dh_exch.c
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]

View File

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
#include "crypto/dh.h"
static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_newctx_fn dh_newctx;
@ -91,6 +92,43 @@ static void *dh_newctx(void *provctx)
return pdhctx;
}
/*
* For DH key agreement refer to SP800-56A
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
* "Section 5.5.1.1FFC Domain Parameter Selection/Generation" and
* "Appendix D" FFC Safe-prime Groups
*/
static int dh_check_key(const DH *dh)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
size_t L, N;
const BIGNUM *p, *q;
if (dh == NULL)
return 0;
p = DH_get0_p(dh);
q = DH_get0_q(dh);
if (p == NULL || q == NULL)
return 0;
L = BN_num_bits(p);
if (L < 2048)
return 0;
/* If it is a safe prime group then it is ok */
if (DH_get_nid(dh))
return 1;
/* If not then it must be FFC, which only allows certain sizes. */
N = BN_num_bits(q);
return (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256));
#else
return 1;
#endif
}
static int dh_init(void *vpdhctx, void *vdh)
{
PROV_DH_CTX *pdhctx = (PROV_DH_CTX *)vpdhctx;
@ -103,7 +141,7 @@ static int dh_init(void *vpdhctx, void *vdh)
DH_free(pdhctx->dh);
pdhctx->dh = vdh;
pdhctx->kdf_type = PROV_DH_KDF_NONE;
return 1;
return dh_check_key(vdh);
}
static int dh_set_peer(void *vpdhctx, void *vdh)
@ -320,7 +358,12 @@ static int dh_set_ctx_params(void *vpdhctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
EVP_MD_free(pdhctx->kdf_md);
pdhctx->kdf_md = EVP_MD_fetch(pdhctx->libctx, name, mdprops);
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (!ossl_prov_digest_get_approved_nid(pdhctx->kdf_md, 1)) {
EVP_MD_free(pdhctx->kdf_md);
pdhctx->kdf_md = NULL;
}
#endif
if (pdhctx->kdf_md == NULL)
return 0;
}