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Allow oversized buffers for provider cipher IV fetch

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When we're fetching an IV, there's no need to enforce that the
provided buffer is exactly the same size as the IV we want to
write into it.  This might happen, for example, when
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst() passes sizeof(ctx->iv) (that is,
EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) for an AES-GCM cipher that uses a shorter IV.
AES-OCB and CCM were also affected.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12039)
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Kaduk 2020-06-01 12:31:55 -07:00 committed by Benjamin Kaduk
parent 320d96a32c
commit 7cc5e0d283
3 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions

2
providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_ocb.c

@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int aes_ocb_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV);
if (p != NULL) {
if (ctx->base.ivlen != p->data_size) {
if (ctx->base.ivlen > p->data_size) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
return 0;
}

2
providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_ccm.c

@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int ccm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV);
if (p != NULL) {
if (ccm_get_ivlen(ctx) != p->data_size) {
if (ccm_get_ivlen(ctx) > p->data_size) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IVLEN);
return 0;
}

2
providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c

@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
if (p != NULL) {
if (ctx->iv_gen != 1 && ctx->iv_gen_rand != 1)
return 0;
if (ctx->ivlen != p->data_size) {
if (ctx->ivlen > p->data_size) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
return 0;
}