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Resolve a TODO(RECLAYER) in the SSLv3 code
We remove some code outside of the record layer which is no longer relevant since its functions are now performed by the new record layer code. This removes a TODO(RECLAYER) as a result. Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18132)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell
parent
4564b47d75
commit
51ccad3f40
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "../ssl_local.h"
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#include <openssl/trace.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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@ -611,21 +612,6 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me: now declared in
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* ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h
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*/
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char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
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int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
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unsigned char *md_out,
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size_t *md_out_size,
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const unsigned char *header,
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const unsigned char *data,
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size_t data_size,
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size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
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const unsigned char *mac_secret,
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size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
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int n_ssl3_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
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int sending)
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{
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@ -635,16 +621,18 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
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size_t md_size;
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size_t npad;
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int t;
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unsigned int md_size_u;
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EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
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if (sending) {
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mac_sec = &(sc->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
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seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&sc->rlayer);
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hash = sc->write_hash;
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} else {
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mac_sec = &(sc->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
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seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&sc->rlayer);
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hash = sc->read_hash;
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}
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/*
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* All read record layer operations should have been moved to the new
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* record layer code
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*/
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assert(sending);
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mac_sec = &(sc->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
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seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&sc->rlayer);
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hash = sc->write_hash;
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t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
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if (t < 0)
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@ -652,77 +640,34 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
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md_size = t;
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npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
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if (!sending
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&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(sc->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
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&& ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
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#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
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/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
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md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (md_ctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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#else
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/*
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* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
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* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
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* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
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*/
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/*-
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* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
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* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
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*
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* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
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* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
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* total size.
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*/
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unsigned char header[75];
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size_t j = 0;
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memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
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j += md_size;
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memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
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j += npad;
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memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
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j += 8;
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header[j++] = rec->type;
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header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
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header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
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/* Final param == is SSLv3 */
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if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
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md, &md_size,
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header, rec->input,
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rec->length, rec->orig_len,
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mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
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return 0;
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#endif
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} else {
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unsigned int md_size_u;
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/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
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EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (md_ctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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rec_char = rec->type;
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p = md;
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s2n(rec->length, p);
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if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
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|| EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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rec_char = rec->type;
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p = md;
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s2n(rec->length, p);
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if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
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|| EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
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ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
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return 1;
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}
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@ -743,13 +688,14 @@ int tls1_mac_old(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
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int t;
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int ret = 0;
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if (sending) {
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seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&sc->rlayer);
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hash = sc->write_hash;
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} else {
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seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&sc->rlayer);
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hash = sc->read_hash;
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}
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/*
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* All read record layer calls should have been moved to the new record
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* layer.
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*/
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assert(sending);
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seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&sc->rlayer);
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hash = sc->write_hash;
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t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
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if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
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@ -789,21 +735,6 @@ int tls1_mac_old(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
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header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
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header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
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if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(sc)
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&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(sc->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
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&& ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
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OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
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&rec->orig_len);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
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tls_hmac_params)) {
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goto end;
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}
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}
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if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
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