Remove RSA SSLv23 padding mode

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14248)
This commit is contained in:
Rich Salz 2021-02-22 12:55:25 -05:00 committed by Tomas Mraz
parent d546e8e267
commit b0aae91324
21 changed files with 16 additions and 280 deletions

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@ -77,6 +77,13 @@ OpenSSL 3.0
*Tomáš Mráz*
* Removed RSA padding mode for SSLv23 (which was only used for
SSLv2). This includes the functions RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() and
RSA_padding_add_SSLv23() and the `-ssl` option in the deprecated
`rsautl` command.
*Rich Salz*
* Deprecated the obsolete X9.31 RSA key generation related functions
BN_X931_generate_Xpq(), BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(), and
BN_X931_generate_prime_ex().

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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ASN1PARSE, OPT_HEXDUMP,
OPT_RSA_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_SSL, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931,
OPT_RSA_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931,
OPT_SIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT,
OPT_PUBIN, OPT_CERTIN, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_KEYFORM,
OPT_R_ENUM, OPT_PROV_ENUM
@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ const OPTIONS rsautl_options[] = {
OPT_SECTION("Output"),
{"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
{"ssl", OPT_SSL, '-', "Use SSL v2 padding"},
{"raw", OPT_RSA_RAW, '-', "Use no padding"},
{"pkcs", OPT_PKCS, '-', "Use PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (default)"},
{"x931", OPT_X931, '-', "Use ANSI X9.31 padding"},
@ -123,9 +122,6 @@ int rsautl_main(int argc, char **argv)
case OPT_OAEP:
pad = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
break;
case OPT_SSL:
pad = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
break;
case OPT_PKCS:
pad = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
break;

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@ -1186,7 +1186,6 @@ static int fix_rsa_padding_mode(enum state state,
{
static const OSSL_ITEM str_value_map[] = {
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
{ RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" },
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $COMMON=rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_pk1.c \
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\
rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c rsa_ssl.c
rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c
IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}]
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=rsa_depr.c
ENDIF

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@ -195,9 +195,6 @@ int ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(RSA *rsa, RSA_ACVP_TEST *test,
int nbits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_GENCB *cb);
int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
int flen);
int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
int flen);

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@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
from, flen, NULL, 0,
NULL, NULL);
break;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
i = ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(rsa->libctx, buf, num, from, flen);
break;
#endif
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
@ -278,7 +273,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
default:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
@ -487,11 +481,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
break;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
break;
#endif
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
memcpy(to, buf, (r = j));
break;

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@ -604,8 +604,6 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) {
pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {

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@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
int flen)
{
int i, j;
unsigned char *p;
if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
return 0;
}
p = (unsigned char *)to;
*(p++) = 0;
*(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
/* pad out with non-zero random data */
j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen;
if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, j) <= 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
if (*p == '\0')
do {
if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, 1) <= 0)
return 0;
} while (*p == '\0');
p++;
}
memset(p, 3, 8);
p += 8;
*(p++) = '\0';
memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
return 1;
}
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen)
{
return ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(NULL, to, tlen, from, flen);
}
/*
* Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
* if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
* preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
*/
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
{
int i;
/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
unsigned char *em = NULL;
unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
return -1;
if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (em == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
/*
* Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
* BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
* bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
* in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
*/
for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
flen -= 1 & mask;
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
mask = ~good;
/* scan over padding data */
found_zero_byte = 0;
threes_in_row = 0;
for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
i, zero_index);
found_zero_byte |= equals0;
threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
}
/*
* PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
mask = ~good;
/*
* Reject if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. Note
* that RFC5246 incorrectly states this the other way around, i.e. reject
* if it is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. However this is
* corrected in subsequent errata for that RFC.
*/
good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
mask = ~good;
/*
* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
*/
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
mlen = num - msg_index;
/*
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
/*
* Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
* Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
* Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
* Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
* the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
* parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
* length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
* The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
*/
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, err);
err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
}

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@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ B<pkeyopt> values are supported:
=item B<rsa_padding_mode:>I<mode>
This sets the RSA padding mode. Acceptable values for I<mode> are B<pkcs1> for
PKCS#1 padding, B<sslv23> for SSLv23 padding, B<none> for no padding, B<oaep>
PKCS#1 padding, B<none> for no padding, B<oaep>
for B<OAEP> mode, B<x931> for X9.31 mode and B<pss> for PSS.
In PKCS#1 padding if the message digest is not set then the supplied data is

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@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ B<openssl> B<rsautl>
[B<-pkcs>]
[B<-x931>]
[B<-oaep>]
[B<-ssl>]
[B<-raw>]
[B<-pkcs>]
[B<-ssl>]
[B<-raw>]
[B<-hexdump>]
[B<-asn1parse>]
@ -106,12 +102,10 @@ Encrypt the input data using an RSA public key.
Decrypt the input data using an RSA private key.
=item B<-pkcs>, B<-oaep>, B<-x931> B<-ssl>, B<-raw>
=item B<-pkcs>, B<-oaep>, B<-x931> B<-raw>
The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
ANSI X9.31,
special padding used in SSL v2 backwards compatible handshakes,
or no padding, respectively.
ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively.
For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
=item B<-hexdump>

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@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ terminating NUL byte.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() sets the RSA padding mode for I<ctx>.
The I<pad> parameter can take the value B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> for PKCS#1
padding, B<RSA_SSLV23_PADDING> for SSLv23 padding, B<RSA_NO_PADDING> for
padding, B<RSA_NO_PADDING> for
no padding, B<RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING> for OAEP padding (encrypt and
decrypt only), B<RSA_X931_PADDING> for X9.31 padding (signature operations
only), B<RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING> (sign and verify only) and

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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1,
RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2,
RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP,
RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1,
RSA_padding_add_SSLv23, RSA_padding_check_SSLv23,
RSA_padding_add_none, RSA_padding_check_none - asymmetric encryption
padding
@ -48,12 +47,6 @@ L<openssl_user_macros(7)>:
const unsigned char *p, int pl,
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
@ -95,10 +88,6 @@ PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 2)
PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-OAEP
=item SSLv23
PKCS #1 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 with SSL-specific modification
=item none
simply copy the data

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@ -43,11 +43,6 @@ new applications. SEE WARNING BELOW.
EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty
encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
=item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes
that the server is SSL3 capable.
=item RSA_NO_PADDING
Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I<only> be used to implement

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@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ The type of padding to be used. Its value can be one of the following:
=item "pkcs1" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15>)
=item "sslv23" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23>)
=item "x931" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931>)
=item "pss" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS>)

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@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ algorithms:
The type of padding to be used. The interpretation of this value will depend
on the algorithm in use. The default provider understands these RSA padding
modes: 1 (RSA_PKCS1_PADDING), 2 (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING), 3 (RSA_NO_PADDING),
modes: 1 (RSA_PKCS1_PADDING), 3 (RSA_NO_PADDING),
4 (RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING), 5 (RSA_X931_PADDING), 6 (RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) and
7 (RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING). See L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(3)> for
further details.

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@ -384,7 +384,6 @@ extern "C" {
/* RSA padding modes */
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE "none"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 "pkcs1"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 "sslv23"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP "oaep"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 "x931"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS "pss"

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@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
# define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
# define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
# define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
# define RSA_X931_PADDING 5
@ -405,13 +404,6 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
int num,
const unsigned char *param, int plen,
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl,
int rsa_len);
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

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@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
{ RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP }, /* Correct spelling first */
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },

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@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
{ RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
{ RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
{ RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
@ -1187,9 +1186,6 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
goto cont;
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
goto cont;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
goto cont;

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@ -278,28 +278,6 @@ static int test_rsa_pkcs1(int idx)
NULL, NULL);
}
static int test_rsa_sslv23(int idx)
{
int ret;
/* Simulate an SSLv2 only client talking to a TLS capable server */
ret = test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 1, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
/* Simulate a TLS capable client talking to an SSLv2 only server */
ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, 1, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
/*
* Simulate a TLS capable client talking to a TLS capable server. Should
* fail due to detecting a rollback attack.
*/
ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 0, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
return ret;
}
static int test_rsa_oaep(int idx)
{
int ret = 0;
@ -411,7 +389,6 @@ err:
int setup_tests(void)
{
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_pkcs1, 3);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_sslv23, 3);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_oaep, 3);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_security_bit, OSSL_NELEM(rsa_security_bits_cases));
return 1;

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@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ EVP_PBE_get 1424 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt 1425 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CONF_modules_finish 1426 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_value_one 1427 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RSA_padding_add_SSLv23 1428 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
RSA_padding_add_SSLv23 1428 3_0_0 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
OCSP_RESPBYTES_it 1429 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
EVP_aes_192_wrap 1430 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OCSP_CERTID_it 1431 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
@ -3302,7 +3302,7 @@ PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new 3369 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EDIPARTYNAME_new 3370 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CMS_add1_cert 3371 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
DSO_convert_filename 3372 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 3373 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 3373 3_0_0 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
CRYPTO_gcm128_finish 3374 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_SAFEBAGS_it 3375 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_PBE_add 3376 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION: