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Sanity check PVK file fields.
PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption. However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not significant. Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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@ -119,6 +119,10 @@ static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r)
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# define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL
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/* Salt length for PVK files */
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# define PVK_SALTLEN 0x10
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/* Maximum length in PVK header */
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# define PVK_MAX_KEYLEN 102400
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/* Maximum salt length */
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# define PVK_MAX_SALTLEN 10240
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static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in,
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unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
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@ -608,6 +612,9 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
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*psaltlen = read_ledword(&p);
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*pkeylen = read_ledword(&p);
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if (*pkeylen > PVK_MAX_KEYLEN || *psaltlen > PVK_MAX_SALTLEN)
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return 0;
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if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) {
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PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER);
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return 0;
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