EVP: don't touch the lock for evp_pkey_downgrade

This commit tries to address a locking issue in evp_pkey_reset_unlocked
which can occur when it is called from evp_pkey_downgrade.

evp_pkey_downgrade will acquire a lock for pk->lock and if successful
then call evp_pkey_reset_unlocked. evp_pkey_reset_unlocked will call
memset on pk, and then create a new lock and set pk->lock to point to
that new lock. I believe there are two problems with this.

The first is that after the call to memset, another thread would try to
acquire a lock for NULL as that is what the value of pk->lock would be
at that point.

The second issue is that after the new lock has been assigned to
pk->lock, that lock is different from the one currently locked so
another thread trying to acquire the lock will succeed which can lead to
strange behaviour. More details and a reproducer can be found in the
Refs link below.

This changes the evp_pkey_reset_unlocked to not touch the lock
and the creation of a new lock is done in EVP_PKEY_new.

Refs:
https://github.com/danbev/learning-libcrypto/blob/master/notes/issues.md#openssl-investigationtroubleshooting
https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/29817

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13374)
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Bevenius 2020-11-11 05:23:11 +01:00 committed by Tomas Mraz
parent 2b407d0508
commit 8dc34b1f57

View File

@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppub)
/*
* This reset function must be used very carefully, as it literally throws
* away everything in an EVP_PKEY without freeing them, and may cause leaks
* of memory, locks, what have you.
* of memory, what have you.
* The only reason we have this is to have the same code for EVP_PKEY_new()
* and evp_pkey_downgrade().
*/
@ -1354,17 +1354,21 @@ static int evp_pkey_reset_unlocked(EVP_PKEY *pk)
if (pk == NULL)
return 0;
memset(pk, 0, sizeof(*pk));
if (pk->lock != NULL) {
const size_t offset = (unsigned char *)&pk->lock - (unsigned char *)pk;
memset(pk, 0, offset);
memset((unsigned char *)pk + offset + sizeof(pk->lock),
0,
sizeof(*pk) - offset - sizeof(pk->lock));
}
/* EVP_PKEY_new uses zalloc so no need to call memset if pk->lock is NULL */
pk->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
pk->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
pk->references = 1;
pk->save_parameters = 1;
pk->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (pk->lock == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
@ -1380,6 +1384,12 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
if (!evp_pkey_reset_unlocked(ret))
goto err;
ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (ret->lock == NULL) {
EVPerr(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EVP_PKEY, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@ -1880,7 +1890,6 @@ int evp_pkey_copy_downgraded(EVP_PKEY **dest, const EVP_PKEY *src)
int evp_pkey_downgrade(EVP_PKEY *pk)
{
EVP_PKEY tmp_copy; /* Stack allocated! */
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *tmp_lock = NULL; /* Temporary lock */
int rv = 0;
if (!ossl_assert(pk != NULL))
@ -1908,12 +1917,9 @@ int evp_pkey_downgrade(EVP_PKEY *pk)
if (evp_pkey_reset_unlocked(pk)
&& evp_pkey_copy_downgraded(&pk, &tmp_copy)) {
/* Grab the temporary lock to avoid lock leak */
tmp_lock = pk->lock;
/* Restore the common attributes, then empty |tmp_copy| */
pk->references = tmp_copy.references;
pk->lock = tmp_copy.lock; /* |pk| now owns THE lock */
pk->attributes = tmp_copy.attributes;
pk->save_parameters = tmp_copy.save_parameters;
pk->ex_data = tmp_copy.ex_data;
@ -1945,16 +1951,10 @@ int evp_pkey_downgrade(EVP_PKEY *pk)
evp_pkey_free_it(&tmp_copy);
rv = 1;
} else {
/* Grab the temporary lock to avoid lock leak */
tmp_lock = pk->lock;
/* Restore the original key */
*pk = tmp_copy; /* |pk| now owns THE lock */
*pk = tmp_copy;
}
/* Free the temporary lock. It should never be NULL */
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(tmp_lock);
end:
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock))
return 0;