Shorten some symbol names

VMS C doesn't allow symbols longer than 31 characters.  We do the
automatic shortening with the library files, but not otherwise (to
make sure to work the VMS C magic).

For consistency, I shortened other similar symbols in the same manner.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Richard Levitte 2016-06-14 00:44:29 +02:00
parent 35096e912c
commit a8c82fa00f

View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ typedef struct handshake_ex_data {
static int ex_data_idx;
static void info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static void info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
}
}
static int servername_callback(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
static int servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
{
const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
if (servername != NULL && !strcmp(servername, "server2")) {
@ -58,25 +58,25 @@ static int servername_callback(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
static int verify_reject_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
return 0;
}
static int verify_accept_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
return 1;
}
static int broken_session_ticket_callback(SSL* s, unsigned char* key_name, unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL* s, unsigned char* key_name, unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
{
return 0;
}
static int do_not_call_session_ticket_callback(SSL* s, unsigned char* key_name,
unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL* s, unsigned char* key_name,
unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
{
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
{
switch (test_ctx->client_verify_callback) {
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL:
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_callback,
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb,
NULL);
break;
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL:
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_callback,
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb,
NULL);
break;
default:
@ -106,17 +106,17 @@ static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
}
/* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
/*
* The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the
* session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second
* session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked
*/
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx, do_not_call_session_ticket_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx, do_not_call_session_ticket_cb);
if (test_ctx->session_ticket_expected == SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_BROKEN) {
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_callback);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb);
}
}
@ -285,8 +285,8 @@ HANDSHAKE_RESULT do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(client, ex_data_idx,
&client_ex_data) == 1);
SSL_set_info_callback(server, &info_callback);
SSL_set_info_callback(client, &info_callback);
SSL_set_info_callback(server, &info_cb);
SSL_set_info_callback(client, &info_cb);
/*
* Half-duplex handshake loop.