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openssl.pod: Move verification doc to new doc/man1/openssl-verification-options.pod
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13315)
This commit is contained in:
David von Oheimb
Dr. David von Oheimb
parent
6b480ee369
commit
b6f18ed2ef
398
doc/man1/openssl-verification-options.pod
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398
doc/man1/openssl-verification-options.pod
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@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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openssl-verification-options - generic X.509 certificate verification options
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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B<openssl>
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I<command>
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[ I<options> ... ]
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[ I<parameters> ... ]
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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Many OpenSSL commands and various other uses of the crypto library function
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L<X509_verify_cert(3)> verify X.509 certificates. The details of how each
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command handles errors are documented on the specific command page.
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Certificate verification is a complicated process, consisting of
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a number of separate steps that are detailed in the following paragraphs.
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First, a certificate chain is built up starting from the target certificate
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and typically ending in a self-signed "root" CA certificate.
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It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up
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unless the B<-partial_chain> option is given.
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The chain is built up iteratively, looking up in turn
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the certificate of the signer ("issuer") of the current certificate.
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If a certificate is found that appears to be its own issuer
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it is assumed to be the self-signed root, which must be trusted.
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The process of looking up the issuer's certificate itself involves a number
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of steps.
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All available certificates with a subject name that matches the issuer
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name of the current certificate are subject to further tests.
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The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate
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(if present) must match the subject key identifier (if present)
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and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer certificate.
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The lookup first searches for issuer certificates in the trust store.
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If it does not find a match there it consults
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the list of untrusted "intermediate" CA certificates (if provided).
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The last certificate (which typically is of a root CA) is always looked up
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in the trusted certificate list; an exact match must be found there.
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The second step is to check the extensions of every untrusted certificate
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for consistency with the supplied purpose.
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If the B<-purpose> option is not included then no checks are done.
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The target or "leaf" certificate must have extensions compatible with the
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supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid CA certificates.
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The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
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L<openssl-x509(1)/CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS>.
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The third step is to check the trust settings on the last certficate,
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typically of a root CA.
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It should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
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For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL,
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a certificate with no trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
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The fourth, and final, step is to check the validity of the certificate chain.
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For each element in the chain, including the root CA certificate,
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the validity period as specified by the C<notBefore> and C<notAfter> fields
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is checked against the current system time.
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The B<-attime> flag may be used to use a reference time other than "now."
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The certificate signature is checked as well
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(except for the signature of the typically self-signed root CA certificate,
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which is verified only if the B<-check_ss_sig> option is given).
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When verifying a certificate signature
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the keyUsage extension (if present) of the candidate issuer certificate
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is checked to permit digitalSignature for signing proxy certificates
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or to permit keyCertSign for signing other certificates, respectively.
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If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered
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valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
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=head1 OPTIONS
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=head2 Verification Options
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The certificate verification can be fine-tuned with the following flags.
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=over 4
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=item B<-verbose>
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Print extra information about the operations being performed.
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=item B<-attime> I<timestamp>
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Perform validation checks using time specified by I<timestamp> and not
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current system time. I<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
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January 1, 1970 (i.e., the Unix Epoch).
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=item B<-no_check_time>
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This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs
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against the current time. If option B<-attime> is used to specify
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a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
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=item B<-x509_strict>
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This disables non-compliant workarounds for broken certificates.
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Thus errors are thrown on certificates not compliant with RFC 5280.
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When this option is set,
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among others, the following certificate well-formedness conditions are checked:
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=over 4
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=item -
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The basicConstraints of CA certificates must be marked critical.
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=item -
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CA certificates must explicitly include the keyUsage extension.
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=item -
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If a pathlenConstraint is given the key usage keyCertSign must be allowed.
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=item -
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The pathlenConstraint must not be given for non-CA certificates.
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=item -
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The issuer name of any certificate must not be empty.
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=item -
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The subject name of CA certs, certs with keyUsage crlSign, and certs
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without subjectAlternativeName must not be empty.
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=item -
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If a subjectAlternativeName extension is given it must not be empty.
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=item -
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The signatureAlgorithm field and the cert signature must be consistent.
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=item -
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Any given authorityKeyIdentifier and any given subjectKeyIdentifier
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must not be marked critical.
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=item -
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The authorityKeyIdentifier must be given for X.509v3 certs unless they
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are self-signed.
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=item -
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The subjectKeyIdentifier must be given for all X.509v3 CA certs.
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=back
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=item B<-ignore_critical>
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Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present that is not
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supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
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If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
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=item B<-issuer_checks>
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Ignored.
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=item B<-crl_check>
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Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
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If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
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=item B<-crl_check_all>
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Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
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to look up valid CRLs.
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=item B<-use_deltas>
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Enable support for delta CRLs.
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=item B<-extended_crl>
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Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
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signing keys.
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=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
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Enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
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192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
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See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
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reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
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P-256 and P-384.
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=item B<-auth_level> I<level>
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Set the certificate chain authentication security level to I<level>.
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The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
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public key strength when verifying certificate chains. For a certificate
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chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates must meet the
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specified security I<level>. The signature algorithm security level is
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enforced for all the certificates in the chain except for the chain's
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I<trust anchor>, which is either directly trusted or validated by means
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other than its signature. See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the
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definitions of the available levels. The default security level is -1,
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or "not set". At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
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Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
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interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA
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keys shorter than 1024 bits.
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=item B<-partial_chain>
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Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
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self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
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trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
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This certificate may be self-issued or belong to an intermediate CA.
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=item B<-check_ss_sig>
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Verify the signature of
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the last certificate in a chain if the certificate is supposedly self-signed.
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This is prohibited and will result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA
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certificate with key usage restrictions not including the keyCertSign bit.
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This verification is disabled by default because it doesn't add any security.
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=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>
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Allow the verification of proxy certificates.
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=item B<-trusted_first>
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As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
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When constructing the certificate chain, the trusted certificates specified
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via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath>, B<-CAstore> or B<-trusted> are always used
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before any certificates specified via B<-untrusted>.
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=item B<-no_alt_chains>
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As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, since B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
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effect.
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=item B<-trusted> I<file>
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Parse I<file> as a set of one or more certificates in PEM format.
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All certificates must be self-signed, unless the
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B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
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This option implies the B<-no-CAfile>, B<-no-CApath>, and B<-no-CAstore> options
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and it cannot be used with the B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath> or B<-CAstore> options, so
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only certificates in the file are trust anchors.
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This option may be used multiple times.
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=item B<-untrusted> I<file>
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Parse I<file> as a set of one or more certificates in PEM format.
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All certificates are untrusted certificates (typically of intermedate CAs)
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that may be used to
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construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust anchor.
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This option may be used multiple times.
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=item B<-policy> I<arg>
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Enable policy processing and add I<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
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RFC5280). The policy I<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
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This argument can appear more than once.
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=item B<-explicit_policy>
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Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
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=item B<-policy_check>
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Enables certificate policy processing.
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=item B<-policy_print>
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Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
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=item B<-inhibit_any>
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Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
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=item B<-inhibit_map>
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Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
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=item B<-purpose> I<purpose>
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The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified, this
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command will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
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Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
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B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>.
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=item B<-verify_depth> I<num>
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Limit the certificate chain to I<num> intermediate CA certificates.
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A maximal depth chain can have up to I<num>+2 certificates, since neither the
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end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
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B<-verify_depth> limit.
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=item B<-verify_email> I<email>
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Verify if I<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
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the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
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=item B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>
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Verify if I<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
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Common Name in the subject certificate.
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=item B<-verify_ip> I<ip>
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Verify if I<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
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the subject certificate.
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=item B<-verify_name> I<name>
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Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
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policies identified by I<name>.
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The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
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to verifying the given certificate chain.
|
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See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options for L<openssl-x509(1)>.
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Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
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B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
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These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
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and S/MIME.
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As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
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specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
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corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
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=back
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=head2 Extended Verification Options
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Sometimes there may be more than one certificate chain leading to an
|
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end-entity certificate.
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This usually happens when a root or intermediate CA signs a certificate
|
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for another a CA in other organization.
|
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Another reason is when a CA might have intermediates that use two different
|
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signature formats, such as a SHA-1 and a SHA-256 digest.
|
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|
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The following options can be used to provide data that will allow the
|
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OpenSSL command to generate an alternative chain.
|
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|
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=over 4
|
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=item B<-xkey> I<infile>, B<-xcert> I<infile>, B<-xchain>
|
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|
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Specify an extra certificate, private key and certificate chain. These behave
|
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in the same manner as the B<-cert>, B<-key> and B<-cert_chain> options. When
|
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specified, the callback returning the first valid chain will be in use by the
|
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client.
|
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|
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=item B<-xchain_build>
|
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|
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Specify whether the application should build the certificate chain to be
|
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provided to the server for the extra certificates via the B<-xkey>,
|
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B<-xcert>, and B<-xchain> options.
|
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|
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=item B<-xcertform> B<DER>|B<PEM>|B<P12>
|
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|
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The input format for the extra certificate.
|
||||
This option has no effect and is retained for backward compatibility only.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-xkeyform> B<DER>|B<PEM>|B<P12>
|
||||
|
||||
The input format for the extra key.
|
||||
This option has no effect and is retained for backward compatibility only.
|
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=back
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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|
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L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
|
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L<openssl-verify(1)>,
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L<openssl-ocsp(1)>,
|
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L<openssl-ts(1)>,
|
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L<openssl-s_client(1)>,
|
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L<openssl-s_server(1)>,
|
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L<openssl-smime(1)>,
|
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L<openssl-cmp(1)>,
|
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L<openssl-cms(1)>
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|
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|
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=head1 HISTORY
|
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The checks enabled by B<-x509_strict> have been extended in OpenSSL 3.0.
|
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|
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=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
|
||||
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
|
||||
|
||||
=cut
|
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@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
||||
|
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L<openssl(1)>,
|
||||
L<openssl-verification-options(1)>,
|
||||
L<openssl-x509(1)>,
|
||||
L<ossl_store-file(7)>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ Time Stamping Authority command.
|
||||
=item B<verify>
|
||||
|
||||
X.509 Certificate Verification.
|
||||
See also the L<openssl-verification-options(1)> manual page.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<version>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -762,359 +763,9 @@ This file can be used in a subsequent command invocation.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=head2 Extended Verification Options
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes there may be more than one certificate chain leading to an
|
||||
end-entity certificate.
|
||||
This usually happens when a root or intermediate CA signs a certificate
|
||||
for another a CA in other organization.
|
||||
Another reason is when a CA might have intermediates that use two different
|
||||
signature formats, such as a SHA-1 and a SHA-256 digest.
|
||||
|
||||
The following options can be used to provide data that will allow the
|
||||
OpenSSL command to generate an alternative chain.
|
||||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-xkey> I<infile>, B<-xcert> I<infile>, B<-xchain>
|
||||
|
||||
Specify an extra certificate, private key and certificate chain. These behave
|
||||
in the same manner as the B<-cert>, B<-key> and B<-cert_chain> options. When
|
||||
specified, the callback returning the first valid chain will be in use by the
|
||||
client.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-xchain_build>
|
||||
|
||||
Specify whether the application should build the certificate chain to be
|
||||
provided to the server for the extra certificates via the B<-xkey>,
|
||||
B<-xcert>, and B<-xchain> options.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-xcertform> B<DER>|B<PEM>|B<P12>
|
||||
|
||||
The input format for the extra certificate.
|
||||
This option has no effect and is retained for backward compatibility only.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-xkeyform> B<DER>|B<PEM>|B<P12>
|
||||
|
||||
The input format for the extra key.
|
||||
This option has no effect and is retained for backward compatibility only.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=head2 Verification Options
|
||||
|
||||
Many OpenSSL commands verify certificates. The details of how each
|
||||
command handles errors are documented on the specific command page.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification is a complicated process, consisting of a number of separate
|
||||
steps that are detailed in the following paragraphs.
|
||||
|
||||
First, a certificate chain is built up starting from the target certificate
|
||||
and typically ending in a self-signed "root" CA certificate.
|
||||
It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up
|
||||
unless the B<-partial_chain> option is given.
|
||||
The chain is built up iteratively, looking up in turn
|
||||
the certificate of the signer ("issuer") of the current certificate.
|
||||
If a certificate is found that appears to be its own issuer
|
||||
it is assumed to be the self-signed root, which must be trusted.
|
||||
|
||||
The process of looking up the issuer's certificate itself involves a number
|
||||
of steps.
|
||||
All available certificates with a subject name that matches the issuer
|
||||
name of the current certificate are subject to further tests.
|
||||
The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate
|
||||
(if present) must match the subject key identifier (if present)
|
||||
and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
The lookup first searches for issuer certificates in the trust store.
|
||||
If it does not find a match there it consults
|
||||
the list of untrusted "intermediate" CA certificates (if provided).
|
||||
The last certificate (which typically is of a root CA) is always looked up
|
||||
in the trusted certificate list; an exact match must be found there.
|
||||
|
||||
The second step is to check the extensions of every untrusted certificate
|
||||
for consistency with the supplied purpose.
|
||||
If the B<-purpose> option is not included then no checks are done.
|
||||
The target or "leaf" certificate must have extensions compatible with the
|
||||
supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid CA certificates.
|
||||
The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
|
||||
L<openssl-x509(1)/CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS>.
|
||||
|
||||
The third step is to check the trust settings on the last certficate,
|
||||
typically of a root CA.
|
||||
It should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
|
||||
For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL,
|
||||
a certificate with no trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
The fourth, and final, step is to check the validity of the certificate chain.
|
||||
For each element in the chain, including the root CA certificate,
|
||||
the validity period as specified by the C<notBefore> and C<notAfter> fields
|
||||
is checked against the current system time.
|
||||
The B<-attime> flag may be used to use a reference time other than "now."
|
||||
The certificate signature is checked as well
|
||||
(except for the signature of the typically self-signed root CA certificate,
|
||||
which is verified only if the B<-check_ss_sig> option is given).
|
||||
When verifying a certificate signature
|
||||
the keyUsage extension (if present) of the candidate issuer certificate
|
||||
is checked to permit digitalSignature for signing proxy certificates
|
||||
or to permit keyCertSign for signing other certificates, respectively.
|
||||
If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered
|
||||
valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
|
||||
|
||||
The details of the processing steps can be fine-tuned with the
|
||||
following flags.
|
||||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verbose>
|
||||
|
||||
Print extra information about the operations being performed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-attime> I<timestamp>
|
||||
|
||||
Perform validation checks using time specified by I<timestamp> and not
|
||||
current system time. I<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
|
||||
January 1, 1970 (i.e., the Unix Epoch).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-no_check_time>
|
||||
|
||||
This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs
|
||||
against the current time. If option B<-attime> is used to specify
|
||||
a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-x509_strict>
|
||||
|
||||
This disables non-compliant workarounds for broken certificates.
|
||||
Thus errors are thrown on certificates not compliant with RFC 5280.
|
||||
|
||||
When this option is set,
|
||||
among others, the following certificate well-formedness conditions are checked:
|
||||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
The basicConstraints of CA certificates must be marked critical.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
CA certificates must explicitly include the keyUsage extension.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
If a pathlenConstraint is given the key usage keyCertSign must be allowed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
The pathlenConstraint must not be given for non-CA certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
The issuer name of any certificate must not be empty.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
The subject name of CA certs, certs with keyUsage crlSign, and certs
|
||||
without subjectAlternativeName must not be empty.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
If a subjectAlternativeName extension is given it must not be empty.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
The signatureAlgorithm field and the cert signature must be consistent.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
Any given authorityKeyIdentifier and any given subjectKeyIdentifier
|
||||
must not be marked critical.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
The authorityKeyIdentifier must be given for X.509v3 certs unless they
|
||||
are self-signed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item -
|
||||
|
||||
The subjectKeyIdentifier must be given for all X.509v3 CA certs.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-ignore_critical>
|
||||
|
||||
Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present that is not
|
||||
supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
|
||||
If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-issuer_checks>
|
||||
|
||||
Ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-crl_check>
|
||||
|
||||
Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
|
||||
If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-crl_check_all>
|
||||
|
||||
Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
|
||||
to look up valid CRLs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-use_deltas>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable support for delta CRLs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-extended_crl>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
|
||||
signing keys.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
|
||||
192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
|
||||
See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
|
||||
reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
|
||||
P-256 and P-384.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-auth_level> I<level>
|
||||
|
||||
Set the certificate chain authentication security level to I<level>.
|
||||
The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
|
||||
public key strength when verifying certificate chains. For a certificate
|
||||
chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates must meet the
|
||||
specified security I<level>. The signature algorithm security level is
|
||||
enforced for all the certificates in the chain except for the chain's
|
||||
I<trust anchor>, which is either directly trusted or validated by means
|
||||
other than its signature. See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the
|
||||
definitions of the available levels. The default security level is -1,
|
||||
or "not set". At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
|
||||
Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
|
||||
interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA
|
||||
keys shorter than 1024 bits.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-partial_chain>
|
||||
|
||||
Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
|
||||
self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
|
||||
trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
|
||||
This certificate may be self-issued or belong to an intermediate CA.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-check_ss_sig>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify the signature of
|
||||
the last certificate in a chain if the certificate is supposedly self-signed.
|
||||
This is prohibited and will result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA
|
||||
certificate with key usage restrictions not including the keyCertSign bit.
|
||||
This verification is disabled by default because it doesn't add any security.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>
|
||||
|
||||
Allow the verification of proxy certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-trusted_first>
|
||||
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
When constructing the certificate chain, the trusted certificates specified
|
||||
via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath>, B<-CAstore> or B<-trusted> are always used
|
||||
before any certificates specified via B<-untrusted>.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-no_alt_chains>
|
||||
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, since B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
|
||||
effect.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-trusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
Parse I<file> as a set of one or more certificates in PEM format.
|
||||
All certificates must be self-signed, unless the
|
||||
B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
|
||||
This option implies the B<-no-CAfile>, B<-no-CApath>, and B<-no-CAstore> options
|
||||
and it cannot be used with the B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath> or B<-CAstore> options, so
|
||||
only certificates in the file are trust anchors.
|
||||
This option may be used multiple times.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-untrusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
Parse I<file> as a set of one or more certificates in PEM format.
|
||||
All certificates are untrusted certificates (typically of intermedate CAs)
|
||||
that may be used to
|
||||
construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust anchor.
|
||||
This option may be used multiple times.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy> I<arg>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable policy processing and add I<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
|
||||
RFC5280). The policy I<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
|
||||
This argument can appear more than once.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-explicit_policy>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy_check>
|
||||
|
||||
Enables certificate policy processing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy_print>
|
||||
|
||||
Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-inhibit_any>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-inhibit_map>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-purpose> I<purpose>
|
||||
|
||||
The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified, this
|
||||
command will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
|
||||
Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
|
||||
B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_depth> I<num>
|
||||
|
||||
Limit the certificate chain to I<num> intermediate CA certificates.
|
||||
A maximal depth chain can have up to I<num>+2 certificates, since neither the
|
||||
end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
|
||||
B<-verify_depth> limit.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_email> I<email>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<email> matches any email address in a Subject Alternative Name or
|
||||
(if no SAN is included) the email address in the subject Distinguished Name.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<hostname> matches any DNS name in a Subject Alternative Name or
|
||||
(if no SAN is included) the Common Name in the subject Distinguished Name.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_ip> I<ip>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<ip> matches any IP address in a Subject Alternative Name or
|
||||
(if no SAN is included) the Common Name in the subject Distinguished Name.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_name> I<name>
|
||||
|
||||
Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
|
||||
policies identified by I<name>.
|
||||
The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
|
||||
to verifying the given certificate chain.
|
||||
See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options for L<openssl-x509(1)>.
|
||||
Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
|
||||
B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
|
||||
These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
|
||||
and S/MIME.
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
|
||||
specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
|
||||
corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
See the L<openssl-verification-options(1)> manual page.
|
||||
|
||||
=head2 Name Format Options
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ a set of non-trusted certificates that may be needed for chain construction,
|
||||
flags such as X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT, and various other optional components
|
||||
such as a callback function that allows customizing the verification outcome.
|
||||
A complete description of the certificate verification process is contained in
|
||||
the L<openssl-verify(1)> manual page.
|
||||
the L<openssl-verification-options(1)> manual page.
|
||||
|
||||
Applications rarely call this function directly but it is used by
|
||||
OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item = ""
|
||||
. "B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict> B<-issuer_checks>\n"
|
||||
. "\n"
|
||||
. "Set various options of certificate chain verification.\n"
|
||||
. "See L<openssl(1)/Verification Options> for details.";
|
||||
. "See L<openssl-verification-options(1)/Verification Options> for details.";
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Extended validation options.
|
||||
@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ $OpenSSL::safe::opt_x_item = ""
|
||||
. "B<-xkeyform> B<DER>|B<PEM>\n"
|
||||
. "\n"
|
||||
. "Set extended certificate verification options.\n"
|
||||
. "See L<openssl(1)/Extended Verification Options> for details.";
|
||||
. "See L<openssl-verification-options(1)/Extended Verification Options> for details.";
|
||||
|
||||
# Name output options
|
||||
$OpenSSL::safe::opt_name_synopsis = ""
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user