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Remove RSA SSLv23 padding mode
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14248)
This commit is contained in:
parent
d546e8e267
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b0aae91324
@ -77,6 +77,13 @@ OpenSSL 3.0
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*Tomáš Mráz*
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* Removed RSA padding mode for SSLv23 (which was only used for
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SSLv2). This includes the functions RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() and
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RSA_padding_add_SSLv23() and the `-ssl` option in the deprecated
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`rsautl` command.
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*Rich Salz*
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* Deprecated the obsolete X9.31 RSA key generation related functions
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BN_X931_generate_Xpq(), BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(), and
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BN_X931_generate_prime_ex().
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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
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typedef enum OPTION_choice {
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OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
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OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ASN1PARSE, OPT_HEXDUMP,
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OPT_RSA_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_SSL, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931,
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OPT_RSA_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931,
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OPT_SIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT,
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OPT_PUBIN, OPT_CERTIN, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_KEYFORM,
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OPT_R_ENUM, OPT_PROV_ENUM
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@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ const OPTIONS rsautl_options[] = {
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OPT_SECTION("Output"),
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{"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
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{"ssl", OPT_SSL, '-', "Use SSL v2 padding"},
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{"raw", OPT_RSA_RAW, '-', "Use no padding"},
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{"pkcs", OPT_PKCS, '-', "Use PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (default)"},
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{"x931", OPT_X931, '-', "Use ANSI X9.31 padding"},
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@ -123,9 +122,6 @@ int rsautl_main(int argc, char **argv)
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case OPT_OAEP:
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pad = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
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break;
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case OPT_SSL:
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pad = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
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break;
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case OPT_PKCS:
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pad = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
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break;
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@ -1186,7 +1186,6 @@ static int fix_rsa_padding_mode(enum state state,
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{
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static const OSSL_ITEM str_value_map[] = {
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{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
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{ RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
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{ RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
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{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" },
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{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $COMMON=rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_pk1.c \
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SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\
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rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
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rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c rsa_ssl.c
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rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c
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IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}]
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SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=rsa_depr.c
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ENDIF
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@ -195,9 +195,6 @@ int ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(RSA *rsa, RSA_ACVP_TEST *test,
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int nbits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
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BN_GENCB *cb);
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int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
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int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
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int flen);
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int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
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int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
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int flen);
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@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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from, flen, NULL, 0,
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NULL, NULL);
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break;
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
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i = ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(rsa->libctx, buf, num, from, flen);
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break;
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#endif
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
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break;
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@ -278,7 +273,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
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break;
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case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
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default:
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
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goto err;
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@ -487,11 +481,6 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
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r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
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break;
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
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r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
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break;
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#endif
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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memcpy(to, buf, (r = j));
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break;
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@ -604,8 +604,6 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
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pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
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} else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) {
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pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
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} else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
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pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
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} else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
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@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "internal/constant_time.h"
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#include "rsa_local.h"
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int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
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int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
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int flen)
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{
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int i, j;
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unsigned char *p;
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if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
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return 0;
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}
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p = (unsigned char *)to;
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*(p++) = 0;
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*(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
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/* pad out with non-zero random data */
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j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen;
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if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, j) <= 0)
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return 0;
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for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
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if (*p == '\0')
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do {
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if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, 1) <= 0)
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return 0;
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} while (*p == '\0');
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p++;
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}
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memset(p, 3, 8);
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p += 8;
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*(p++) = '\0';
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memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
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return 1;
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}
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int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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const unsigned char *from, int flen)
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{
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return ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(NULL, to, tlen, from, flen);
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}
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/*
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* Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
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* if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
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* preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
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*/
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int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
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{
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int i;
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/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
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unsigned char *em = NULL;
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unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
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int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
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if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
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return -1;
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if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
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return -1;
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}
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em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
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if (em == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
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* BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
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* bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
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* in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
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*/
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for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
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mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
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flen -= 1 & mask;
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from -= 1 & mask;
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*--em = *from & mask;
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}
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good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
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good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
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err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
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mask = ~good;
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/* scan over padding data */
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found_zero_byte = 0;
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threes_in_row = 0;
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for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
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unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
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zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
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i, zero_index);
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found_zero_byte |= equals0;
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threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
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threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
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}
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/*
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* PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
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* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
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* also fails.
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*/
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good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
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err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
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RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
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mask = ~good;
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/*
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* Reject if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. Note
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* that RFC5246 incorrectly states this the other way around, i.e. reject
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* if it is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. However this is
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* corrected in subsequent errata for that RFC.
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*/
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good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
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err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
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RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
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mask = ~good;
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/*
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* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
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* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
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*/
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msg_index = zero_index + 1;
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mlen = num - msg_index;
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/*
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* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
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*/
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good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
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err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
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/*
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* Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
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* Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
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* Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
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* Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
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* the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
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* parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
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* length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
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* The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
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*/
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tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
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num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
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for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
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mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
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for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
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em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
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}
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for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
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mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
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to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
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}
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OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, err);
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err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
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return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
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}
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@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ B<pkeyopt> values are supported:
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=item B<rsa_padding_mode:>I<mode>
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This sets the RSA padding mode. Acceptable values for I<mode> are B<pkcs1> for
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PKCS#1 padding, B<sslv23> for SSLv23 padding, B<none> for no padding, B<oaep>
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PKCS#1 padding, B<none> for no padding, B<oaep>
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for B<OAEP> mode, B<x931> for X9.31 mode and B<pss> for PSS.
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In PKCS#1 padding if the message digest is not set then the supplied data is
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@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ B<openssl> B<rsautl>
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[B<-pkcs>]
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[B<-x931>]
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[B<-oaep>]
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[B<-ssl>]
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[B<-raw>]
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[B<-pkcs>]
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[B<-ssl>]
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[B<-raw>]
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[B<-hexdump>]
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[B<-asn1parse>]
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@ -106,12 +102,10 @@ Encrypt the input data using an RSA public key.
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Decrypt the input data using an RSA private key.
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=item B<-pkcs>, B<-oaep>, B<-x931> B<-ssl>, B<-raw>
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=item B<-pkcs>, B<-oaep>, B<-x931> B<-raw>
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The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
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ANSI X9.31,
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special padding used in SSL v2 backwards compatible handshakes,
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or no padding, respectively.
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ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively.
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For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
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=item B<-hexdump>
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@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ terminating NUL byte.
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() sets the RSA padding mode for I<ctx>.
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The I<pad> parameter can take the value B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> for PKCS#1
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padding, B<RSA_SSLV23_PADDING> for SSLv23 padding, B<RSA_NO_PADDING> for
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padding, B<RSA_NO_PADDING> for
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no padding, B<RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING> for OAEP padding (encrypt and
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decrypt only), B<RSA_X931_PADDING> for X9.31 padding (signature operations
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only), B<RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING> (sign and verify only) and
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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1,
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RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2,
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RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP,
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RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1,
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RSA_padding_add_SSLv23, RSA_padding_check_SSLv23,
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RSA_padding_add_none, RSA_padding_check_none - asymmetric encryption
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padding
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@ -48,12 +47,6 @@ L<openssl_user_macros(7)>:
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const unsigned char *p, int pl,
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const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
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int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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const unsigned char *f, int fl);
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int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
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int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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const unsigned char *f, int fl);
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@ -95,10 +88,6 @@ PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 2)
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PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-OAEP
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=item SSLv23
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PKCS #1 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 with SSL-specific modification
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=item none
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simply copy the data
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@ -43,11 +43,6 @@ new applications. SEE WARNING BELOW.
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EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty
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encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
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=item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
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PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes
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that the server is SSL3 capable.
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=item RSA_NO_PADDING
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Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I<only> be used to implement
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@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ The type of padding to be used. Its value can be one of the following:
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=item "pkcs1" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15>)
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=item "sslv23" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23>)
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=item "x931" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931>)
|
||||
|
||||
=item "pss" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS>)
|
||||
|
@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ algorithms:
|
||||
|
||||
The type of padding to be used. The interpretation of this value will depend
|
||||
on the algorithm in use. The default provider understands these RSA padding
|
||||
modes: 1 (RSA_PKCS1_PADDING), 2 (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING), 3 (RSA_NO_PADDING),
|
||||
modes: 1 (RSA_PKCS1_PADDING), 3 (RSA_NO_PADDING),
|
||||
4 (RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING), 5 (RSA_X931_PADDING), 6 (RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) and
|
||||
7 (RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING). See L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(3)> for
|
||||
further details.
|
||||
|
@ -384,7 +384,6 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
/* RSA padding modes */
|
||||
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE "none"
|
||||
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 "pkcs1"
|
||||
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 "sslv23"
|
||||
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP "oaep"
|
||||
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 "x931"
|
||||
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS "pss"
|
||||
|
@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
|
||||
# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
|
||||
|
||||
# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
|
||||
# define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
|
||||
# define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
|
||||
# define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
|
||||
# define RSA_X931_PADDING 5
|
||||
@ -405,13 +404,6 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
int num,
|
||||
const unsigned char *param, int plen,
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
|
||||
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
|
||||
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
|
||||
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
|
||||
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *f, int fl,
|
||||
int rsa_len);
|
||||
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
|
||||
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
|
@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
|
||||
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
|
||||
{ RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
|
||||
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
|
||||
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP }, /* Correct spelling first */
|
||||
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
|
||||
|
@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
|
||||
|
||||
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
|
||||
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
|
||||
{ RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
|
||||
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
|
||||
{ RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
|
||||
{ RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
|
||||
@ -1187,9 +1186,6 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
|
||||
err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
|
||||
goto cont;
|
||||
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
|
||||
err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
|
||||
goto cont;
|
||||
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
|
||||
err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
|
||||
goto cont;
|
||||
|
@ -278,28 +278,6 @@ static int test_rsa_pkcs1(int idx)
|
||||
NULL, NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int test_rsa_sslv23(int idx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Simulate an SSLv2 only client talking to a TLS capable server */
|
||||
ret = test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 1, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Simulate a TLS capable client talking to an SSLv2 only server */
|
||||
ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, 1, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Simulate a TLS capable client talking to a TLS capable server. Should
|
||||
* fail due to detecting a rollback attack.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 0, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int test_rsa_oaep(int idx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
@ -411,7 +389,6 @@ err:
|
||||
int setup_tests(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_pkcs1, 3);
|
||||
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_sslv23, 3);
|
||||
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_oaep, 3);
|
||||
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_security_bit, OSSL_NELEM(rsa_security_bits_cases));
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ EVP_PBE_get 1424 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt 1425 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
CONF_modules_finish 1426 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
BN_value_one 1427 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
RSA_padding_add_SSLv23 1428 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
|
||||
RSA_padding_add_SSLv23 1428 3_0_0 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
|
||||
OCSP_RESPBYTES_it 1429 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
|
||||
EVP_aes_192_wrap 1430 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
OCSP_CERTID_it 1431 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
|
||||
@ -3302,7 +3302,7 @@ PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new 3369 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
EDIPARTYNAME_new 3370 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
CMS_add1_cert 3371 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
|
||||
DSO_convert_filename 3372 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 3373 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
|
||||
RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 3373 3_0_0 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
|
||||
CRYPTO_gcm128_finish 3374 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
PKCS12_SAFEBAGS_it 3375 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
PKCS12_PBE_add 3376 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user