2
0
mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git synced 2025-04-24 20:51:14 +08:00

statem: always save sigalgs during PHA

We use the same extension-parsing function on server and client
for convenience, but while the server might worry about tracking
what was previously received and not overwriting it, on the client
receiving a request for post-handshake authentication, we always
want to use the values from the current extension (and should
always have a new session object that we are free to mutate).

It is somewhat unclear whether the server also needs the check
for a resumed connection; it appears to have been added back in
2015 in commit 062178678f5374b09f00d70796f6e692e8775aca as part
of a broad pass to handle extensions on resumption, but without
specific documentation of each extension's handling.

Fixes: 

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24651)

(cherry picked from commit ddd99d52d30e2fdae08f9684947cba45ce53898b)
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Kaduk 2024-06-14 14:10:39 -07:00 committed by Tomas Mraz
parent 3fb15ea0dd
commit 6db6c61131

@ -288,7 +288,13 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
/*
* We use this routine on both clients and servers, and when clients
* get asked for PHA we need to always save the sigalgs regardless
* of whether it was a resumption or not.
*/
if ((!s->server || (s->server && !s->hit))
&& !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
@ -307,7 +313,13 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
/*
* We use this routine on both clients and servers, and when clients
* get asked for PHA we need to always save the sigalgs regardless
* of whether it was a resumption or not.
*/
if ((!s->server || (s->server && !s->hit))
&& !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}