mirror/openssl
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git synced 2025-04-06 20:20:50 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Address non-FP coverity nits

Browse Source 
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26765)
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Dukhovni 2025-02-15 15:57:48 +11:00 committed by Neil Horman
parent fc00d9b7b1
commit afc64c240f
6 changed files with 18 additions and 15 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
apps/dgst.c
View File

@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int do_fp_oneshot_sign(BIO *out, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, BIO *in, int sep, int b
buflen = bio_to_mem(&buf, maxlen, in);
if (buflen <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Read error in %s\n", file);
goto end;
return ret;
}
if (sigin != NULL) {
res = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, sigin, siglen, buf, buflen);

14
crypto/ml_kem/ml_kem.c
View File

@ -1821,8 +1821,7 @@ int ossl_ml_kem_genkey(uint8_t *pubenc, size_t publen, ML_KEM_KEY *key)
return 0;
vinfo = key->vinfo;
if ((pubenc != NULL && publen != vinfo->pubkey_bytes)
|| (mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
if (pubenc != NULL && publen != vinfo->pubkey_bytes)
return 0;
if (ossl_ml_kem_have_seed(key)) {
@ -1834,6 +1833,9 @@ int ossl_ml_kem_genkey(uint8_t *pubenc, size_t publen, ML_KEM_KEY *key)
return 0;
}
if ((mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* Data derived from (d, z) defaults secret, and to avoid side-channel
* leaks should not influence control flow.
@ -1872,14 +1874,14 @@ int ossl_ml_kem_encap_seed(uint8_t *ctext, size_t clen,
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
int ret = 0;
if (!ossl_ml_kem_have_pubkey(key))
if (key == NULL || !ossl_ml_kem_have_pubkey(key))
return 0;
vinfo = key->vinfo;
if (ctext == NULL || clen != vinfo->ctext_bytes
|| shared_secret == NULL || slen != ML_KEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES
|| entropy == NULL || elen != ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES
|| key == NULL || (mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|| (mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* Data derived from the encap entropy defaults secret, and to avoid
@ -1953,8 +1955,8 @@ int ossl_ml_kem_decap(uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t slen,
if (shared_secret == NULL || slen != ML_KEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES
|| ctext == NULL || clen != vinfo->ctext_bytes
|| (mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
RAND_bytes_ex(key->libctx, shared_secret,
ML_KEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES, vinfo->secbits);
(void)RAND_bytes_ex(key->libctx, shared_secret,
ML_KEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES, vinfo->secbits);
return 0;
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_CONSTANT_TIME_VALIDATION)

3
providers/implementations/keymgmt/ml_kem_kmgmt.c
View File

@ -690,13 +690,14 @@ static void *ml_kem_gen(void *vgctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
PROV_ML_KEM_GEN_CTX *gctx = vgctx;
ML_KEM_KEY *key;
uint8_t *nopub = NULL;
uint8_t *seed = gctx->seed;
uint8_t *seed;
int genok = 0;
if (gctx == NULL
|| (gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) ==
OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY)
return NULL;
seed = gctx->seed;
key = ml_kem_new(gctx->provctx, gctx->propq, gctx->evp_type);
if (key == NULL)
return NULL;

3
providers/implementations/keymgmt/mlx_kmgmt.c
View File

@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static void *mlx_kem_gen(void *vgctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
{
PROV_ML_KEM_GEN_CTX *gctx = vgctx;
MLX_KEY *key;
char *propq = gctx->propq;
char *propq;
if (gctx == NULL
|| (gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) ==
@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void *mlx_kem_gen(void *vgctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
return NULL;
/* Lose ownership of propq */
propq = gctx->propq;
gctx->propq = NULL;
if ((key = mlx_kem_key_new(gctx->evp_type, gctx->libctx, propq)) == NULL)
return NULL;

7
ssl/t1_lib.c
View File

@ -999,11 +999,10 @@ int tls1_get0_implemented_groups(int min_proto_version, int max_proto_version,
int ret = 0;
size_t ix;
if ((collect = sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_new(tls_group_ix_cmp)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (grps == NULL || out == NULL)
return 0;
if ((collect = sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_new(tls_group_ix_cmp)) == NULL)
return 0;
for (ix = 0; ix < num; ++ix, ++grps) {
if (grps->mintls > 0 && max_proto_version > 0
&& grps->mintls > max_proto_version)
@ -1030,7 +1029,7 @@ int tls1_get0_implemented_groups(int min_proto_version, int max_proto_version,
if (sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(out, gix->grp->tlsname) <= 0)
goto end;
}
return 1;
ret = 1;
end:
sk_TLS_GROUP_IX_pop_free(collect, free_wrapper);

4
test/ml_dsa_test.c
View File

@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_gen_key(const char *alg,
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx), 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params), 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey), 1))
goto err;
err:
pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return pkey;
}